

# Marines in War and Peace<sup>★</sup>

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THIS occasion serves to remind us that in spite of natural rivalry between the Army and the Navy and the Marine Corps, we have achieved in this war a notable integration and coordination between the services that has been an important element in our success to date. The Marine Corps, of course, is part of the Navy, but I hope I'm not indulging in wishful thinking when I say that if we were orphans I think the Army would be willing to take us in.

In this connection, it may amuse you to know that in the South Pacific recently, Marines and the Army have been fighting a little war of poetry. One of our men started the affair with a composition called "Our Fighting Men," dedicated, of course, to the soldiers.<sup>1</sup> Here's the way it starts:

"A Marine told his buddy on Guadalcanal  
'The Army is coming, think of it, pal—'  
The Corporal answered him, 'All right, then,  
Let's build a clubhouse for Our Fighting Men.'

"A Seabee rolled up and he asked, 'What's the score?  
The wagons and cruisers all laying off shore?  
And scads of destroyers are sweeping the bay.  
Is the Army finally landing today?'

"Their generals outrank ours, so they'll take command.  
New rules and new orders will govern the land.  
They'll have some M.P.'s to push us around  
When the Army takes over it sure shakes the ground.'

"We can take it,' said the Raider. 'It won't be long  
Til the Admiral bellers, and we'll shove on.  
And a little while later we'll be landing again,  
To make New Guinea safe for Our Fighting Men.'

I gather that the Army got a little tired of hearing this poem recited by Marines in the area, because before long some unknown soldier genius came up with a reply titled "Well, Whose Marines?" This really is a great tribute to the Corps. I'll give you one verse:

"We want him to be cocky, he's welcome to his pride.  
They scratch him off the muster right at the warship's side.  
He makes the contact for us—that's what it's all about—  
The Navy dumps him in there. The Army gets him out."

Then it ends:

"We do not heed the yapping—we go our way serene,  
For we are in his Army, and he is our Marine!"

THANKS to the training of the men in all branches of the service, and to the teamwork between the branches, we have carried the war today to a point where we can see

certain victory ahead. It may be a long time coming, and it may be costly to achieve, and certainly we have no right to take things easy or indulge in self-congratulations. But I think we are entitled to look back briefly on what we have done in the last three years and take stock. The strides we have made have been a rude shock to our enemies, and ought to be a source of gratification to ourselves. In retrospect, the tasks and the accomplishments of these three years have been truly herculean. Three years ago, we still were a nation at peace—not only in fact, but in our attitudes and our way of life. Many believed that somehow this all-engulfing war would pass us by, and that we had no real reason to fight at all. Our Army consisted of 257,655 officers and men. Our Navy numbered 157,986 officers and men, and our Marine Corps had 26,801 officers and men. Our production of tanks, guns, military vehicles, munitions and other military supplies was practically nil. We were making some aircraft of excellent quality, but numerically the output was small compared to that of other nations.

No wonder the Axis was disdainful of us as a potential enemy! For ten years, more or less, the dictator nations had concentrated all their energies and resources on building their war machine, while we were living in a dream world. Hitler and company sneered at us—a soft, weak, "decadent" democracy, without the will or power to fight even if the war was thrust on us. And for a time it looked to much of the outside world as if he might be right. Many men in many nations believed that the Axis was invincible, and that the free peoples of the democracies indeed were doomed.

But during our history we Americans more than a few times have proved that we can do what seemed impossible. In the short space of three years we have built an Army of more than 7,000,000. Our Navy now has 2,000,000 men and thirteen times the number of fighting ships we had in 1940, despite considerable losses in the interim. Our Marine Corps has expanded to a body of over 300,000 of as well-equipped, as highly-trained fighting men as any in the world. As we all know today, the conversion of industry from peacetime to wartime production, and the subsequent production of war goods, will stand as one of the great epics of our national life. We now have the greatest merchant marine in the world, an air fleet that dwarfs that of any other nation, and unlimited quantities of munitions and other equipment. Furthermore, in nearly every category our production still mounts steadily. We have created, in three short years, one of the world's greatest military powers.

The mere recital of these figures and these gains is impressive enough, but they do not begin to convey an idea of the almost overwhelming difficulties that have been surmounted, the incredible amount of planning that has been

<sup>★</sup>A Navy Day address delivered at a Navy League dinner in New York, October 27, 1943.

