

CMC FY-1981 Posture Statement

by Gen Robert H. Barrow

Readiness to respond to all assigned missions is still the watchword of the Marine Corps.

This statement contains my assessment of the state of the Corps, sets forth our salient capabilities and summarizes our achievements of the past year. In addition, it outlines our needs as translated into those vital programs essential to carrying out the roles and missions assigned to us by law. Also, I will voice some concerns that I have regarding the future of the Navy-Marine team as we move into the 1980s—a period which will prove most challenging.

On 1 May of last year I appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee as the nominee for Commandant of the Marine Corps. At that time, I made a commitment that I would be unwavering in my dedication to having a Marine Corps that is without peer in quality of people, performance and leadership. That pledge remains foremost in my mind and will figure prominently in the course I am charting for the Corps for the next four years. Combat readiness will continue to be our top priority. As the accession and retention of quality

personnel and the modernization of our force are fundamental to maintaining readiness, they will continue to receive primary emphasis.

The United States is a maritime nation—we always have been, and in view of recent world events, I see a need for increased emphasis on our maritime orientation for the future. We are dependent upon the sea for our economic prosperity and for our national security. We have extensive overseas interests that are vulnerable. Those interests are of vital consequence to the Nation and are essential to our standing as a major power.

I need not dwell at length on the details of the burgeoning Soviet threat. Recent events bear clear witness to their ambitions. However, I am compelled to highlight that nation's explosive development of a formidable blue-water naval force. Should the Soviets attain naval supremacy, I believe that our ability to reinforce NATO with forces and materiel during a general war, or to control their adventurism in the Third

World—or that of their proxies—is at grave risk.

Without question, the threat to NATO Europe remains our conventional forces' most demanding challenge. Even could a war there be contained to those means, it portends the most devastating conflict in history. We must preserve on that continent the delicate force balance which has proven so effective a deterrent for some 35 years. Yet, armed with lessons gained elsewhere in those years, we must grid ourselves against the more probably dangers outside that theater.

To protect its national interests, the United States must have a clear ability to establish maritime superiority when and where required. Without it, we forfeit our option of measured response to aggression, our forward deployment strategy is unsupportable, and we risk reliance on weapons of last resort. With maritime superiority, we can meet the Soviet naval challenge, thereby reducing the likelihood of general conventional

war or nuclear war, and we can support a forward deployment strategy that provides us with a capability for timely and flexible response.

Sea control and power projection are the major components of sea power. In fact, power projection is also an essential element of sea control and, accordingly, amphibious forces make a large contribution to sea control operations. Marine landing forces can seize and hold land areas either to deny them from the enemy's use in interdicting our sea lines of communication or to permit our forces to exploit these areas as advance bases from which to attack enemy forces. Enemy access to the open seas can be restricted by employing amphibious forces to seize key choke points. Conversely, through control of land-dominated straits, amphibious operations can contribute to naval efforts to maintain sea lines of communication free for passage of allied shipping. Thus, to attain naval supremacy, both sea control and power projection force are required.

As for the separate function of power projection, Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) embarked in Navy amphibious shipping constitute the nation's premier capability for the forcible entry of combatant forces into a hostile environment. The capability to execute an amphibious assault remains an absolute requirement.

This summarizes how I view the Corps' maritime role in the national strategy. I can assure you that the Marine Corps is today prepared to execute this mission assigned by law. Beyond this, I am pledged during my tenure as Commandant to lend my total support to the Navy in revitalizing those programs essential to amphibious power projection and furtherance of the maritime strategy.

To be responsive to our mission we stress readiness, versatility and flexibility, the latter two through the total integration of our capabilities into an air-ground team. The very nature of this team incorporates the principles of efficiency and unity of command which have long been bywords of the Corps. By the total integration of all its firepower, the combat power of a Marine air-ground task force is greater than the sum of its parts.

The ability to task organize Marine forces to meet the requirements of the mission assigned provides great flexibility. For example, should the

Marine commander face an opponent possessing significant armor, he can structure his task force accordingly by selectively strengthening its aviation element and increasing the tank and antitank capabilities of its ground combat element.

It is increasingly clear that the nation's ability to act quickly and move military forces to a developing crisis is essential. Our getting there early with the force necessary to do the job, whether to provide a U.S. presence or project power, allows decision makers a high degree of flexibility. We are an amphibious force, certainly, but we are not limited to moving by ships alone. Provided airlift, we can use that means for getting to the scene. Indeed, we have for many years maintained task-organized air contingency forces prepared for instantaneous response to crises worldwide; their combat readiness has been demonstrated.

With respect to strategic employment, Marines are not limited to a particular geographical region—our perspective is global, and we train and equip our forces accordingly.


Preserving U.S. dominance on the high seas and maintaining our unique and tested capability for amphibious

joint and combined exercises throughout the world. In the Pacific, these have ranged from a Marine amphibious force landing in Japan to smaller scale exercises in Korea, the Republic of the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. In the Caribbean, the resolve of the United States was demonstrated by the reinforcement exercise of the Naval Base, Guantanamo, Cuba. Our commitment to NATO is reinforced continuously by deployment of Regular and Reserve forces to both the northern and southern flanks of the Alliance. We have participated in operations in Germany, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Spain and Italy in the last year.

Closer to home, we train routinely in the desert of California, the High Sierras, the jungles of Panama and the snows of Alaska.

