CMC FY-82 Posture Statement

by Gen Robert H. Barrow

† *Each year shortly after Congress convenes in January, the Commandant of the Marine Corps appears before the Committees on Armed Forces and Appropriations of both Houses of Congress. He may also appear before elements of the Budget Committees.*

During these appearances the Commandant presents a formal report commonly referred to as his annual Posture Statement. Normally submitted in written form and summarized orally, the Posture Statement is a concise assessment of the condition of the Corps. It sets forth the Marine Corps' fundamental reasons for being, its recent accomplishments, the challenges it faces, and a justification for the Marine Corps related programs and items contained in the President's Budget.

At the various hearings, the oral summary of the Posture Statement is normally followed by a question and answer session. The Commandant's appearances before these committees provides the overview and sets the stage for later testimony by appropriation sponsors, who cover in much greater detail the Marine Corps programs and portion of the budget falling under their cognizance.

In accordance with legislation governing the budget procedure, this year's authorization and appropriation hearings cover appropriation requests for fiscal year 1982, authorization requests for fiscal year 1983, and budget projections for fiscal years 1984-1986. Accordingly, the Posture Statement must encompass these periods.

This year's statement by Gen Barrow was first presented to the House Armed Services Committee on 4 February 1981. It is reprinted here for the benefit of all our readers.

I must first take this opportunity to thank the members of the committee and the entire Congress for the support given to the military Services, particularly to the Marine Corps, during the past year. Combat readiness has improved this past year, as have manpower quality and quantity, and the recently signed budget will enable us to continue our modernization efforts. However, much remains to be done.

Our military forces must be designed to protect and advance our basic national interests, central of which is to maintain the security of our Nation, as well as that of our allies and friends around the world. We seek to deter any aggression that could threaten that security and should deterrence fail, to defeat any military attack. Challenges to that security abound. Continuing global threats require that our readiness, flexibility, and mobility—the hallmarks of the Marine Corps—be enhanced. My greatest concern for today and the future, however, centers around requirements for mobility and addresses our Nation's

inadequate amphibious capability and our limited means of strategic mobility.

The United States is no longer a maritime superpower because we have neglected our maritime heritage and have, over time, allowed serious degradation to occur in both sea control and power projection capabilities. This, in turn, limits our ability to counter or stabilize developments that threaten U.S. interests overseas and makes our traditional naval force deterrent less credible. In addition, inadequate strategic mobility limits deployability and sustainability, both of which constrain our operational capabilities.

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Operational Capabilities

As a maritime nation, the United States is and will continue to be highly dependent on free use of the seas to protect access to scarce strategic resources, to participate in world trade, and to support our alliances abroad. Guaranteeing continued freedom of the seas requires naval forces with the capability to keep sea lines of communication open and to project power ashore when and where it is required. The Marine Corps plays a vital and unique role in providing these two crucial capabilities.

Amphibious task forces provide a means for controlling choke points and narrow sea passages adjacent to our sea lines of communications. They have the capability to seize, occupy, and defend these critical areas, as well as to deny their use to an enemy.

Our Marine landing forces offer a wide range of employment capabilities. Foremost is our ability to conduct a forcible entry on a hostile shore against formidable opposition, a capability *unique* in our country's military arsenal. Inherent in this capability is the ability to open ports, airfields, and other facilities and to seize advanced naval bases. Next, amphibious task forces can provide support and reinforcement for other U.S. forces and those of our allies.

The presence of an amphibious task force near an area faced with crisis sends a strong signal of U.S. resolve to friend and foe alike and displays vividly a strong and versatile capability to deal quickly and effectively with a variety of challenges. Personally, I place a very high value on conventional deterrence. However, if it is to succeed, it must be credible—the kind of credibility found in an amphibious task force poised for action near the crisis area.

Using our forward deployed units as the spearhead, we Marines have capitalized on our unique organization and expeditionary nature in order to provide the nation with a rapid and credible response to crises. Our combined arms, air-ground teams are well-suited to such roles because we take only what we need from our full range of capabilities, task organizing to accomplish the assigned mission, thereby economizing strategic lift assets.

All of our active forces, three Marine amphibious forces (MAFs), are rapid deployment forces. For example, for contingencies in Southwest Asia we can quickly bring to bear a combined arms division/wing team, a MAF, with an amphibious forcible entry capability. Separately or in concert, a brigade can rapidly close the area by a combination of airlift and the sealift of the brigade's equipment, weapons, and supplies prepositioned on ships in the area.

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The key to rapid response in any situation is timely or early decisionmaking. With an early decision, amphibious forces can be positioned in a timely fashion near any potential crisis. While deployment is not commitment, it does provide the nation with flexible response from a force that, by virtue of being positioned afloat, conserves other vital strategic mobility assets and avoids the numerous problems associated with basing in the area or the airlift option. Most importantly, an amphibious task force possesses more combat power than comparable airlifted forces. Marine landing forces provide this nation with its only credible and sustainable forcible entry capability against substantial opposition.

Maritime and land prepositioning programs contribute significantly to our rapid deployment ability.

The maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) program is a mobility enhancement initiative specifically intended to increase the U.S. capability to respond rapidly to a crisis situation with a force having considerable fire-

power, mobility, and antiarmor capability. Under this program, commercial multipurpose ships will be used for the prepositioning of equipment and supplies for three Marine amphibious brigades (MABs). When required, the MAB personnel will be airlifted to an area to link up with its equipment prior to the execution of the assigned mission. The MPS program complements existing strategic mobility capability and offers potential for rapid reinforcement of established forces ashore, thereby reducing reliance on strategic airlift.

The TAKX, an integral part of maritime prepositioning, is a multipurpose ship designed expressly for the maritime prepositioning concept. TAKX provides not only lift capacity but space for essential organizational level maintenance, an environmental preservation capability, and a tactical loading/selective off-load capability. The major advantage is its capability for on-load/off-load without port facilities. The TAKX is superior in this regard to any merchant ship type currently being built in the U.S.

Until the MPS program is established, there are seven near term prepositioned ships (NTPS) positioned at Diego Garcia with equipment for the 7th MAB to assist in responding to a threat in Southwest Asia.

The Marine Corps is also programming for the land prepositioning of equipment, supplies, and ammunition for a Marine amphibious brigade in Norway. This will enhance flexibility and responsiveness to NATO by reducing strategic lift requirements/force closure times and will, in some measure, contribute to the sustainability of forces should they be required to deploy there.

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Having just mentioned sustainability, sustaining units in combat presents other problems. The Marine Corps' supply inventory objective, to support the active and reserve forces, has not been achieved as a result of restrictions levied by the Department of Defense Consolidated Guidance.

Exercising the full range of our capabilities this year, Navy and Marine Corps forces have conducted operations and exercises in Australia, the Caribbean, Denmark, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Tunisia, and Turkey. Verstility of Marine Corps units also has been demonstrated in amphibious and airlift training operations and exercises in jungle, desert, and mountain environments. Additionally,

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Marines have participated in a variety of humanitarian assistance projects including providing relief from natural disasters in the Caribbean and security for refugee camps in the U.S.

Readiness remains my top priority. As I anticipated, the change to the new JCS reporting system (UNITREP) led to a drop in some unit readiness ratings. This was due largely to the requirement to report against wartime tables of organization and equipment. Our capabilities have not been diminished. UNITREP highlights our personnel and materiel deficiencies, and we are using it to improve the balance of resources among our units. We are now better able to determine where we can help ourselves and also where we must ask for help. As a result, it has become apparent that personnel shortages in certain units is a major readiness problem in the Marine Corps. Nonetheless, I remain confident that our units and individual Marines would acquit themselves well if committed to combat today.

Our training programs are effective and enable us to field a well-trained Marine. However, we continually seek improvements through our training.

Programmed improvements at the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) and at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) are expected to pay large dividends. Expanded capabilities at both centers will provide the necessary facilities to support increased training requirements resulting from rapid deployment force (RDF) commitments. The live fire, combined arms exercises at MCAGCC and the introduction of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) will provide yet another dimension which will enhance our ability to train Marines for combat.

We continue to incorporate training in nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) warfare in unit training and exercises. Similarly, electronic warfare is realistically played in our training exercises.

While we are certain that current programs provide a solid foundation for future growth, any optimism must be tempered by the realities of restrictions and encroachment on training areas. These are particularly evidenced by the lack of adequate areas for amphibious and fire and maneuver exercises. To overcome these deficiencies, we have initiated a Corps-wide training area analysis to study our current and future requirements. Concomitantly, we are pursuing a program designed to standardize targets and target systems and to validate training ammunition requirements.

Success in any of our training efforts is directly related to the effectiveness of recruit training. Although continuous review has resulted in some minor refinements, the male recruit program has remained essentially unchanged during the past two years. Marine recruit training is our most precious asset. It has my personal attention in all respects.

"Our biggest manpower challenge now and in the years ahead is both to recruit and to retain the number of qualified individuals we need to man the force structure."

Training initiatives and progress will ensure continued growth and improvement in the operational readiness of today's Marine Corps; however, the capability and spirit of the individual Marine is the foundation of a capable, ready force.

Manpower Matters

Our biggest manpower challenge now and in the years ahead is both to recruit and to retain the number of qualified individuals we need to man the force structure. I am convinced that our society continues to produce many able, spirited individuals who can endure rigorous training, accept firm discipline, respond to sound leadership, and perform in a capable manner. Those individuals can be Marines. We cannot and will not compromise on quality.

Our dedication to quality over the past several years has resulted in fewer losses of individuals prior to completion of their enlistments. This

success has been accompanied by reduced rates of unauthorized absence, desertion, and unacceptable behavior. Clearly, a quality recruit produces a quality Marine.

Despite our improved performance in fiscal year 1980, it is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to recruit qualified manpower from a declining eligible male population. We plan to maintain our goal of 75 percent high school graduates for new recruits. High school graduation continues to be the best predictor of success as a Marine, measured by responsiveness to training, discipline, and conscientious performance of duty. For fiscal year 1980 we exceeded our goal by recruiting 78 percent high school graduates.