<sup>1</sup>See THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, July, 1943, page 59.

necessary. Reflect for a moment that a single Marine division requires 20,039 small arms weapons, 1133 machine guns, 162 pieces of artillery, 54 tanks, 557 "jeeps," and many trucks, trailers, and engineer vehicles. This division requires 13 ships, each of 10,000 tons, for an overseas movement.

A single squadron of dive bombers must have 18 planes. In a single day's operations this squadron will use 36 1000-pound bombs, and 11,160 gallons of gasoline and oil. When sent overseas a single squadron occupies the cargo and troop spaces of a 10,000-ton ship.

So that our forces can strike with maximum power and effectiveness, all these and a multitude of other supplies must be available in the right place at the right time. Furthermore, every man who fights and uses these supplies represents at least six months of training, and an investment of over \$750 to turn him into a hard, able fighting man.

The creation of this great power of ours could not have been accomplished if it had not been for the fact that during the years of peace we maintained, in the Army, Navy, and Marines, a corps of experts, military executives and planners, who were ready, when the call came, to start the tremendous job of building our war machine from virtually nothing. These military experts were matched, in civilian life, by the production geniuses of assembly line, turret lathe, mine, field and forest. Together these two groups have saved America in one of her most critical hours. Together they have given the lie to those who proclaimed that our democracy was too lazy to work and too soft to fight. *Of course* we have made mistakes, both on the home front and in the actual prosecution of the war. But on the whole, this gigantic effort has been made, and these vast goals reached, with efficiency.

So when I read remote-control strategy in the newspaper columns, or hear dinner table discussions of why we don't do this, that, or the other thing, I am reminded of a speech by a Roman consul which the historian Livy recorded more than two thousand years ago. Speaking of a current war against Macedonia, this consul said:

"In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia, who know where the camp ought to be placed, what posts ought to be occupied by troops, when and through what pass Macedonia should be entered . . . how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea, and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet . . . I am not one of those who think that commanders ought never to receive advice, on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who did everything of his own single judgment. . . . If therefore, anyone thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct . . . let him not refuse his assistance to the State, but let him come with me to Macedonia." I highly recommend Livy to all who think that they can direct the war by sticking pins in maps thousands of miles from the fighting fronts.

This war is unlike any other in history, not only on account of its scope but also the nature of the fighting. It is the first war in which landings and amphibious operations have played so vital a part, most previous wars having been fought on land exclusively. Landing operations are,

of course, the most difficult of all military maneuvers, and have so been acknowledged by all authorities throughout history. By the same token, they also are apt to be the most costly of all operations.

GENERAL JAMES WOLFE, who won fame in his attack at the landing in Quebec in 1759, was himself the son of a Royal Marine Officer. As a postmaster of amphibious warfare, he once described the hazards—as well as the importance—of landing operations, as follows:

"I have found out that an Admiral should endeavor to run into an enemy's port immediately after he appears before it; that he should reconnoiter and observe it as quickly as possible, and lose no time in getting the troops on shore. Experience shows me that, in an affair depending on vigor and despatch, the generals should settle their plan of operations so that no time may be lost in idle debate and consultations when the sword should be drawn; that pushing on smartly is the road to success, and more particularly so in an affair of this sort; that nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to your undertaking which is not found really so on trial; that in war something must be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing that it is in its nature hazardous and an option of difficulties; that the greatness of an object should come under consideration, opposed to the impediments that lie in the way; that the honor of one's country is to have some weight; and that, in particular circumstances and times, the loss of a thousand men is rather an advantage to a nation than otherwise."

The U. S. Marine Corps always has had a predilection for this kind of amphibious fighting. The Marine Corps history dates back to 1775, a year before the Declaration of Independence, the first service authorized by the Continental Congress. For nearly one hundred and seventy years, Marines have been specializing in amphibious warfare, and I believe the Corps has fought more continuously than any other service. We conducted landing operations during the Civil War, and again during the Spanish-American War. The Marines landed at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. They landed in Haiti, and Nicaragua, and at other places in Latin America and the Caribbean. They landed in China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. Always, when trouble required the presence of United States forces, the Marines were first on the scene. This has given the Corps its great background of practical experience, and also has led to the development of a unique *esprit de corps*.

There is a notion in some quarters that a Marine is primarily a roughneck with tremendous fighting ability and unlimited courage.