Combined with the continuing refinement of our amphibious capabilities and techniques, the versatility of Marine Corps combat units continues to be demonstrated by airlift exercises with the Military Airlift Command.

Our three Marine amphibious forces (MAFs), on the East Coast, West Coast and in Japan, are well



positioned to respond to global requirements.

II MAF, located in the Carolinas, provides a Marine amphibious unit (MAU) to the U.S. European Command as the landing force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet for contingencies in the Mediterranean and other areas. Other II MAF elements are task organized to respond to national commitments in the Atlantic and Caribbean.

III MAF, with elements located in Hawaii and Japan, is ready to respond to U.S. requirements throughout the Western Pacific and in the Indian Ocean, the Mideast and

Africa. One MAU and one battalion landing team (BLT) are deployed in amphibious shipping with the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

1 MAF, located in California, is available to respond to a requirement in either ocean or can be deployed to Europe as part of the Marine Corps' commitment to NATO.

Additionally, our Reserve forces are capable of rapidly reinforcing or augmenting the active MAFs or providing a separate combined arms force to complement active forces. Mobilization operational readiness deployment tests are regularly administered to ensure our Reserve is prepared for any mobilization role. Furthermore, most exercises conducted by our Regular forces include Reserve participation.

Rapid deployment is high on the interest list today, and rightly so. To the Marine Corps, rapid deployment means getting to the assigned area quickly and being able to carry out the assigned mission upon arrival. This has been our stock in trade for many years. Our forward-deployed afloat forces can display U.S. presence or land as an early U.S. commitment in response to a developing crisis. In many cases these forces

As we transition to a new JCS readiness reporting system during this year, our reported readiness will drop somewhat due to revised, more realistic, reporting criteria. These criteria will be for wartime requirements rather than for a structure which reflects peacetime constraints. I believe this new reporting system to be beneficial for it will focus my attention and that of my commanders on the most effective management of the personnel and materiel assets at our disposal, and will also clearly demonstrate deficiencies which result from the fiscal and manpower constraints with which we are faced.

The Marine Corps is expanding and refining a system called the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System for evaluating objectively the combat readiness of units and their capability for accomplishing assigned missions. All Fleet Marine Force units, active and Reserve, are evaluated regularly. A secondary benefit of the system is that it provides objective goals for unit training.

We maintain sufficient inventories of principal end items in the Marine Corps stores system as prepositioned war reserves to sustain substantial



enhance our flexibility and responsiveness to our NATO commitment and afford the National Command Authorities (NCA) the option to commit Marine forces quickly.

Second, the maritime prepositioning program is a new concept which will expand the strategic options available to the NCA by providing a powerful rapid response capability for overseas crises. Under this program, commercial multipurpose ships will be procured for the afloat prepositioning of equipment and supplies for three MABs. When required, the Marines composing a MAB will be airlifted to an area for an administrative linkup with their equipment.

All things considered, we can go to war with the resources we have. Our individual Marines and combat units would acquit themselves well if required to fight today. But that is not to say that we don't need some help, as I will discuss momentarily.

Strategic mobility

Though the Marine Corps maintains expertise in amphibious operations using the Navy's assault ships, we also have the capability to deploy by air. If our forces are likely to be opposed, the amphibious operation with its forcible-entry capability offers a distinct and unique advantage and provides the best chance for success. On the other hand, if the environment is benign, Marines can quickly deploy there by strategic airlift. Let me reemphasize that light, task-organized, battalion-size forces are ready now, configured for airlift to meet situations which require rapid response but not a heavy commitment of military power.

The key to rapid deployment is early decisionmaking. If amphibious task forces are alerted early and moved quickly, this Country has maximum flexibility to respond with either a forcible or administrative entry into a crisis area. An early decision of this nature places effective, self-sustaining military forces on the scene at a time when the situation can



would be the initial building block for larger follow-on forces. Task organizing forces for a specific threat, environment and mission has been Navy and Marine Corps specialty for decades. For us, rapid deployment means readiness and on-scene presence with the capability to deter conflict or deal with the situation should deterrence fail.

Readiness and sustainability

Readiness to respond to all assigned missions is still the watchword of the Marine Corps.

combat readiness of our forces. The Marine Corps' reliance on its continued ability to upgrade repairable assets through a depot repair program is essential to this posture.

Two innovative programs will contribute substantially to Marine Corps rapid deployment and sustainability:

First, the Marine Corps is programming resources to preposition equipment, supplies, and ammunition for a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) in strategic locations ashore from which we can sustain NATO reinforcement. Prepositioning will

still be influenced without commitment of combat forces ashore. Such actions send a strong signal of resolve and combat capability. In some cases, Navy and Marine forward-deployed forces can secure a port or airfield for follow-on deployments. Similarly, early decisions to alert Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships to rapid deployment allows those ships to be positioned close to ports of embarkation for quicker reaction.

Strategic mobility is the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of our national strategy. The Marine Corps is dependent on the Nation's strategic mobility resources, which include the amphibious ship force, to meet its lift requirements. Our capability to project power ashore requires amphibious ships, the MSC, militarily suitable commercial ships of the U.S. Merchant Fleet, and support by the Military Airlift Command augmented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

With our limited number of U.S. Navy amphibious ships dedicated to the assault echelon, our assault follow-on echelon requires MSC/commercial ships. Airlift requirements vary from an aviation support fly-in echelon, associated with a traditional amphibious assault, to the total force in cases involving prepositioning or air-landed operations.