Our ability to continue this performance will depend on four principal factors. First, we must continue to apply the necessary resources to the recruiting effort in terms of sufficient talented recruiters, adequate reenlistment bonuses, effective advertising, and necessary supporting capabilities. Second, we must have the authority to conduct routine checks of local police records and high school senior lists. This effort should not be limited by state and local laws denying access to juvenile records and by regulations that prevent effective contact with high school seniors. For several years now, considerable time and money has been spent dealing with numerous fraudulent enlistments which could have been avoided if routine record checks were possible. Legislation to remove these state and local constraints would greatly benefit the military Services. Third, we must continue to emphasize entrance tests that provide accurate estimates of mental ability and literacy. Because of Congressional interest, we now have a good screening test, after suffering through four years with a poor one. Fourth, we must strengthen our military educational benefit program. Providing future opportunity for higher education to Service personnel or their dependents, that is better than what is available to the public at large, could well be the single most significant action that can be taken to attract increased numbers of quality young men and women from the higher mental groups. In sum, recruiting in the all-volunteer force (AVF) environment remains both competitive and expensive, and I urgently seek your continued support for the necessary resources and programs to attract qualified individuals to join the Corps.

The biggest challenge facing the AVF is retention. Legislation passed last year expanding the selective reenlistment bonus program was a major step forward. We expect the expanded bonus program and improvements in compensation will have a positive impact on retention, particularly in the case of career Marines. However, we are still suffering shortages in several technical fields where the training investment is high. I urge your continued support for adequate levels of compensation and reenlistment bonuses that will be necessary to influence these highly skilled career Marines to reenlist.

While fiscal year 1980 saw measured improvements in military compensation, I believe several additional things should be done if adequate force levels and capabilities are to be maintained under the current AVF environment. High priority items include the additional compensation necessary to achieve parity with the civilian sector, travel reimbursements equal to what other Federal employees are receiving, improvements in the military health care system, and a new noncontributory educational benefit program. Additionally, increased funding is required to strengthen long-neglected morale, welfare, recreation, and family assistance support programs. While modest, this increase is necessary to provide minimal community standards in which our Marines and their families can take pride in both their lives and their work.

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We continue to achieve our annual officer procurement requirements with little difficulty. The Platoon Leaders Class program, which you supported so strongly during the last session of Congress, remains the largest single source for Marine officer accessions. Overall, officer retention is satisfactory. Although the long-term trend of increasing attrition of company grade pilots seems to have arrested somewhat, this problem continues to be an area of concern.

In sum, the future of the AVF remains uncertain because of the declining service-eligible population and the turbulent economy at a time when our requirements for skilled people are increasing. I endorse peacetime draft registration and continued close attention to the effectiveness and efficiency of manning the Armed Services entirely with volunteers.

For fiscal year 1982, I am requesting a military end strength of 188,100. This level reflects recent trends in retention that are largely the result of the cumulative effects of reduced attrition and an emphasis on reenlistment. As you are aware, I informed the Congress of these encouraging trends in August of last year. Your actions and support resulted in higher manning levels and greater capability for the Marine Corps. Our expanding commitment to worldwide rapid response as an element of the RDF requires the highest strength achievable. Should conditions show that a further increase in manpower is attainable, I will make that fact known through appropriate channels.

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Our civilian manpower end strength request is 19,476—a level that I consider austere. It represents a small, vital, and highly productive part of the Marine Corps work force. I strongly urge support of initiatives to maintain civilian strength at no less than that currently authorized.

Marine Corps Reserve

A responsive, ready Marine Corps Reserve is essential if the Marine Corps is to meet wartime requirements. The 109,200 members of the Reserve represent 37 percent of the total available Marine Corps manpower.

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) has continued to show steady improvement over the past year. End strength climbed to 35,449 in fiscal year 1980, 5 percent above the figure forecast in the budget. Quality has so improved that 76 percent of the non-prior service accessions in 1980 were high school graduates as compared to 50 percent

in 1975. These trends are expected to continue in fiscal year 1981. The positive trends have been somewhat offset by undesirably low prior service recruiting and high non-end of obligated service attrition.

In fiscal year 1980, of 13 Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System tests conducted on Reserve units, 9 resulted in an evaluation of fully combat ready. All aviation units tested were combat ready. The majority of the 4th Division/Wing team (DWT) units were reported marginally combat ready or better under UNITREP, the major deficiencies being personnel and equipment shortages. Mission readiness was demonstrated through participation in 13 training exercises conducted throughout the United States and at locations overseas, involving 14,382 reservists. Unit drill participation improved this year. Drill participation rates for fiscal year 1980 were 99 percent for officers and 87 percent for enlisted.

While manpower and unit readiness continue to improve, the equipment status has not changed significantly from my last report. The most critical areas are in communication/electronic, NBC, engineer, and motor transport equipment. I anticipate these major deficiencies will persist in fiscal year 1983, but I am optimistic that they will be improved by fiscal year 1986. We must continue to be conscious of an aging inventory of aviation assets which further detract from the capability of the Reserve forces.

For mobilization, the prime source of individual fillers will be the 55,000 Individual Ready Reserve.

While the statistical picture is favorable, lessons learned from mobilization exercises have shown that the size, diversity, and turnover of this manpower source is such that the present managerial structure is inadequate to effectively categorize, preassign, predesignate, and train these individuals. Greater emphasis will be placed on grouping and preassigning or predesignating individual reservists according to known mobilization requirements, and increasing mobilization readiness through the Reserve counterpart and skill refresher training programs.

