by Capt Robert J. Muise

Two articles in the October issue-those by Maj Philip E. Knobel and Maj Robert S. Trout-criticize FMFM-1, Warfighting and call for its revision. I disagree with the basic premise of both articles. What FMFM 1 does not provide, and rightly so, are formulas for success, formulas for task organization or force structure, and details for weapons and equipment procurement. The bottom line is that there is no bottom line.” What I find interesting is the difficulty that many Marines have with this concept. Also, interestingly enough, from my experience as a teacher in the Marine Corps University, lieutenants have the least difficulty grasping the basic tenets of Warfighting.

Maj Trout praises the Army for its me of FM 100-5 as a “doctonal template” because it was capable of “engineering a tactical success into a deep operational turning movement to meet its mandated strategic goal.” When considering the commander’s intent and the focus of effort, which were aimed at the Republican Guards (a stated center of gravity), a close examination of the “successful” turning movement clearly demonstrated that it was too slow, too shallow, and ultimately 0indecisive. As was the case with counterinsurgency, the Army again appears to have had difficulty understanding the requirements and demands of its own doctrine.

The greatest failure of FMFM 1, in my opinion, is that it assumes that the Marine Corps’ “culture” is capable of changing. The Corps’ fondness for systems and processes and its “this is the way we do it” attitude are formidable institutional barriers to the acceptance of FMFM 1. FMFM 1 requires Marines to think “outside of the box.” Maj Trout’s comment about the tailings of FMFM 1 to provide guidance on weapons procurement is just such an example.

FMFM 1 requires Marines to seek creative solutions to unique problems through innovative ideas and actions. These ideas and actions are to be nurtured at the lowest level-those closest to the problem. Initiative is coordinated through the commander’s intent. The criteria for success is decisiveness. FMFM 1 also demands that we consider the enemy’s perspective. This “outward” focus is extremely difficult for us to adopt.

Consider the use of the U.S. Army Rangers against a pitifull band of thugs” in Somalia. Rangers are an elite unit, but one bound by their own dogmatic approach and insistence upon established techniques. They proved to be an inappropriate tool and unable to completely focus on the enemy. There is a lesson in this somewhere.

There are those, Martin van Creveld in particular, who are discussing a “fourth generation” of warfare-a generational shift that will pose asymmetrical problems requiring unique, nontraditional solutions. Our present fondness for the “methodical battle” has made it difficult for us to grasp the concepts of maneuver warfare, a third generation approach to warfighting. The obvious question remains: “How can a second generation military adjust to a fourth generation war?” Our difficulty accepting the concepts of FMFM 1, as indicated by these two articles, leaves me with little hope.

by 1stLt William B. Henry

* I think it is important to take FMFM-1, Warfighting for what it is-a simple manual that teaches those of us in the profession of arms that there is more to warfighting than slugging it out with the enemy.

In order to be better warfighters, we need to understand the politico-military realities that dictate military action. We need to learn how to thrive amidst the chaos of a battlefield and use it to our advantage. And above all, we should constandy and consistently reevaluate our combat techniques and tactics to ensure we are the best in our profession!

FMFM-1 is probably the best guidebook for military thought ever published with- in the U.S. military. In remarkably concise terms, it provides a great jumping-off point for further discussion, debate, and planning. Much like the commander’s intent in an operation order, it sets the tone for future and more specific doctrine.

I think it would be a mistake to replace FMFM-1 with a manual that outlines a joint staff planning sequence, “provides guidance for weapons procurement, or dictates a particular force structure” as suggested in the October Gazette. All of these functions are more appropriately dealt with in specialized reference publications.

FMFM-1, Warfighting prescribes an attitude with which to plan and conduct combat operations. Let’s not lose this focus.