As I have mentioned, initiatives concerning the overseas prepositioning of equipment and supplies, both afloat and ashore, will lessen reaction time and enhance our capability to sustain our forces through a crisis while reducing the burden on

strategic transportation assets. Prepositioning, however, must be developed as an adjunct to, and not as an alternative for, providing an adequate strategic mobility capability. In brief, we need strategic mobility for a forcible entry capability. Prepositioning is a logical and welcome concept to reduce lift requirements, but it does not replace the forcible entry capability. With all these capabilities, however, I cannot overstress that early decision making is the key to defusing crisis situations.

Training and Training Management

The quality of our training will determine our success on any future battlefield.

I am generally satisfied with the state of training within the Marine Corps. Our program is basically sound and produces well-trained Marines.

However, we strive to improve in many areas. We have reduced on-the-job training by formalizing the training of all infantrymen and assault amphibian crewmen. The result has been a more stabilized training period which ensures a well-trained individual and permits greater concentration by combat units on mission oriented training.

Implementation of the 10.3-week male recruit training program appears to be effective in satisfying our objectives of quality and efficiency. In my judgment, this is our most important training, fundamental to all other training and who we are, and we must preserve its character.

The state of air crew training is excellent. Introduction of flight

simulators and the advanced weapons and tactics training being conducted by the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron located at Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona, are notable examples of program improvements.

Specialized skill training continues to require detailed attention and exceptional management techniques. This training involves a wide variety of courses, is conducted at numerous locations to include other Service schools, and uses varied training methodologies. This complex training demands imaginative responses to constantly changing requirements. To this end, we are examining long-term improvement in the formal schools planning and programming process. We are seeking reductions in course lengths by thorough application of instructional systems development techniques and the use of self-paced and computer assisted/managed instruction.

In addition to these program improvements, we have initiated a comprehensive review designed to modernize and improve our training management system and its essential program components. Key elements of this review are a complete study of the organization for management of training within the Marine Corps, identification of definitive training standards and priorities, and a review of management policies. This effort will ultimately result in improved skill qualification of all Marines.

Our determination to improve the training of all Marines must also address specific requirements for the effective training of our women Marines. Our position is to recruit, train, and assign women to perform a variety of valuable functions well short of close combat. While the number and role of women Marines is increasing, training for combat will continue to be excluded as inappropriate, unnecessary and uneconomical.

Effective training of Marines for combat requires the commitment of adequate training areas and material assets. Unfortunately, limited training space and assets are fast becoming ever more scarce. I am genuinely concerned about this trend. We are faced with increasing pressures for real estate where training is conducted and increasing costs of training ammunition, equipment and fuel. Many Marine Corps training areas are subject to restrictions brought on by con-



cern for endangered species and the environment. In some areas encroachment has surfaced as a significant problem. There is a steady demand from the public for military training areas to support recreation, public use, housing projects, and industry.

On the positive side, the tempo and scope of training at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, continues to enhance our readiness. There are eight battalion or larger combined arms exercises scheduled for fiscal year 1981. The high desert at Twentynine Palms provides an ideal site for air/ground combined arms exercises in that it allows us to exercise the live fire and maneuver of Regular and Reserve combat units in a realistic desert-oriented environment.

The Marine Corps will continue to emphasize that training required for amphibious operations in a balanced program that includes training for operations in desert, jungle, extreme cold and mountain environments. Within the framework of this program, additional support and emphasis is being directed towards improved training in nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and electronic warfare (EW) techniques.

Finally, the importance of education to a better trained Marine, and ultimately to the Marine Corps, has long been an established fact. With this in mind, the Marine Corps has an extensive full-time academic and professional military education program, and supports off-duty education. We consider education to be a vital part of a formula which equates improved and broadened individual knowledge with increased versatility, productivity, and general value of the individual to the Marine Corps.

While we feel that the Marine Corps is getting an equitable return for our training dollars, we are quick to recognize the need for improvement. To achieve this, we will continue to explore every opportunity to better provide the quality of training required and expected for a force-in-readiness of the future.

Manpower Matters

The heart of our Corps is the individual Marine. Our readiness to deploy rapidly and to accomplish our mission is dependent on the individual Marine's ability to endure rigorous training, to accept firm discipline, and to respond to sound leadership. These qualities are directly

linked to the physical and moral characteristics of persons we enlist. For this reason, I am determined to preserve our standards and am prepared to accept a reduced end strength, if necessary, to maintain a quality Marine Corps.

Professional competence and readiness for combat can only be maintained by dedication to a quality forces. This investment in quality is essential to maintaining effective combat capabilities. This emphasis over the past several years has resulted in lower attrition and fewer disciplinary problems. Significant reductions in unauthorized absence and desertion have also been realized. For the fourth year in a row, our confined population shows a downward trend. Although we continue to identify and discharge Marines who fail to meet performance and discipline standards, their numbers have been reduced dramatically. In short, we are convinced that the demands of combat in today's sophisticated technological environment require Marines who are dedicated, disciplined, and trainable.

We realize that the need for quality individuals in sufficient numbers to meet our needs is the biggest challenge facing the all-volunteer force today. Clearly, it will become more difficult and expensive to compete for qualified manpower in a declining male recruiting market. During fiscal year 1979, we achieved, for the third straight year, our goal of 75 per cent high school graduates for all new enlistees; however, we accepted a shortfall in our overall accession goal rather than increase our



non-high school graduate percentage. We intend to maintain the 75 per cent recruiting goal for high school graduates. Completion of high school remains the best predictor of performance as a Marine in terms of conscientiousness, trainability, and amenability to discipline.