Force Modernization

I realize that our future readiness is directly related to the actions we take now to modernize our forces. This means significant investment in new but proven systems that will keep us ready for tomorrow's battlefield.

Emphasis in our ground forces will be to increase and improve tactical mobility and firepower. A prime example of tactical mobility is our LVT7A1. As the result of a service life extension program, the utility of our current LVT7 as the principal vehicle for amphibious assault and ground tactical mobility will be prolonged through the 1980s. The LVT7A1, to be fielded in 1983, will incorporate improvements in operational capabilities to include a weapons firing station as well as enhanced reliability, availability, and maintainability.

As many of you already know, we are also looking to complement the firepower and mobility of assault elements by acquisition of a light armored vehicle (LAV). "Off-the-Shelf" procurement will commence next fiscal year with the first version of this family of helicopter-transportable vehicles scheduled to reach the field in 1983. It is intended that the LAV will be introduced in battalion-sized organizations which integrate the several variants of the vehicle into a fully capable maneuver unit. In addition to the basic light assault vehicle, these variants may include an assault gun version, an antitank version and an air-defense version among other possibilities. The battalion will be highly mobile, both strategically and tactically. We are currently planning to introduce three of these battalions into the Fleet Marine Forces.

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A program I would like to emphasize again this year, is the Navy's revolutionary landing craft air cushion (LCAC) program. This improvement in landing craft technology is the most significant advance in amphibious warfare since introduction of the helicopter. The LCAC travels at speeds up to 50 knots and can land on 70 percent of the world's littoral—a 4:1 improvement over today's capability. It provides flexibility in the ship-to-shore movement by virtue of its across-the-beach capability and longer range. The LCAC will provide us with speed and will contribute to surprise through greater standoff distances, thereby reducing the vulnerability of our amphibious ships to enemy fire. The LCAC offers an opportunity we as a maritime nation must seize.

We have an R&D program underway that will provide our Marines with a mobile protected weapons system (MPWS) which will give them organic direct fire support capabilities. The helicopter transportable MPWS will be capable of defeating enemy armor, materiel, and personnel targets. We expect to introduce it into the Fleet Marine Force by 1988.

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While the Marine Corps continues to make steady improvement in NBC defense, our capability in this area is marginal. We begin this year to add sorely needed NBC defense units to our structure at the division, wing, and force service support group levels. Much equipment modernization remains, and I urge you to be especially attentive to this requirement. As a nation we must establish a credible retaliatory capability to deter enemy use of chemical weapons. I fully support the Army as the executive agent for NBC efforts in all phases of research and development of needed equipment, particularly in the development of the binary program as a means of achieving a chemical retaliatory capability.

The requirement to modernize the aviation component of our Marines air-ground team remains one of the Marine Corps' high priorities. Our aviation combat element must be at least technologically equal, if not superior, to the enemy threat. As I stressed last year, the AV-8B remains Marine aviation's highest priority modernization program. Because of the continued strong support of the Congress, this important modernization program is proceeding to a 1985 initial operating capability (IOC). The very successful YAV-8B test program has so positively demonstrated the capabilities of the AV-8B that the technical excellence of this aircraft is

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no longer a question. The AV-8B's V/STOL performance and range characteristics make this aircraft particularly well suited for rapid deployment. The AV-8B has also been designed to take advantage of state-of-the-art technology that should allow our Marine light attack force to meet the projected threat through the year 2000 and beyond.

There has been some concern expressed over the relatively small numbers of AV8Bs to be procured for the Marine Corps. I am confident that the program will grow in size beyond the 336 aircraft currently projected for Marine acquisition. Other countries are impressed by the aircraft and its unique V/STOL capabilities, and foreign military sales opportunities could result in substantial program growth in the future.

The fiscal year 1981 funding appropriated by the Congress will produce four full scale development aircraft and provides long lead funding for 12 pilot production aircraft. Requested funding in the fiscal year 1982 budget provides for continued Research & Development; however, due to fiscal constraints and other considerations, no money has been allocated for procurement.

The Marine Corps strongly supports the F/A-18 program, and we look forward to the F/A-18 as a replacement for the capable but aging F-4s in our 12 active Marine fighter/attack squadrons. I view the AV-8B and F/A18 not as competitive programs, but rather as mutually supportive weapon systems, possessing separate characteristics and performing different missions. An analysis of our fighter/attack modernization requirements indicates that a mix of aircraft, including AV-8Bs for the close air support mission and F/A-18s to meet our air-to-air defense requirement and provide an additional air-to-ground capability, is the best force available today.

The A-6E Intruder aircraft provides our Marine air-ground task forces with the preponderant share of close air support and interdiction during inclement weather and periods of decreased visibility. With the continuing shortage of naval gunfire assets, all-weather, close air support becomes even more important to successful Marine combat operations. The 12 A-6Es provided by the Congress in fiscal year 1981 along with the 4 A-6Es requested in the fiscal year 1982 budget will assist in maintaining our current Marine A-6E force level at 50 aircraft in 5 tactical squadrons, and I fully support this procurement.

