

# COMMANDANT'S REPORT





*Statement of the Commandant before the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Appropriations, United States Senate, concerning Fiscal Year 1967 Marine Corps posture. His summation: "Our condition is good."*

**Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr.**

I AM GLAD TO have this opportunity to report to you on the posture of the United States Marine Corps. I propose first to review briefly the operations of the Marine Corps since this time last year. Then, I will report the effect that the tactical commitments have had upon our posture. And I will conclude with an analysis of our position now as we begin our 191st year of service to this Nation.

As you well know, 1965 was a year of action for the Marine Corps. In March, I stated that the Marine Corps was "combat ready" and "prepared to undertake any mission to which our forces may be committed." Within two months the Marine Corps was called upon to prove this statement in two widely separated parts of the globe.

I refer, of course, to the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang, Viet-Nam, in March, and the landing of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the Dominican Republic in April and May. In each instance, the Marines were committed in their classic role—an amphibious landing on a foreign shore in support

of National policy, as directed by the President.

On 28 April 1965, the situation in the Dominican Republic had deteriorated until American lives were being threatened. An amphibious task force with 2300 Marines of the 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit lay over the horizon from Santo Domingo. When the decision to commit American forces was made, 560 Marines landed immediately by helicopter to provide a secure evacuation area. The next day the balance of the Marine Expeditionary Unit landed by air and surface means.

Not only were the Marines the first to arrive, but within 6 days a total of over 8000 Marines of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was landed by sea and air. Their equipment was with them, and they were ready for employment as required. They established, and maintained, an international safety zone.

With other US forces they helped to restore a semblance of law and order within the strife-torn country. They assisted in the evacuation of over 4000 civilians. When the Inter-American Peace

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Force arrived to assume the peace-keeping task, the Marines were withdrawn. The last Marine elements reembarked on the 6th of June.

The Dominican Republic operation was a classic demonstration of amphibious flexibility. We deployed to the vicinity of the potential trouble spot without diplomatic complications before the trouble began; and landed before it had gotten out of hand. When the job was over, our units withdrew, reembarked, and were immediately available for employment elsewhere.

It is most significant that the Dominican Republic operations were conducted at the same time Marine Corps forces were being built up in South Viet-Nam. This re-validates and emphasizes the requirement to continue to maintain the most modern amphibious capability in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Marine Corps support of the Republic of Viet-Nam accelerated rapidly during 1965. In the beginning of last year we had a helicopter squadron and its ground support units in-country, to advise and to provide air transportation for the Vietnamese armed forces. A few Marines were serving on the staff of the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam. Others were in advisory capacities with the Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

On 8 March 1965, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which included the Special Landing Force of the 7th Fleet, began landing at Da Nang. It was given the mission of securing the airfield and other support facilities against Viet Cong attack. Shortly thereafter, an additional Battalion Landing Team was dispatched to Hue/Phu Bai with a similar mission.

On 8 May, another Marine Brigade—the 3rd Marine Amphibious Brigade—landed at Chu Lai to seize and defend a new airfield site. Utilizing new techniques developed by the Navy and Marine Corps, the Marines and Seabees constructed an expeditionary airfield on extremely difficult, sandy soil in less than one month.

In May 1965, all Marine units in the northern, or I Corps, area were placed under the Headquarters of the III Marine Amphibious Force. The Commanding General also was designated as the Commander of the Naval Component of the Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam. Included in that Marine Amphibious Force are aviation units, artillery, tanks, engineers, and other hard-working support units.

Our pattern of operations within the Marine Corps area of responsibility has been, in effect, an extension of US sea power ashore—into a series of coastal strongpoints along the resource-rich and populous coastal plain of South Viet-Nam. By a combination of aggressive day and night military action, complemented by a dynamic program of civic action designed to improve the social

and economic lot of the long-suffering Vietnamese people, the hold of the Viet Cong over the countryside is being broken.

As our in-country forces have increased, so has the tempo of our military operations.

However, successful military operations alone will not achieve our ultimate national goals in South Viet-Nam. Although initially we search and clear the villages of Viet Cong, our ultimate objective is to help reconstitute and train local forces so these villages may protect themselves, and to help institute a program of social reconstruction which will improve the welfare of the long-suffering inhabitants. So an essential complement to our military operations is our effort to win the people. Our success in this endeavor is perhaps best measured by the fact that we are often able to locate the Viet Cong because of information supplied by the villagers, who no longer fear revenge. We identify this complementary effort as our Civic Action program.