Our ability to enlist high school graduates in the numbers required is tied directly to the availability of recruiting resources. Without the necessary recruiters and operating support, we will not be able to recruit enough quality men and women for the force. With these resources and given the dedication of the Marine Corps recruiter, we believe we have a reasonable chance of attaining our goals. I do believe, however, that the recruiter's ability to do his job is limited by state and local laws denying him access to juvenile records and by regulations which prevent his obtaining lists of high school seniors. Legislation to remove these state and local constraints would enhance the recruiter's capability to contact and cultivate eligible individuals to enlist in the Marine Corps. Additionally, I especially urge your support for resource programs such as recruit advertising and enlistment incentives.



to help ensure we convince enough qualified individuals of the opportunities in the Corps.

Recruiting difficulties are compounded by problems in retention. The Marine Corps has a problem in this regard, especially with careerists in the critical technical fields. Critical shortages have resulted in several fields where experience is an absolute requirement and the training investment is high. The most effective means of dealing with this situation is an adequately funded selective reenlistment bonus program. I urge your continued support for this vital program.

We continue to satisfy our annual officer procurement requirements without difficulty. The major reason for this success is the contribution the platoon leaders classes make to our officer accessions. To that end, we need to make permanent the current temporary Public Law 92-117 to provide a stipend, competitive with the ROTC program stipend, for qualified members of the program. Officer retention is satisfactory overall; however, we are still experiencing high attrition in some specific areas, particularly naval aviators. I ask your support of proposed legislation which would increase overall compensation and aviation career incentive pay.

I am requesting a military end strength of 185,200 for fiscal year 1981. This reflects my desire to maintain end strength for fiscal years 1980 through 1982 at the level of fiscal year 1979. As you know, I informed the Congress in August of last year of our intent to seek an end strength of 180,600 in fiscal year 1980, and 179,100 in fiscal year 1981, in order to maintain program balance between manpower, procurement and operations and maintenance. We subsequently revised our plans in response to decisions placing a greater emphasis upon the immediate readiness of rapidly deployable conventional forces and the desire of Congress to first review Marine Corps future roles, missions, and strength plans.

We are concerned about congressional action on the proposed Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. The Senate version of the bill (S.1918) calls for very significant reductions in the upper grades to an already austere officer force. Those reductions, in some instances 30 per cent greater than the Administration's proposal, would impact seriously on our ability to properly



staff and lead our forces.

In addition to our active military strength request, I am requesting a civilian end strength of 19,222, a reduction of approximately 400 from fiscal year 1980 levels. Our civilians are a professional and highly productive workforce who form a vital part of our Marine Corps manpower program. This civilian strength level is the most austere program possible consistent with workload. I strongly urge your support of that level of Marine Corps civilian manpower.

One area of special concern, especially in the all-volunteer environment, is the adequacy of compensation and benefits. There remains a widely held belief and growing anxiety on the part of Marines, particularly career Marines, that their benefits and compensation are being sacrificed in the war on inflation. The principal impact of inadequate compensation is poor retention, especially in the technical fields, of trained and experienced Marines. I am confident the Congress will continue to be acutely aware of, and responsive to, the need for adequate compensation for uniformed personnel. We owe it to our Service members to provide tangible and continuing support for their welfare.

The Marine Corps remains manpower intensive with over 70 per cent of Marine Corps appropriations devoted to both military and civilian manpower. The manpower mix, however, continues to be lean. Our operating-to-support ratio remains better than 60:40, reflecting our strong combat orientation. The average grades of our officers and enlisted personnel are the lowest of all

the Services, as is our officer-to-enlisted ratio of 1:9.34. In addition, our civilian workforce remains, proportionately, the smallest within the Department of Defense.

Marine Corps Reserve

The Marine Corp Reserve is organized and trained for its mobilization roles to reinforce and augment the active forces or to provide a Marine air-ground task force in support of various contingencies. Studies conducted after 11 integrated active and Reserve exercises in fiscal year 1979 resulted in some structural changes to enhance this compatibility. New programs have been initiated in fiscal year 1979 to elevate the level of Reserve training. The increased versatility of the Reserve is a strength we can safely rely upon to further solidify our readiness posture.

I am also pleased to report that the Selected Marine Corps Reserve realized a growth of 600 during fiscal year 1979. Seventy-seven per cent of the accessions without prior service are high school graduates. These accomplishments were made possible, in part, by your funding approval for our Selected Reserve Incentive Program. Your support of this worthy program is appreciated.

The outlook for the Reserve is good. The introduction of new equipment and modernization of weapons continues, and I am optimistic concerning our ability to achieve our fiscal year 1980 strength goals as well as maintain readiness objectives. My goal is for ground units of battalion size or smaller to be able to mobilize within 30 days, and for aviation units to be able to mobilize within 7 days.

The funds we have requested will provide the means by which recruiting goals are met and these readiness objectives maintained.

Replacement/Selective Modernization

Before detailing our programs, I would first highlight the fact that my first priority for readiness enhancement must be toward upgrading, through inkind replacement, the proven but worn equipment in our present inventory. Modernization is essential, too, and significant investment will be necessary to modernize Marine forces to ensure success on the battlefield of the 1980s. Emphasis will be to increase and improve firepower and mobility.