With the recent delivery of our 15th aircraft, the EA-6B aircraft is now fully integrated into Marine aviation. This outstanding electronic counter measures aircraft acts as a force multiplier by providing increased aircraft survivability against enemy air defenses during close air and other offensive air operations. The 6 EA-6Bs provided by the Congress in fiscal year 1981 will assist in maintaining our current fiscally constrained Department of Navy (DON) EA-6B structure at 36 Navy and 15 Marine aircraft. This structure is insufficient, and we have an objective of building to a 48 Navy and 18 Marine EA-6B force, which, though short of full wartime requirements, will more closely match our current needs. By replacing one year of peacetime attrition aircraft, we maintain our current DON 51-aircraft structure.

The 49 CH-53E heavy lift helicopters funded by the Congress through fiscal year 1981 will provide 33 aircraft to the Marine Corps. These aircraft will be operated in two 15-plane squadrons. Because our current hea vy lift requirement is for three 16-aircraft squadrons with appropriate pipeline, training, and advanced attrition aircraft, we have a procurement objective of 78 Marine aircraft. The CH-53Es requested for fiscal year 1982 procurement are necessary if we are to proceed in an orderly fashion toward what I see as a minimum CH-53E force structure.

Within the DON's medium helicopter force, we are experiencing both inventory and performance deficiencies. DON procured its last medium helicopter in 1973, and these aircraft are approaching block obsolescence. The Marine Corps is now severely contrained in the support of the ship-to-shore movement and subsequent operations ashore requiring vertical lift capability for tactical mobility. In an effort to correct the Navy and Marine Corps medium helicopters deficiencies with a single aircraft, we are pursuing a program called the HXM designed to replace three medium helicopters (H-3, CH-46, CH-53A/D). The $5.3 million RDT&E funding requested for the HXM in fiscal year 1982 will allow us to begin this program. The requested fiscal year 1982 start will permit source selection in fiscal year 1983 and an IOC of the early 1990s. We will face an unacceptable mission risk if this program is delayed past a fiscal year 1982 start and and the IOC for the HXM is pushed into the mid-1990s, when our medium helicopter inventory will be below minimum risk requirements.

The procurement of air deliverable antiarmor weapons has not kept pace with the capabilities of our delivery aircraft. We need an array of air delivered weapons to meet the armored threat on the modern battlefield including standoff precision guided munitions, area/area denial weapons, and a multimission aircraft gun. We are evaluating the Imaging Infrared Maverick and wide-area antiarmor munitions as midrange solutions to the armor threat problem, but we need a near term solution. I recommend that we procure state-of-the-art antiarmor weapons now completing development, such as Laser Maverick, the 25mm multipurpose gun, Gator, and the Hellfire missile, as a near term solution to improve our antiarmor inventory.

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Just as our Marine air-ground task forces will meet a formidable armored threat on the modern battlefields, they will also have to contend with a formidable enemy air threat over the battlefield. To assist in successfully combatting this air threat, we plan to increase by one-third the strength of our light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalions, eqipped with Improved Hawk (IHAWK) missiles which will engage low to medium altitude enemy aircraft. We also plan on increasing existing structure with additional forward area air defense (FAAD) platoons, equipped with Stinger missiles, to improve our ground air-defense capability against low-flying enemy aircraft.

For our Marine aviation combat element to sustain itself in any combat scenario, an increase in the inventory quantities of conventional air-to-ground ordnance, air-to-air munitions, and aircraft spare parts is required. I support fully the efforts in this budget request to increase the funding levels for the programs that

provide our air delivered munitions and increase the on-hand aircraft spares.

As part of force modernization, we are developing tactical command and control systems capable of providing the commander with faster and more accurate information to assist in making combat decisions. The Position Location Report System (PLRS), in joint development with the Army for introduction in 1984, will provide the infantryman with his real-time exact location and the location of friendly units. Position information will be provided to the Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System (MIFASS) which will then automate the coordination of supporting arms (mortars, artillery, naval gunfire, and direct air support). MIFASS, in full-scale engineering development for introduction in 1986, provides the commander with a system which will graphically display in real-time the unit's tactical area of responsibility. It will also facilitate support planning and receive, store, and display target intelligence. MIFASS, in conjunction with PLRS, will provide the Marine Corps with a responsive, accurate, and safe means of providing fire support for combat units.

In order to provide the commander more time for decision-making and battle management, the Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) System is being developed. TCO will assist the commander and his staff in carrying out the functions of operations and intelligence, including the production and dissemination of intelligence and the planning and directing of combat operations. TCO is presently undergoing engineering study.

In order to support these emerging tactical command and control systems, enhancements and new capabilities are required in communications. The modernization of communications systems, converting from analog systems to digital systems, will provide rapid, reliable, and flexible service. Our new communications systems will be more secure and compatible with other systems. For worldwide communications, the Marine Corps utilizes both satellites and high frequency radios. For tactical communications, the Marine Corps is developing new families of manpack radios which will be lighter, more reliable, more secure, and Service interoperable. In addition, the digital communication terminal to be introduced in 1984 will offer quantum improvements in the speed and reliability of communications.

The Marine Corps has studied the feasibility of using smaller numbers of higher capacity vehicles as part of the field logistics system. A goal is to meet our requirements while obtaining a reduction in the variety and total number of vehicles. Those reductions will provide the opportunity for associated reductions in operators, maintenance personnel, and training effort.