Well, we have seen his courage and his fighting ability at Guadalcanal and Wake Island and a score of other places in this war. But what the public sometimes forgets or overlooks is the fact that the individual Marine is an expert in his particular specialty. As a strategic force we obviously do not compare in size with either the Army or Navy. We are not big enough to fight whole wars by ourselves. But what we lack in size, we make up in experience and specialized knowledge. In spite of our growth we are still a highly specialized service trained especially for amphibious operations.

**M**ARINES for the most part join the Corps voluntarily. Because of the comparatively small number of Marines, every man receives the most thorough and intensive training possible. I believe this training is unmatched. No soldier is better equipped, better fed, better doctored and better cared for. It also is true that in the course of training the men develop a rather special feeling about themselves as Marines, and a special feeling—call it pride if you will—about the service. They think of themselves as a group apart, and they are jealous of the standing and organizational independence of the Corps. They are trained to work as independent units in perfect coordination with the Navy, and when occasion requires it, with the Army.

The Marine emerges from his training with a high degree of individual initiative. The true Marine isn't cocky, as he sometimes is made out to be, but he is self-confident, with the self-confidence that comes with knowing you have learned your job well. I recall one Marine who told me that his training had changed his whole outlook on life, by giving him a feeling of confidence in himself for the first time. And this feeling of confidence and individual initiative is something which Marine training deliberately instills in the men.

The type of operations in which we specialize often demands in modern warfare that men working in small units or alone be able to carry on independently. Marines know how to improvise and are taught how to survive and fight in any circumstances when the occasion requires it, without benefit of the rule book or orders from a commanding officer. This kind of fighting by individuals or small combat units operating independently is not confined exclusively to the Marines. We see the same thing in aerial and tank warfare, for example, and it is one of the most important developments in modern war. Today the unit, the individual, the picked specialist is of greater importance than ever before. And the Marine Corps ever since its formation in 1775 has concentrated on producing just such specialists, just such individualists.

Our chief assignment during the last twenty years has been to perfect the most modern techniques of amphibious warfare and to develop an amphibious expeditionary force of specialists of the kind I have described.

In this period we endlessly studied the practical and theoretical aspects of landing operations, and have analyzed the causes of success and failure of such operations in the past—Gallipoli and the German landings in the Baltic Islands in 1917, to mention two. As early as 1924 a force of Marines participated in combined amphibious training exercises with our fleet at Panama, and from 1931 to 1938 such exercises were held regularly in the Caribbean and at Hawaii.

Our Marine Corps Schools made the initial studies on combat unit loading, naval gunfire support, and the offensive use of chemicals in an amphibious operation. Out of our experience we developed the indispensable rubber boat, and applied to our special use the amphibian tractor. Any new weapon or new method which might be useful in our specialized operations was thoroughly tested. Nothing was rejected simply because it had never been tried before and might upset established ways of doing things.

Many years ago, while controversy raged over the value

of the airplane and the proper military and naval use of airpower, the Marine Corps was quietly conducting its own experiments, and was learning to employ planes which took off from carriers and came down on land as air support and as a means of *supplying* ground troops. Like all other parts of the whole, our air has been integrated and coordinated as an important member of a team. In passing, I might mention that the words of the Marine anthem recently have been changed to read . . . "We fight our country's battles, in the *air*, on land, on sea."

**I**N the twenty years of training and experimentation that I have mentioned we have developed the finest force of its kind in the world, and one which has already played a crucial rôle in this war. Marine operations to date in the Pacific have been of the utmost importance, but these operations have been small compared to what will come. It won't be long before our forces are spearheading invasions on a grander scale. The action of the Marines on Guadalcanal has a special significance which is probably not generally recognized. It was our country's first successful land offensive in this war, and I have no doubt the reason the Japanese continued to come back and back, was because it was the first time in their history they were forced to give up territory under the control of their sacred emperor.

But the contribution of the Marine Corps to date transcends the actual fighting which we have done. Just as individual Marines during their training learn to be members of a team, each with a special part and each having the responsibility for initiative, so the Marine Corps as a whole has played its part in the larger team composed of Army, Navy, and Marines. When war was imminent, we were able quickly to give the benefits of our training to the Army and Navy. Thus it has been possible in record time to train huge forces of men to become proficient in this most highly skilled branch of military science. The landing operations in Africa, Europe, and the Aleutians contained officers and men who received this Marine training—a fact which should help silence those who complain of lack of cooperation between the services. This has been, I believe, the great contribution of the Corps, above and beyond the heroic performance of our men in combat.