The XM-1 tank is programmed for procurement in the mid-1980s and an improved version of TOW antitank weapons system in fiscal year 1981. We are supporting the development of both air- and ground-delivered, precision guided projectiles. The integration of Marine Corps close air support with these needed modernizations will provide the Marine combined arms teams with a formidable armor-killing capability. On that point, a recently conducted mobile-mechanized test has validated Marine Corps doctrine of task-organizing heavy forces for the mission assigned as opposed to permanent, less flexible, structural changes.

Artillery support will be improved by introduction of the M198 155-mm towed howitzer during the next year.

We also need improvements in weapon systems organic to the infantry battalion. Being tested is a squad automatic weapon, which will provide a significant increase in firepower. With the Army's support,

we are testing four possible product improvements for the M16A1 rifle, and efforts are underway to increase the reliability of the M60 machine gun.


The LVT7A1 modernization program will enhance tactical mobility and also will extend its life an additional 10 years through improvements in maintainability and reliability.

We are conducting an intensive examination of the entire Marine Corps structure. It includes an analysis of our combat force structure to determine the most combat-effective mix of personnel and weaponry attainable, as well as a review of the Marine Corps' supporting structure.

The Marine Corps has made modest improvements in its NBC defense capabilities, but is still woefully deficient in light of the vast NBC offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, its established doctrine to use chemical agents as an integral part of tactical operations. Just as importantly, in my view, we must achieve a credible retaliatory capability to deter the use of chemical weapons against us. Consequently, I fully support the Army's efforts to seek improvements in this area.

Our requirement to modernize the aviation component of our air-ground team is driven by the increasingly sophisticated threat that Marines face worldwide.

We continue to feel that the AV-8B provides the capabilities needed for the modernization of our light attack force, as borne out by the success of the YAV-8B Flight Demonstration Program. We have also been encouraged by the renewed interest expressed by the United Kingdom in acquiring additional aircraft. Such




cooperation, of course, would decrease program cost and favor NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. It is with great regret that we must again acknowledge that, due to OSD funding constraints, R&D funding to continue the program is not included in the fiscal year 1981 budget.

Procurement of a light attack aircraft is necessary to maintain force levels beyond the mid-1980s. The F/A-18 is currently programmed to fill this need; however, other actions are also required to maintain a capable inventory during the 1980s. The AV-8A to AV-8C conversion-in-lieu-of-procurement program is required to maintain force levels, meet the threat through improved combat capability, and preclude an excessive new buy. Necessary funding to continue this important program is in the fiscal year 1981 budget.

The Marine Corps, due to aircraft inventory and budget constraints, has been forced to reduce its A-6E force structure by decrementing about 17 per cent of its all-weather attack capability. The six A-6E aircraft provided for in the fiscal year 1980 budget have helped but have not resolved the problem. I am concerned that adequate all-weather close air support be available to our Marines on the ground.

We are closely monitoring progress of the F/A-18 aircraft and eagerly look forward to it as a means of replacing our aging F-4s. At the same time we are faced during fiscal year 1981 with a reduction of aircraft in our fighter squadrons, with the added prospect that, by the mid-1980's, we will have to decommission a number of squadrons. We view our fighters as "fighter-attack" assets with a dual air-to-air and air-to-ground role. The fighter-attack element in fact provides 50 per cent of our close air support capability. The requirement to reduce force structure in the out-years unquestionably would impact on our ability to provide air support to our ground forces.



Joint development continues on the Laser Maverick air-to-ground missile. This stand-off weapon allows the ground commander to designate specific point targets for attack. Delivered with exceptional accuracy from tactical aircraft, Laser Maverick is a critical element in our overall antiarmor equation.

Redeye, a man-portable, surface-to-air missile system, will be replaced by Stinger, scheduled to be introduced into the Fleet Marine Force during 1981. Stinger Post, a 1983 follow-on, will engage higher and faster targets and incorporates an identification friend or foe (IFF) capability. With the fielding of the Improved Hawk missile system, advances have been made through product improvements in reliability, maintainability, and performance.

Our fleet of CH-46 and CH-53A/D helicopters, which provides the primary troop and cargo carrying functions for assault operations, is approaching 15 years of service. They are increasing in cost of ownership, cannot cope with the present nor projected antiair warfare threat, and suffer inventory shortfalls which soon will become acute. Accordingly, two investments are planned to correct these deficiencies. First, a safety, reliability and maintainability program is planned for the entire fleet of Navy/Marine Corps H-46 series aircraft, with initial funding in fiscal year 1981. This program contains only materiel improvement. The second step in correcting the Marine Corps' medium lift deficiency is to pursue a program start, with first R&D funding to be requested in fiscal year 1982, for a common-solution replacement system for the Marine Corps CH-46 and CH-53A/D aircraft.

The tactical lift capabilities of our assault helicopter force will increase with the introduction of the CH-53E during March 1981. This heavy-lift helicopter, with its 16-ton lift capability, is a vital complement to introduction of the M-198 155-mm towed howitzer and the future Mobile Protected Weapon System.

The aging aerial refueling capability for Marine tactical aviation is of concern to me. The KC-130 service life extension program will extend the useful combat life of the Marine Corps' tactical aerial refueling fleet into the mid-to-late-1980s. Cancellation of the Air Force Advanced Medium STOL Transport program

has left us without a suitable alternative to modernize our force.