This program has provided food, shelter, clothing, medical attention, relocation, schools, wells, churches, and tools for the population. Our military presence has provided a measure of security, a degree of freedom and an element of hope which the civilians within our area have not enjoyed in 20 years.

In addition to those Marine forces which are committed to Viet-Nam, the Marine Corps has had to maintain, continuously, highly mobile forces for use in other contingency operations. Including the Special Landing Force with the Seventh Fleet which has been repeatedly employed in Viet-Nam—we have maintained forces deployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific, another segment of a Division/Wing Team in the Hawaii/California area, and a full Division/Wing Team in or near the Atlantic ocean. At least two-ninths of this Atlantic Division/Wing Team is always deployed in the Caribbean and Mediterranean areas.

During 1965, the increasing tempo of our operations in Viet-Nam, combined with our requirement to maintain a ready contingency posture in other areas of the world, exerted considerable strain upon our manpower resources.

In August the Secretary of Defense authorized the Marine Corps a temporary increase of 30,000 to our previously approved FY66 end strength of 193,000, making a total temporarily authorized end strength of 223,000 men. With this increase we were able to support additional units in Viet-Nam, to bring our total in-country strength to 42,000.

As 1965 drew to a close, we anticipated a possible need for additional forces in South Viet-Nam, based upon a revised estimate of hard-core Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars in that country. In order to meet the Marine Corps force goals in-country, and to maintain our contingency posture throughout the rest of the world,

we were authorized an additional temporary increase to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 1967. With this latest authorization, it is anticipated that our in-country strength will also rise. By that time, we will have added a fourth division to our active forces.

In order to achieve the FY67 end strengths and to meet the schedule of approved force levels it has been necessary to program for these forces and for their equipment during this last half of FY 1966.

Achieving these force levels will present problems. Moreover, there are some rather rigid constraints which we shall have to live with during this period of accelerated growth. Long lead time required for aircraft and certain major items of material to equip this force is one. The training time necessary to produce technical specialists for it is another.

To support these increasing combat commitments, our enlarged training base, and to maintain our uncommitted units in the highest possible state of readiness for other possible contingencies, our request for Operation and Maintenance Funds has been increased. An appropriation of \$325.6 million is required for these purposes in fiscal year 1967.

We are still maintaining the Marine Corps Reserve as our ready mobilization capability. With an authorized ready reserve strength of 48,000, our Reserve contains the trained men and units for an additional Division/Wing Team. Any grade or MOS shortages that may exist can be rectified by selective recall of prior service reservists. Except for the availability of certain aircraft, this team is in a high state of readiness, capable of mobilizing rapidly, should the need be demonstrated.

To maintain this capability of our Reserve at its authorized strength of 48,000 officers and men during fiscal year 1967, we are including a request for \$36.5 million in this year's budget.

There can be no doubt that the tempo of Marine Corps operations during 1965 and the force level increases to which we are committed during 1966 have had and will continue to have profound effects upon the Marine Corps. Obviously the manpower implications will be significant. There will be logistic and material implications as well. New equipment has been needed and the rates of attrition of old equipment have increased. There has also been a large increase in our consumption of supplies, particularly combat supplies. I will briefly assess the specific effects that these increased deployments and operations and our large-scale activation of new units have had upon our posture.

To achieve the manpower increase we have instituted several specific actions.

First, during the initial stages of our buildup, it was necessary to retain certain highly skilled

personnel, both officer and enlisted, for a period of time beyond their normal obligations. This reduced our attrition and provided a stable base upon which to build.

Second, we urged reservists—especially those with critical skills—to remain on, or apply for, extended active duty. Their response has been heartening.

Third, we increased our recruiting effort. In the buildup of our initial increment of 30,000, we resorted to draft calls only for the month of November to reach our programmed quota, because our recruiting efforts had been so successful. As we build further toward our ultimate strength, we have had further recourse to the draft, however.

There has been a price which we have had to pay for our added numbers. Standards have been lowered slightly. We have enlisted a higher percentage of non-high school graduates. We have accepted shorter enlistment contracts.

Our high standards of training have not been reduced, however. Our recruit depots still turn out the same fine product. As a temporary measure, we have shortened recruit training to eight weeks by increasing the hours of instruction per week. Recruit training is still designed to develop discipline, physical fitness, marksmanship, pride and a sense of individual responsibility and moral integrity. Upon graduation, recruits continue to undergo individual combat training. This involves small unit tactics, work in the field, and the firing of weapons found in the assault squad.