Our motor transport fleet is currently in a transition/modernization period. The current 5-ton and 2½-ton vehicle fleets have reached the end of their service life and are being replaced by the product improved 5-ton M939 series of vehicles. This new series of vehicles offers greater transport capacity. Fielding of these vehicles is anticipated in the 3d quarter fiscal year 1982. Additionally, the ¼ to 1¼-ton vehicle and trailer fleets are scheduled for replacement by a single vehicle, the 5/4-ton high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle. This vehicle will be configured to meet multimission roles to include command and control, fire support, communications, and tactical mobility. We are currently engaged in a joint development program with the Army and Air Force. Modernization of our tactical vehicle fleet [motor transport] is one of my top priorities.

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During the past two years we have made notable progress in bringing our field logistics system from conception to fruition. This family of new equipment, designed to give the Marine Corps an increased logistical capability that will meet our support requirements, is scheduled for introduction in fiscal year 1982. Our initial procurements of shelters, water purification equipment, container handlers, and utilities distribution equipment which began last fiscal year, will be delivered early next year. I am pleased with our progress in introducing this system and believe it represents a quantum, and much needed, increase in our logistics support capability.

During the past year the Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and the Naval Medical Material Command, has developed new Authorized Medical Allowance Lists which are reflective of current medical technological advances, the consolidated combat service support concept, and the anticipated casualty rate on a high intensity modern battlefield. However, it is significant to point out that these new allowance lists will provide the minimum medical care required to sustain life and stabilize Marines prior to evacuation.

Savings Through Efficiency

The Marine Corps is reorganizing its data processing support structure by consolidating its 24 computer centers into 7. Supporting this reorganization and redesign of key automated information systems is the acquisition of more modern, capable, and reliable equipment. Existing 12-to 15-year old computers do not provide satisfactory reliability or processing capability. Redesigned automated information systems for supply, financial, and personnel management will utilize computer terminals located worldwide.

To enhance managerial efficiency of our automated information systems, small unit commanders within the FMF are now being provided a source data automation device. This DOD pilot project will analyze the benefits of providing readily deployable automatic data processing equipment to battalion/squadron levels to enhance the timeliness and accuracy of data input.

Research and Development

One of our principal research and development efforts is the Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE). The MULE is a manpacked, precision ground laser designator that will accurately determine the direction and range to targets, thereby enhancing the accuracy of conventional fire support weapons. The MULE also provides laser designation compatible with precision laser guided munitions. It is functionally modular and can be employed in the hand-held mode by small units. Procurement of MULE commences in fiscal year 1982 with IOC by fiscal year 1984.

A collateral R&D project is the 155mm cannon launched guided projectile (Copperhead). Copperhead is a fin-stabilized, semiactive, laser guided projectile employed in the indirect fire mode, designed to destroy or neutralize moving and stationary hard point targets. Copperhead will enhance our antiarmor capability. Pro-

curement is to begin in fiscal year 1982 with IOC in fiscal year 1983.

The Marine Corps has a long standing requirement for a semi-automated tactical intelligence system. Intelligence staffs have a requirement to process large quantities of information into timely and accurate intelligence, to quickly disseminate intelligence, and to more effectively manage the intelligence effort. The intelligence analysis center provides for these requirments.

The team-portable direction finding and airborne radio direction finding systems will replace antiquated, expensive to maintain equipment and provide the landing force commander with radio direction finding capability during the amphibious assault phase and subsequent operations ashore.

The requirement remains for tactical signals intelligence direct support at the battalion and higher headquarters level. The Integrated Communications Collection/Signals Analysis System (ICC/SIAS) provides the battlefield commander with the signals intelligence support required on the electronic battlefield.

Another one of our most important aviation programs is the Tactical Air Operation Central 85 (TAOC- 85) Program with production planned in 1983-86. The TAOC-85 will replace aging air defense command and control equipment in the 1985 through 1988 period. The Air Force and the Army have also expressed interest in this program.

Amphibious Lift

Earlier I touched on our major concern for the future of amphibious lift. Power projection from the seas requires substantial increases in amphibious lift capability to carry out national strategy. Depending on amphibious task force configuration, the lift requirement is about 20 ships to carry a Marine amphibious brigade. Approximately 50 ships are required

"Power projection from the sea requires substantial increases in amphibious lift capability to carry out national strategy."

to carry the assault echelon (AE) of the Marine amphibious force (MAF (AE)). The MAF is the minimum force size necessary for sustained combat operations against determined opposition.

To provide a reasonable assurance of success in the event of a general war of global proportions, we must have the capability to conduct simultaneous MAF amphibious assaults. In the present inventory there are only 67 amphibious ships, active and reserve. Because 15 percent of the ships will always be in maintenance, only enough lift for 1 MAF (AE) is available and ships must swing from one ocean to another to provide this capability.

"All but six of the current inventory of amphibious ships will leave the fleet by 2002 . . . ."