Let me now address the major logistics programs essential to support of our combat capabilities.



The current readiness posture of the motor transport fleet is at 85 per cent, a significant attainment in view of the age of the fleet. Nevertheless, excessive age and its related reduced combat capability require new equipment procurement. The 2 1/2- and 5-ton cargo trucks of 1967 are being

replaced during fiscal years 1979 to 1985 with a new series 5-ton truck. Future equipment procurements include replacement of the 1/4-ton to 1 1/4-ton truck fleet by a 5/4-ton high mobility tactical truck and 5-ton and 10-ton tractors and associated trailers by commercially designed items.


The concept of multipurpose equipment design has been adopted to a greater extent, with a significant reduction in the numbers of vehicles and equipments designed for a single function. A product of these innovative concepts, the field logistics system is progressing well and promises to give us greater logistics support capabilities at reduced investment costs.

Savings Through Efficiency

Savings through efficiency has long been a tenet of the Marine Corps and will remain so in my tenure.

The missions and functions of our combat support and combat service support organizations have been reexamined and consolidated where feasible. Similarly, consolidation of artillery support with the introduction of the single-gun M198 howitzer offers potential for increased efficiency and savings.

Automated service centers are being reorganized to realize economies through consolidation and regionalization. The number of major automated service centers is being reduced from 24 to 7. In support of this effort and the redesign of critical automated information systems, we plan the acquisition of modern,



automated data processing equipment for the seven centers. A separate acquisition will provide the operating forces, down to battalion and squadron levels, with the readily deployable equipment essential to improving the timeliness and quality of input at the source.

An 11 per cent reduction in facilities energy consumption was accomplished in fiscal year 1979 and steady progress is being made toward our goal in fiscal year 1985 of a 20 per cent reduction from the fiscal year 1975 baseline consumption rate.

The Marine Corps thus far has been able to make a significant contribution to the Nation's energy conservation efforts while sustaining combat essential levels of readiness and training. Further energy reductions, however, could adversely affect our training and readiness.

Research and Development

The Marine Corps' research and development strategy is to take advantage of the state-of-the-art technology to provide maximum combat power on the battlefield. This modernization must be sought at an affordable cost. We have requested \$118.1 million of the Department of the Navy's R&D budget for fiscal year 1981 to support what we believe to be a balanced program needed to satisfy priority deficiencies.

Except for landing force aspects of amphibious warfare, for which development the Marine Corps is responsible, our equipment needs can be satisfied largely by close coordination with the other Services. Marine

aviation, for example, is an integral part of naval aviation. As such, aviation systems, except for Marine Corps-peculiar ground support equipment, are funded by the Navy. Our Mobile Protected Weapons System (MPWS) program is included in our joint undertakings with the Army through the Armored Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT) program. The Marine Corps' goal is to place in the field a lightweight (16 tons or less) helicopter-transportable, highly mobile antiautomobile vehicle. Given the results of the joint operational test and evaluation of the MPWS concept and the ACVT program, the Army Chief of Staff and I, in early 1981, will decide whether to pursue acquisition of this type of vehicle.

We are exploring other modernization having multi-Service value. In the vital area of command, control and communications, the Position Location and Reporting System (PLRS), in joint development with the Army for initial fielding in 1983, will automatically provide the tactical commander with accurate, real-time location of his tactical elements on the battlefield, both ground and air. This new capability will better facilitate control of maneuvering forces, provide more effective fire support coordination, ensure timelier combat support, and provide reduced reliance on voice radio communication. PLRS has a high priority within both the Army and Marine Corps, as no other system can provide its unique capabilities. Bringing effective combat power to bear against the



enemy, however, is equally important. For the commander to draw all weapons at his disposal into full concert to destroy the enemy, the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS) is being developed and will integrate direct air support, artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire. MIFASS will meet the Marine Corps requirements to achieve close and continuous coordination and control of fire and air support between Navy and Marine elements of the amphibious task force during amphibious assaults and subsequent operations ashore. If the ordnance selected has a laser homing capability, a first round hit can be virtually ensured by the Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE). The MULE, a lightweight, man-portable laser rangefinder and designator system, programmed with an initial operating capability of 1984, will give precise target location and designate targets for terminally guided artillery and air munitions.

MIFASS and PLRS will contribute significantly to the effectiveness of other tactical command and control systems, such as the Tactical Air Operations Central 85 (TAOC-85). This system will provide the means to monitor and control interceptor and attack aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. It will enable positive, en route traffic control assistance within the amphibious objective area.

The Marine Corps' hand-held Digital Communications Terminal (DCT) has been developed to provide the capability to rapidly compose, edit, "burst" transmit, receive, and display pre-formatted messages, free text, and graphic data in support of the tactical communications requirements of the Marine Corps. It has the additional utility of being interoperable with the automated command and control systems of the landing force integrated communications system, as well as improving our electronic counter-countermeasures posture. Approval for Service use is expected during the third quarter of fiscal year 1981, with the Army, the



Air Force, and other DoD agencies having shown interest in the DCT program.

The LVTX, a conceptualized follow-on system to the LVT7, will provide additional firepower, mobility, and survivability. In conjunction with the Navy's Landing Craft Air Cushion program, it will provide essential improvement in amphibious capabilities. These programs, along with the LSD-41, are the basis of the



amphibious force of the future.

Navy/Other-Service Programs

Now I would like to address some Navy programs that impact directly on Marine Corps and national interests. Certainly most important is amphibious lift capability.