Infantrymen receive four weeks of this training; other specialties, only two. After individual combat training, new Marines undergo Basic Specialist Training. This training is designed to qualify Marines for their military occupational specialty before they report to their first assignment. Infantry personnel receive two weeks basic specialist training in their field. All others receive four weeks.

In addition, those Marines requiring technical skills training are assigned to formal schools for periods varying from 4 to 37 weeks. Marines destined for the Western Pacific receive an additional two weeks of training specifically oriented to Vietnam; including instruction in booby traps, ambushes, patrolling, the nature of the enemy, Civic Action and theatre orientation.

The increased tempo of deployments to Southeast Asia has generated some policy changes in the assignment of Marine Corps personnel. We have discontinued the rotation of combat ready transplacement battalions and squadrons and reverted to the wartime system of replacement drafts. We have shortened the minimum tour in the United States between overseas tours to six months. More frequent overseas tours, unaccompanied by dependents, will be required.

To summarize our personnel posture, we are

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now building the Marine Corps in size and skills to support our commitments in Southeast Asia and to meet our other world-wide contingency responsibilities. All our personnel actions are oriented to this end. There will be instances of personnel inconvenience and hardship. There will be some shortages of skilled personnel in non-deployed units. However, these circumstances are temporary. Combat experience rapidly develops the small unit leader. Our personnel problems can be solved within the framework of authority already granted, or currently requested of Congress.

However, with the substantial increase in our over-all authorized strength, and in view of the sizable number of Marines who are deployed overseas in combat, without dependents, our request for the appropriation Military Personnel, Marine Corps, must be increased. Our request for fiscal year 1967 is in the amount of \$1,183.2 million. These dollars will provide pay and allowances for all our Marines, and will fund the combat pay and family separation allowances due those who will be deployed in Viet-Nam. We know that these families bear a large share of the burden of maintaining forces in readiness around the world. Dollars alone are not always enough to compensate them.

Let us turn, now, to equipment. Combat in South Viet-Nam has tested the adequacy of the equipment of our troops, both as to types and amounts. We have examined not only the equipment which is organic to the Marine Corps, but that which is used by other services operating in the area. We have also noted the areas where improvements in equipment are possible. Our conclusion is that, in general, the equipment in the hands of the combat Marines is adequate in both types and amounts. However, as we build we will experience some logistic difficulties.

It was our recommendation that these additional force levels be achieved without recourse to the mobilization of our Reserve 4th Division/Wing Team. The recommendation was approved. We are presently completing plans to form another active division and to organize selective new air elements. Planning for organizing and supporting the new units has been premised on the assumption that the Reserve Division/Wing would not be called. Consistent with this premise, we have planned to draw temporarily from certain material assets of the Reserve Division to provision for the new active division. Should future developments dictate the mobilization of our Reservists, also, before their stocks have been reconstituted, some shortages will occur. As we progress toward full activation of our additional active division, these shortages will obviously become more acute. Conversely, early mobilization of the

Reserve Division/Wing Team would result in a commensurate delay in the fifth active division attaining its full capability for combat.

The M-14 rifle has proven itself to be a worthy successor to the old M-1 rifle. However, procurement was limited pending evaluation of other families of small arms weapons systems. In the interim, we are procuring a limited quantity of M-16 rifles. This weapon is considered to be particularly well suited for use in jungle warfare, and may be the answer to our small arms problem in Viet-Nam.

Anti-guerrilla operations revealed a requirement for accurate long-range, aimed rifle fire. Therefore we have armed sniper teams with sniper rifles either procured from the Army or purchased commercially. This has proved satisfactory. However, we hope to procure a better weapon in the near future.

The crew-served weapons organic to our deployed forces have proved adequate,—with one exception. A simple, man-transportable light weight mortar was needed. We therefore reverted to the combat-proved 60mm mortar of World War II vintage to provide this fire power at rifle company level.

Additionally, we have provided Marines with two new items of equipment. One is a seismic intrusion detector—an added security measure to assist in detecting tunneling and infiltration efforts. The other is a miniature, hand-held pyrotechnic signal device, to improve our signalling capability in heavily forested areas. This item is of great value on the small unit level.