Thanks to those men, victory has been brought closer, perhaps by years. As I said before, it still may be far distant in time, but it is not too soon to be giving thought to what we shall do after it finally is won. When the last war ended, the nation demobilized as quickly as it had armed a few years earlier. Understandably in a peaceful country, there was a widespread popular revulsion against war and everything connected with it, including the services. For many years the Army and Navy were kept at the bare minimum of strength, and were begrudged funds necessary to develop new equipment. Now, the last thing any of us wants to see is the United States converted into a militaristic state, forever committed to maintaining huge standing forces. But I believe that after this war, we cannot afford to allow ourselves to drift into the same state of mind—and state of woeful unpreparedness—as after the last war. Hating and fearing war as much as we did, we actually invited it by refusing to maintain our strength and

to assert it early and often. Who can say whether this war might not have been averted entirely if we had had the might and the courage to say "No" that day in 1937 when the China war began at Lu Kou Chiao, the Marco Polo Bridge, or before, when Mussolini's men marched into Ethiopia? Or when Hitler took Austria? Or at Munich?

Nevertheless, we were able to meet the great emergency of this war mostly because of the courage, zeal, and devotion of those who labored under great handicaps during the years of uneasy and insecure peace. Those men deserve our deepest thanks and respect, and the men who will guard our security in the postwar future likewise will deserve the

respect of the whole nation. It should be regarded as an honor to serve with the armed forces in *peace*—as well as war—an honor that attracts the very highest type of man in the country. Modern war is an infinitely complicated business and we shall need the best brains in the country to direct our military establishments.

In the meantime, however, we still have a war to win. The Marines are again ready—and more than willing—to land anywhere, anytime, and along with the Army and the Navy I am confident that they will exercise an important rôle in spearheading the landings on the main island of Japan.



## Vandegrift's Battle Instructions

**A**DDRESSING Marine officers shortly to lead the attack on Bougainville, Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift asked his listeners to share his faith in the "superior intelligence of American fighting men" by taking "every man of your command, down to the newest private, into your council during battle."

Then directing his second major offensive against the Japs, the veteran Marine leader spoke from a crude platform set up in a coconut grove where, in the fighting a year ago, he had learned some of the lessons he spoke of on this occasion.

"In leading men, your loyalty must reach down to them," General Vandegrift said. "In battle, men require very little. They must have a confidence of fairness and a feeling of team effort. This can be created by letting them know the immediate plan of action and why it has been chosen. A man fights better when he has a sense of the common objective rather than merely a knowledge of how things look from his own foxhole."

Drawing upon his own experience in the battle for Guadalcanal, General Vandegrift said that "time after time" he had seen men carry on when all their leaders had been knocked out, using the knowledge given them in talks and conferences in advance of the action.

"Give your men that knowledge—and enough ammunition, food, and the assurance of medical aid—and they will repay you ten times over," he said.

General Vandegrift reminded his audience, which included every rank from general to lieutenant, that loyalty requires a practical readiness for the responsibilities of leadership. These he described in four points:

- "1. Know your subject.
- "2. Be sure in your own mind that your mission is correct.
- "3. Always believe, no matter how hard the going, that you will come through successfully.
- "4. If you have any doubts of that—damn well keep them to yourself."

Looking toward the projected operations, the Marine

commander reiterated a maxim on which the fighting in this theater is firmly based: "it is not the individual that counts, nor the individual service. It is the Marines, the Navy, the Army, the Coast Guard, and our Allies that matter—all of them—working toward a common interest—victory!"

After giving this message to his officers, General Vandegrift issued the following stirring "Memorandum to All Hands":

### HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS IN THE FIELD

15 October, 1943.

#### MEMORANDUM TO: All Hands.

1. The forward movement of our enemy in the Pacific has been stopped. More recently he has been forced to give up, at great cost in men and material, positions of great value to his campaign. His ships no longer appear in great force in these waters, his aircraft is becoming more cautious, and many of his soldiers and sailors admit that they are no match for us. Nevertheless, he will fight desperately for his last hold in the Solomons.

2. The First Marine Amphibious Corps, composed of fighting men of the United States and of New Zealand, has been chosen to drive him completely out of the Solomons. It will not be an easy task but, as in the past, our squads can give and take punishment better and longer than his squads. This we are prepared to do. Our supporting air and naval forces are prepared to strike him with vastly greater blows than ever before. The first of these blows has already been delivered.

3. It has been my privilege to assume command at this time. The day is set and we are ready. Be alert, and when the enemy appears, shoot calmly, shoot fast, and shoot straight.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Commanding.