The current Five-Year Defense Program provides for 1.15 MAF (AE) lift. Our national objectives have been fixed on maintaining our current lift capability for the foreseeable future through replacement and modernization only. The current inventory of amphibious ships was, for the most part, acquired during the 60s to replace World War II vintage ships. Because they were built in the same period, they will become obsolete at about the same time. All but six of the current inventory of amphibious ships will leave the fleet by 2002, beginning with the loss of the first ship of the LSD-28 class in 1984. We need to begin now to alleviate this "block obsolescence" problem through a reasonable and affordable program of replacements and service life extensions during the period fiscal year 1981-2002. The longer the delay, the less time available and the higher will be the build rate, the cost, and consequently, the military risk. To maintain the current inventory level, approximately three amphibious ships per year of the same general capabilities of present ships, need to be built.

In reality, the fiscally contrained budget does not provide the amphibious life required to support national strategy. As an interim goal, we need enough ships to lift the assault echelon of a MAF and MAB simultaneously. This would require approximately 83 ships of the capabilities similar to those which currently exist. To reach the inventory objective we must build the equivalent lift of five ships per year of current capability for the next eight years.

To achieve a 2-MAF lift, about 115 ships, measured in terms of the capability of current ships, are required. An average of 5 ships per year over 20 years will achieve this goal. Time is of the essence and I entrust the Congress to treat the matter of amphibious lift with the urgency it so clearly merits.

I view the increasing shortfall of naval gunfire support with concern. Although not an equal replacement for a major caliber gun, the 5-inch guided projectile program with Seafire, an electro-optical gunfire control sytem, provides the capability to carry out the naval gunfire support mission. The Marine Corps vigorously supports Navy efforts to develop, procure, and install improved guns on designated ships. Additionally, reactivation of the four Iowa Class Battleships would provide, within two or three years, a dramatic increase in our major caliber gun capability. The battleships are high survivable, multipurpose, offensive weapons systems with an impressive array of guns to provide fire support during and subsequent to amphibious operations.

We must develop our mine countermeasures technology and improve our capabilities against the increasing Soviet mine threat. Although the LCAC will be less vulnerable, the magnitude of the Soviet threat demands intensive research in this area. I support Navy efforts in the development of critical antimine technology.

The serious shortage of adequate in-theater medical support capability continues to be a concern to both the Navy and Marine Corps. Recently, I initiated steps to activate three medical companies and a hosptial company in the combat service support elements of our Marine am-

"The serious shortage of adequate in-theater medical support capability continues to be a concern to both the Navy and Marine Corps."

phibious forces. When fully activated, these companies will increase the organic medical support capability.

A serious shortfall exists in Navy furnished hospital beds and facilities. This shortfall amounts to 7,000 hospital beds and 56 operating rooms required to support amphibious operations. The critical aspect of this shortfall is the lack of surgical and acute care capability. If these requirements are not met, we risk inceased mortality and the loss of personnel who otherwise might be returned to duty. The program under development by the Navy to correct this problem is

the Fleet Hospital Program. Fleet hospitals are large, self-contained, transportable units designed to provide emergency lifesaving care and recuperative care to Fleet and Fleet Marine Force combat unit personnel. The Navy's five-year procurement strategy includes a mix of medical care units and ancillary support systems to support Marine Corps operations in either industrialized theaters or in areas where host nation support is unavailable.

Equally important is the feasibility study concerning the conversion of the SS *United States* to a hospital ship and activating the hospital ship USS *Sanctuary*. The overall goal is a 2,000-bed, 24-operating room definitive care facility capable of providing full medical support as a self-sufficient hospital in combat areas worldwide in support of an amphibious assault.

I fully welcome and support these Navy initiatives.

Quality of Life Programs

The quality of life of the individual Marine remains one of my highest priorities. Of immediate concern is the Marine Corps Military Construction Program for the next five years. I believe that improved living accommodations for both accompanied and unaccompanied personnel provide immediate and long-range benefits. During the next five years the Marine Corps intends to devote approximately $250 million to construction and modernization of unaccompanied personnel housing, 95 percent of which will be spent to improve the living conditions of our enlisted Marines to DOD standards. In additon, an unprogrammed deficiency of $105 million will remain in bachelor housing.

"During the next five years the Marine Corps intends to devote approximately $250 million to construction and modernization of unaccompanied personnel housing . . . . "

Besides improving living conditions for our Marines, adequate support facilities must also be provided. Accordingly, the Marine Corps intends to spend approximately $18 million for modernization, expansion, and construction of dining facilities. Ancillary projects include new and improved facilities for recreation and physical fitness over the next five year. This program represents an unprogrammed deficiency of $10 million. With your assistance, I intend to increase the quality of Marine life by enhancing living conditions and improving the support facilities.

Funding By Major Category

For comparison, our fiscal year 1981 budget and the fiscal year 1982 request are displayed by appropriation in Table I.

The funding requested for fiscal year 1982 will support an end strength of 188,100 active duty Marines and provide funds for an increase in the average strength of the SMCR. Likewise, it will improve the readiness of our force by funding additional training exercises and operations, by replacing obsolete equipment, and by modernizing our weapons systems.

A significant increase in the operations budget is attributable to price growth. Program growth is necessary for funding Phase V of the six-month unit deployment program, for exercising and training our units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force, and for funding transportation costs for the movement of cargo and equipment of the maritime prepositioning ships program.