To provide reasonable assurance of success in the event of a general war of global proportions, we need the capability to conduct simultaneous MAF-level amphibious assaults. There are 64 amphibious ships currently in the active fleet. Given the maintenance requirement of 15 per cent of all ships in overhaul, there is only enough readily available lift for one MAF, and considerable time is required to assemble it in either ocean. With amphibious ships split between two oceans, ships from one ocean must be transferred to the other to lift but one MAF assault echelon to the right place at the right time. The only possible exception comes when the amphibious objective area is roughly equidistant from the U.S. coasts. In that instance, it would be possible to provide one-half the MAF from each coast and rendezvous near the AOA. While this is

mathematically feasible, it neither addresses the attendant command and control problems nor the use of the disjointed halves of each MAF remaining in the U.S.

The realities of the budget have forced the Marine Corps to develop its absolute minimum requirements to support the current national strategy. Under these circumstances, I believe we need enough ships, readily available, to lift the assault echelon of

a MAF and a MAB simultaneously. Allowing for 15 per cent in overhaul this equates roughly to lift require for the assault echelon of 1.56 MAFs.

Because of budget pressures and competing priorities, the current Five Year Defense Program contains sufficient lift for the assault echelons of 1.15 MAFs. That is to say, sights have been fixed on maintaining our current lift capability for the foreseeable future through replacement and modernization. Our current inventory of amphibious ships was, for the most part, acquired during the 1960s to replace World War II vintage ships. Because they were built in the same period, they will become obsolete at about the same time. This is the "block obsolescence" problem. All but six of the current inventory of amphibious ships will leave the fleet by fiscal year 2002. The first to go will be the LSD-28 class, whose normal useful life expires during fiscal year 84-87. We need to begin now to address this block obsolescence problem through a reasonable and affordable program of replacements and, where feasible, service life extensions, during the period fiscal years 1981 to

2002. The longer the delay, the less time available and the higher will be the build-rate, cost, and, more importantly, risk.

The LSD-41 is the first of the new construction ships being proposed. It will replace the LSD-28 class and will give the U.S. a significant improvement in wet-well capability as well as accommodate the high speed air cushion landing craft of the future. We are in a race with the clock, with the first of the LSD-28s currently projected to go out of commission in less than five years. In order to maintain sufficient lift for the assault echelon of 1.15 MAFs, I urge your continued support of this vital program.

A program I would like to mention again, and solicit your continued support for, is the revolutionary new Landing Craft Air Cushion program. This improvement in landing craft technology is the most significant advance in amphibious warfare since introduction of the helicopter. The new landing craft travels at speeds up to 50 knots and can land on 70 per cent of the world's littoral, a 4:1 improvement over today's capability. It provides flexibility in our ship-to-shore movement by virtue of its across-the-beach capability, greater speed, longer range, and ability to gain surprise. Greater stand-off distances can be employed to reduce the vulnerability of our amphibious ships to enemy fire.

The increasing shortfall of naval gunfire support is another issue viewed with concern. Efforts to improve this capability have been repeatedly frustrated. First, the Major Caliber Lightweight Gun (MCLWG) with its attendant all-weather, hard target, long-range capability has, in essence, been canceled. Although not an equal replacement for the MCLWG, the 5-inch guided projectile program provides a capability to carry out the naval gunfire support mission. This program, however, is also in jeopardy. Naval gunfire support is vitally needed in order to adequately support critical initial assault phases of amphibious operations and to reinforce Marine firepower during subsequent operations ashore. Close air support is complementary; it does not obviate the need for an effective naval gun. The Marine Corps vigorously supports Navy efforts to develop, procure, and install improved guns on designated ships.

Concurrent with requirements for additional ships, improved ship-to-

shore technology, and improved naval gunfire capabilities is a need to further develop our mine countermeasures technology and capabilities against the increasing Soviet mine threat. While new advanced landing craft are expected to be less vulnerable, the magnitude of the Soviet threat demands intensive research in this area. Navy efforts in the development of critical antime technology are strongly supported.


The mission of the Marine Corps' organic medical elements is limited to providing a prescribed level of health care at the frontline infantry units, battalion and squadron aid stations, and medical battalions. The current Marine Corps' World War II vintage medical support system is not adequate to provide this service. The Environmentally-Controlled Medical System (MCEMS), designed to replace our current system, has been the subject of Congressional scrutiny along with the Army's Medical Unit Self-Transportable (MUST) program and other medical support programs of the Navy and Air Force. Funding for MCEMS components was deleted in the fiscal years 1979 and 1980 procurement budgets. This deletion was based upon the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense undertake a study to determine the feasibility of providing a single medical support

system for all Services.

We have studied the Army's MUST system, and while it contains essentially the same medical componentry that we require, the way it is packaged in the MCEMS is superior for employment in amphibious operations. The medical support system within the Marine Corps will continue to be of concern until a replacement can be fielded.

With regard to medical support beyond the limited organic Marine Corps elements, a serious shortfall exists in Navy-furnished hospital beds and facilities rearward from our medical battalions. This shortfall amounts to 7,000 hospital beds required in support of an amphibious operation involving two MAFs. Although this shortfall is addressed by number of beds, its critical aspect rests with the related surgical and acute-care capability. If these requirements are not met, we risk increased mortality and the loss of personnel who otherwise might be returned to duty. Programs are under development by the Navy to correct this problem.