We have affirmed the soundness of the combat support equipment that is organic to our Fleet Marine Forces. However, there have been a few instances where modifications to existing allowances have been indicated and implemented. The most significant example is in the motor transport area. We substituted lighter trucks to compensate for the limited bridge capacities and the sub-standard road net. In view of the extremes in heat and humidity, additional small numbers of refrigerators, ice machines, air conditioners and heavy duty generators have been procured. Each of these items fills a specific operational requirement, and contributes to the combat efficiency of our forces.

With our traditional concern for the individual Marine, we have found that our operations in Viet-Nam have made mandatory some improvements in his clothing and equipment. Testing and evaluation began in 1961, long before we undertook our present commitment. The deployment caused us to expedite our process and to adopt, as an interim measure, certain items which were being developed by the Army.

Significant articles are tropical combat utility uniforms, boots, and an improved ballistic nylon helmet liner, which the Marines are now receiving.

For camouflage, a requirement for green undershirts and towels was met by a new olive-green dye mix, as an interim measure. Pre-dyed items are once again in the system and are now being delivered.

These and many other commodities are the result of research and development. The R&D program in the Marine Corps is unique among the four services, and I want to point out this fact. Although the program embraces the total requirements of our combat forces, only a small portion of this program is funded by the Marine Corps. This is true because much of the equipment we use is also common to the Army and the Navy.

Therefore, the Marine Corps funded program is limited largely to those matters which fall within our statutory responsibility—that is, the development of the doctrine, tactics, techniques and equipment employed by a landing force in amphibious operations. We follow the R&D efforts of the other services very closely, for they are of major concern to us. Because of our responsibility in the field of amphibious warfare, many of the efforts of the Army and the Navy are determined, influenced, and certainly, monitored by Marine Corps Research and Development activity.

We want to acquire those material items that are best suited to the execution of our operational tactics. Thus far, we have been quite successful.

I can say that the Marines in Southeast Asia are now and will continue to be the best equipped Marines we have ever placed in a combat zone. The modifications, the acceleration, the substitutions are only a minute part of the whole. Our design criteria and allowances have been validated and reaffirmed by the performances of the equipment in the hands of the troops.

To obtain this equipment, including ammunition, and to replace losses through combat and normal wear, our request for Procurement Funds in fiscal year 1967 is \$262.9 million. This amount will be supplemented by \$25 million, our target for recoupment from FY66 funds, based on the magnitude of our fiscal year 1966 program. Of this aggregate total of \$287.9 million, more than half, \$147.2 million, will be used to fill our needs in Viet-Nam until 30 June 1967. Once again the preponderance of this money will be spent for ammunition.

Let me turn now to the aviation side of the Marine Corps air/ground team in action in Southeast Asia. There are a number of matters covering the air elements of that partnership that I want to report on.

In 1965 our helicopter strength in the Far East increased by more than two-fold. Helicopters comprise our largest single aviation investment in support of Viet-Nam operations.

You are all aware of the excellent mobility which

the helicopter provides. It is particularly an asset in Viet-Nam because of the poor rail and road networks and the ambush tactics of the Viet Cong. In the past year, our helicopters flew thousands of sorties, lifted untold tons of cargo and carried troops from all nations. Our losses have been held to a minimum by the assistance of our fighter and attack aircraft. This is the same concept developed over many years for use in conventional operations. Additionally, we have provided armament kits for the helicopters themselves and body armor for the pilots.

Because of the special operational circumstances which exist in Viet-Nam, the ratio of helicopters to fixed wing aircraft is higher than would normally be the case if we were engaged in assault amphibious operations. Because of these increases in numbers of helicopters, and their greater utilization under the impetus of combat, it has been necessary to shorten supply pipelines, expedite repair and rework schedules, and accelerate production of new helicopter aircraft. These measures are necessary to sustain our increased tempo of operations.

The validity of the vertical assault concept, which was a Marine Corps innovation, has been combat-proven without a doubt. We are modernizing this capability as new equipment becomes available. During the coming year we will begin modernizing our helicopter forces.

However, we hope to have the OV-10A light armed reconnaissance aircraft (LARA) in operation in the future. This aircraft will augment the light helicopter and assume a portion of the helicopter escort function. The OV-10A will complement the high-performance jet attack aircraft in protecting assault transport helicopters. It will provide effective fire support when terrain or weather conditions restrict jet operations. In its primary role, observation, this aircraft will be less vulnerable than the helicopter and will have sufficient armament to effectively engage fleeting targets.