The requested increases in our procurement appropriation will improve readiness and sustainability for combat. A significant portion of this growth is related to the maritime prepositioning ships program. Major new programs include the position location and reporting system, the light armored vehicle, and modernization of our aging battlefield mobility assets and engineering capabilities. The sustainability of our force will be improved by the acquisition of ammunition, a service life extension program for our amphibious combat vehicle, and by increasing the capability of our support forces to provide water, fuel, and electrical power to the combat units.

Request for the stock fund will improve supplies of cold weather and chemical protective clothing for increased operation and training requirements.

($ in million)

APPROPRIATION	FY 1981	FY 1982
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	2,614.2	2,725.7
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	119.5	123.2
Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps	1,037.5	1,127.7
Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve	29.0	31.8
Procurement, Marine Corps	488.8	1,172.4
Marine Corps Stock Fund	4.1	4.2
Total	4,293.0	5,185.0

TABLE I

1982/1983 Authorization Requests

The Marine Corps fiscal years 1982 and 1983 authorization requests are highlighted in Table II.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this report has been to convey to you and the members of this committee my assessment on the state of the Marine Corps. In my report, I have outlined our salient capabilities, highlighted our achievements within the past year, and identified those programs which I deem essential for the performance of our statutory mission. Much has been accomplished within the past year; however, I want to emphasize that while gains have been made, much more remains to be accomplished. I am dedicated to maintaining a strong and ready Marine Corps and can assure the members of this committee that the funding we have requested represents a sound in-

(Manpower-actuals; $ in millions)

CATEGORY	FY 1982	FY 1983
Active Duty End Strength	188,100	188,100
Selected Reserve Average Strength	37,000	37,700
Civilian Personnel End-Strength[1] (USMC Portion of DON Request)	19,476	19,476
Average Military Student Training Load, Active	18,311	17,656
Average Military Student Training Load, Reserve	2,835	2,835
Procurement Requiring Authorization	426.1	425.0
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps[2]	1,127.7	1,258.4
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps Reserve[2]	31.8	32.0

[1]Includes 17,998 O&MMC: 160 O&MMCR and 1,318 MCIF.

[2]Includes funds to support the number of training days for the combat arms battalions and number of vehicle overhauls.

TABLE II

vestment in the Nation's future.

The commitment I made here last year—to be unwavering in my dedication to having a Marine Corps that is without peer in performance, training, and quality of people—remains steady. During the past year, combat readiness has been my top priority, and the Marine Corps is prepared to demonstrate our readiness to deploy and ability to fight. Combat readiness, which has been the benchmark of Marine Corps' history, will remain the focal point of all our future efforts. And readiness is a function of training. From recruit training to advanced combined arms air-ground team instruction, our training is tough and demanding. That too, will remain. I am committed to providing training that is challenging and realistic, and I can assure you that Marines will continue to be exposed to conditions which approximate those existing on the modern battlefield.

"I am committed to providing training that is challenging and realistic . . . ."

Manpower quality is a major concern to me, because it, too, directly affects our readiness. The individual Marine is the essential element of our Corps, and the quality of that Marine is the key to the successful accomplishment of our mission. For this reason, I am determined to maintain the high standards we have established and will continue to emphasize the recruitment and retention of personnel of the highest caliber.

The modernization programs that I have identified in my report are austere and represent only our most urgently needed requirements. These programs are directed primarily toward improving our tactical mobility and increasing our firepower. Your support of these programs will permit us to strengthen our current capabilities and make a modest investment in future systems.

"Manpower quality is a major concern to me, because it, too, directly affects our readiness. The individual Marine is the essential element of our Corps, and the quality of that Marine is the key to the successful accomplishment of our mission."

The drama now unfolding in the Persian Gulf region is, in my judgment, only a precursor of the momentous events that could occur during the 1980s. We live in a time of unprecedented political instability; the potential for conflict in the world today is great. I see nothing on the horizon to suggest that the tensions that now exist among nations are going to dissipate. The indication is that they will grow in intensity in the coming years and may well place in jeopardy our national interests and our very survival. Should that happen, we must be in a position to act. We must be capable of placing in close proximity to any crisis area a combat ready force which can support our diplomatic efforts. The Marine Corps is a force-in-readiness. Marines have been ready and are prepared today, should the call come, to demonstrate that we are indeed the Nation's force-in-readiness.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to share with you and the members of this committee a few personal thoughts about today's Marine. Earlier in my report, I mentioned that readiness is a function of training and manpower. I submit, however, that combat readiness is more than the mere preparation of equipment and personnel. The readiness of an organization also depends a great deal on the spirit, sense of purpose, courage, enthusiasm, and resolve of the individuals who make up that organization. Today's Marines possess those qualities. I see it daily in their performance. They are proud of what they are doing; they are eager to serve their country. I reject the notion advanced by some that this young generation does not measure up to the traditional standards. I assure you that they do. In general, it is my judgment that they are smarter, better trained, more physcially fit, and more capable than their predecessors. If called upon, they will respond—they will fight—they will give a good account of themselves. They only require that we support them. I am committed to do so. USMC

"I submit, however, that combat readiness is more than the mere preparation of equipment and personnel. The readiness of an organization also depends a great deal on the spirit, sense of purpose, courage, enthusiasm, and resolve of the individuals who make up that organization."