One such program, the Fleet Hospital Program, provides a probable near-term solution in shore-based hospital facilities to support Marine Corps forces in combat. The special value of the fleet hospital is in




its design, consisting of a large number of convalescent beds which can be structured to meet the demands of established evacuation policy. The Navy procurement strategy for the fleet hospital program includes a mix of core units and ancillary medical systems to support Marine Corps operations in either industrialized theaters or in areas where host nation support is unavailable. We welcome and support these Navy initiatives.

Facilities

Our major military construction (MCON) effort continues to be improvement in the quality of life of the individual Marine. The Marine Corps' request for fiscal year 1981 contains projects for replacing or modernizing unaccompanied enlisted housing and dining facilities. These projects represent \$64.4 million or 72 per cent of our MCON program for the budget year.

Enhancement of working conditions is also extremely important to our Marines' overall quality of life and unit readiness. Therefore, \$24.0 million or 26.8 per cent of the fiscal year 1981 MCON program is applied to the construction of operations, training, maintenance, storage, utilities and administrative facilities.

In our effort to achieve a balanced five year military construction program, we need to include morale, welfare, and recreation projects which are essential to the needs of our Marines. The past difficulty in obtaining appropriated funds for construction of facilities used for morale, welfare and recreation projects, coupled with urgent requirements for the use of such facilities by Marines and their dependents, causes me to ask your support in appropriating adequate funding of this program. The present backlog of maintenance and repair is higher than originally forecast. The Marine Corps is continuing to make maximum use of its maintenance dollars through timely application of repair and mainten-



Funding By Major Category
(\$ in Millions).

Appropriation	FY 1980	FY 1981
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	\$2,228.0	\$2,257.3
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	94.2	94.9
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps	834.4	937.2
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve	22.0	27.5
Procurement, Marine Corps	283.8	467.6
Marine Corps Stock Fund	0.0	4.1
Total	\$3,462.4	\$3,788.6

Figure 1

1981/1982 Authorization Request
(Manpower-actuals; \$ in Millions)

Category	FY 1981	FY 1982
Active Duty End Strength	185,200	185,200
Selective Reserve Average Strength	33,700	33,700
Civilian Personnel End-Strength	19,222a/	19,222a/
 (USMC Portion of DON Request)		
Average Military Student	21,393	21,053
Training Load, Active		
Average Military Student	3,144	3,152
Training Load, Reserve		
Procurement Requiring Authorization	161.2	351.7

a/ Includes 17,760 O&MMC; 144 O&MMCR and 1,318 MCIF

Figure 2

ance, priority assignment of funds and stringent validation procedures; however, an aging physical plant and the ravages of inflation are making this task extremely difficult.

Budget Summary

For comparison, our fiscal year 1980 budget and the fiscal year 1981 request are displayed by appropriation in Figure 1. The Marine Corps fiscal years 1981 and 1982 authorization requests are highlighted in Figure 2.

Conclusion

In concluding my statement, I wish to emphasize that the total effort of the Marine Corps is directed toward structuring, organizing, training, and equipping our Fleet Marine Forces to provide the greatest possible contribution to national defense. We will maintain our forces in the highest possible state of readiness—available for immediate use whenever and

wherever they may be required.

Maintaining a strong Marine Corps, which the American people both expect and deserve, and modernizing our force for the future are my major concerns. Ensuring that we are ready and that Marines will go into a fight equipped in a manner that will enable them to win requires a sizable investment. This investment can be expressed in terms of leadership, dedicated men and women who can get the job done, and adequate funding support for those programs essential to readiness and modernization. I shall ensure the first two are provided. The third, adequate funding, is more difficult. Your support, which will allow us to maintain readiness and modernize our forces, is earnestly requested.

I consider the programs I have outlined to be austere in scope, the minimum essential to allow us to

train our forces, maintain our equipment, and to carry out limited modernization.

To those Navy programs which facilitate a maritime strategy and our power projection capability, I give my full support. I consider the revitalization of the Navy's amphibious ship force a priority item since I view with growing concern the alarming downward trend in the amphibious force ship level that has occurred over the past 15 years. Unless we take positive steps now to build additional amphibious ships, I am concerned that when the time comes to protect U.S. global interests we will lack sufficient means to do so.

United States Marines embarked in Navy amphibious ships remain a potent symbol of America's resolve. Moreover, ready amphibious forces comprise the cutting edge for a viable national strategy. Amphibious forces are an essential component of rapid response, power projection, and sea control, but they must be modern and sufficient. To reinforce our recognition of the need for a balanced fleet, we have only to look at the tremendous growth of the Soviet Navy within recent years, its resultant capabilities for imposing sea denial, and its growing capability for power projection.

I assure you that the Marine Corps is ready today should the call come. The individual Marine remains the essential element of our Corps, and I can further assure you that the young men and women who form our ranks are extremely proud to serve as members of our Nation's force-in-readiness. They possess the courage, esprit, training, and physical ability to accomplish the tasks assigned to them. They will continue in their readiness and zeal to be the first to fight.

We welcome the challenges that the 1980s will surely bring, for we consider it a high honor to serve this country well and contribute to its security. We look toward the 1980's, as an era of opportunity for the Corps—a time in which we can amply demonstrate our high utility and preparedness for the Nation's defense.

Finally I want to express my appreciation for your traditional support of the Corps. I look forward to continuing the close association which the Congress and the Corps have enjoyed for so many years.