Today, more than one-third of our jet fighter and attack squadrons are deployed to the Far East. Last June, on the sands of Chu Lai, the Marines and Navy CBs completed construction of an expeditionary airfield made of aluminum matting. Twenty-four days after the first bulldozer hit the beach, we were flying combat missions against the Viet Cong from this site. We have been developing our expeditionary airfield concept for eight years and have installed several similar fields during training exercises.

The Chu Lai operation, however, was the first opportunity we have had to deploy our expeditionary airfield components in a combat situation. Our experience has proven the value of this capability for forward area operations wherever we may be committed. The attack squadrons now located at Chu Lai are averaging more than 100

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take-offs and landings daily on an airfield that has been lengthened to 8,000 feet.

Our fighter squadrons at Da Nang and the attack squadrons at Chu Lai have flown thousands of combat sorties since the first squadron was committed to Viet-Nam in April 1965. We are providing close air support to the Marine Amphibious Force both day and night and under all-weather conditions. Our night and all-weather capability will be materially increased as newer planes are made operational.

We are continuing to modernize our fighter and attack aircraft.

As more of our tactical squadrons are deployed, we must rely more heavily upon those remaining in the United States for the training of replacement air crews. We will activate a combat air crew readiness training group the latter part of this year to aid in this training requirement.

Our aerial refueler/transport squadrons also are heavily committed. Because of the many hundreds of miles which separate our Marine Air and Ground units in the Western Pacific, aircraft in these squadrons have been severely taxed to handle the increased cargo and troop lift requirements generated by Viet-Nam operations. The KC-130 refueler/transport in the Far East are used to refuel our jet squadrons during flights to Viet-Nam, and provide routine tanker service in the combat theater for our jet aircraft returning low on fuel from attack missions. One tanker is constantly maintained on a 15-minute alert status for emergencies. Last June when our aluminum strip at Chu Lai was only 3,300 feet long, our attack aircraft were launched, using JATO, with full ordnance loads, but reduced fuel loads. They received their additional fuel from tankers orbiting overhead, and proceeded on their urgent strike missions. In addition, our KC-130s in the Far East have transported an average of 2,100 tons of cargo and 15,000 passengers each month. These KC-130s can land on our expeditionary airfield and we rely upon them to provide the tactical air resupply necessary to support both air and ground units.

Our commitments in RVN also include a sizable portion of our operational light antiaircraft missile battalions. The 1st LAAM (Hawk) Battalion has been located at Da Nang since February, while the 2d LAAM Battalion arrived in the Chu Lai complex in September. These deployments were the first commitment of US Hawk units to actual combat.

We are employing one augmented Marine Air Support Squadron in Viet-Nam. This unit, with its capability to control and provide all-weather close air support, has proven invaluable.

Our expeditionary airfield installations have

permitted an operational evaluation of the Marine Air Traffic Control Unit. This unit is extremely effective and capable of controlling air traffic under a variety of weather conditions.

There have been some shortages of preferred items in aviation ordnance. However, the large inventory of World War II "fat" bombs has been put to good use. We have also increased the fire power of our aviation units. I think it is fair to say that Marine Air operations have not been hampered by ordnance shortages. However, they will be enhanced once the preferred items, which have been funded, are on hand.

Marine aviation is deeply committed to the Viet-Nam operation. Our squadrons based there are engaged in what they do best—supporting Marines on the ground. Our helicopter vertical assault concept and our expeditionary airfield concept are proving themselves in combat. We are modernizing our aircraft inventory at a rapid pace and will continue to introduce new equipment into the combat environment of Viet-Nam.

We feel the pinch in meeting our overseas replacement requirements, not because of a shortage of men, but because of the long lead time involved in training qualified air crews and technical personnel. This situation will improve during the year as new Marines graduate from flight and technical schools.

The Marine Corps air/ground team organization has once again been reaffirmed and our combat experience level in both departments is rising rapidly. Marine aviation is carrying its full share of the load and is ready for whatever additional commitments may be required.

Behind the Marines on the ground and in the air are those who have the job of putting the gear in the right place at the right time.

The responsiveness of the Marine Corps Supply Support System has again proved its effectiveness during the crucial transition from a peacetime environment to the combat situation which has developed in Viet-Nam. Our logistic support system is an essential element in maintaining constant combat readiness. Very simply, we can move quickly and sustain ourselves when we arrive because our essential supply system is integrated within our combat units. I think it is important that you realize this. It is such a valuable tool. Its worth is being proved more and more each time a crisis erupts.

Viet-Nam is no exception, and we are getting along very well.

There are isolated instances of material deficiencies, which was to be expected. These deficiencies are dealt with summarily, on an individual-case basis. They have not resulted from failures of our Supply Support System itself. Usage data obtained in our last combat operation, in Korea, is not always valid in South Viet-Nam. Heat and humidity take their toll of

communications systems and mechanical systems, as well as producing an equally debilitating effect on men and materials.

In replenishing the increased pipeline to support such problems, we have accelerated procurement. An increased tempo of operations is the order of the day in our repair divisions at the supply centers. The design of our supply system has been flexible enough to absorb these increased requirements.

The basic philosophy of the Marine Corps Supply Support System is to relieve the combat Marine of all possible administrative burdens while in combat. To this end, our peacetime planning has proved itself through the events of the past year.

We were able to enter combat with the men, arms, equipment, and supplies already in being.

Although we were completely ready to *enter* into combat operations immediately, increases in personnel and material are required to *sustain* combat operations indefinitely. This fact has made it necessary to request increased appropriations from the Congress for this fiscal year.

Most of the requested increases in funds for fiscal year 1966 were for procurement programs, principally ammunition, related to our operations in Southeast Asia. The most critical procurement needs were met when the Secretary of Defense granted us \$149.1 million of the \$1.7 billion Emergency Fund, appropriated by the first session of the 89th Congress.

It should be particularly noted that these funds are not required to fill gaps in our Tables of Equipment. They reestablish our complete logistic readiness, which, in turn, gives us the capability for sustained combat, as opposed to simple hit-and-run. This is tremendously important to the Marine Corps. Everyone knows we are ready to mount out on short notice and fight. But our ability to sustain combat for weeks and months thereafter is wholly dependent upon our logistic support.

Operations of the past year have sharply tested some of our basic concepts. In most instances they have proved valid.

Of utmost significance has been the confirmation of the strategic and tactical value of the Navy-Marine Corps team as a force in readiness in support of national policy. Amphibious forces were not only ready, but they were present and available when needed. This degree of readiness is a priceless commodity, without parallel by any other nation.

1965 has confirmed that a landing force which is fully prepared for a full-scale amphibious assault is also prepared for almost any assignment ashore. In the Dominican Republic we played a traditional role of peacekeepers. Our original landing was from the sea. When our job was done, we returned to the sea. In Southeast Asia, we

were again deployed on the sea in ships of the 7th Fleet. We landed in a series of beachheads along the resource-rich and populous coast of South Viet-Nam. This landing, and the subsequent operations, constitute a projection of our Nation's seapower ashore—as in 'our campaign at Guadalcanal and the assault at Inchon.

Viet-Nam has also validated the tactics, techniques and equipment we have developed over the years. The products of our Landing Force Development Center, and our development system, are being utilized in exactly the manner that was intended. The value of planning ahead has never been more evident.

We are also able to view the merits of our close air support concept, our helicopter assault techniques, and our over-the-beach logistics support. All of these were developed and perfected by the Marine Corps for an amphibious assault, but it is obvious that they make us capable of other types of warfare, and give us great flexibility of employment.

That's a summary of our position today, and our condition is good—far better than it was in 1942 at Guadalcanal or in 1950 at Inchon. We can man our Division/Wing teams at near war strength and sustain a significant portion of them overseas in or ready for combat. Our training base has been increased. Our men and officers are of excellent quality.

We can support the increased active duty strengths which we have been authorized and the additional force structure which this strength will provide. However, should our Reserve Division/Wing Team mobilization coincide with the build-up of our additional active division, there will be grave problems associated with the conflicting demands of these organizations for material and equipment.

We have continued to improve our management—of men and materials. We have tightened up in those areas where it was apparent we were losing efficiency, so that we have only one standard of management—the most efficient, the most economical and the best.

I have enumerated for you the manner in which increments of our total request for funds will be utilized. The appropriation required to maintain the current readiness of all Marine Corps units, and to sustain the present level of operations in South Viet-Nam through fiscal year 1967 is \$1,808.2 million.

We have always pledged to obtain the most for every dollar we have to spend. Increased operations in a wartime environment require increased support and more dollars, but we can still be frugal and do our job. That is part of my pledge. We will continue to combine efficiency and economy, and achieve the readiness for service to this country that has always been expected of the Corps of Marines.

USMC