



*Warrior training at Camp Pendleton's School of Infantry—"All Marines, regardless of MOS, train vigorously on infantry combat techniques."*

(Photo by SSGt Christopher Grey)



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contribute to these instabilities. We can only speculate on the outcome, but relatively recent instability embroiled the world in two wars within a period of less than 30 years. While our national military strategy remains solidly based on deterrence and forward defense, we must consider how it will be influenced by the changes in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

### **Regional Threat**

As we reassess the threat, it becomes apparent that any number of regional powers with competing ideologies, cultures, and nationalistic aspirations could threaten our global interests. These regional powers, either present or emerging, provide our most likely sources of conflict. They have the potential to trigger a U.S. military response to protect our vital interests. We can expect these nations to have sophisticated high-technology weapons, to include weapons of mass destruction, and well-trained armies. They need not be superpowers; North Korea, Iran, Libya, Cuba, and Nicaragua are cases in point. Our interests in stability and our support for our friends and allies around the world illustrate the need for a military capability broader than the defense of our homeland.

Our economic health and well-being, and that of our allies, depend on international trade and unimpeded use of the seas. The United States' dependence on world trade has risen from \$16.3 billion in 1960 to \$460 billion in 1988, and our reliance on other nations for oil and critical mineral imports continues to increase. These interests can be threatened at several critical points throughout the globe. The four geographical areas that I believe offer the most potential for future conflict are the emerging nations of the Pacific rim, the mineral rich nations of Africa, the volatile nations of the Middle East, and the turbulent nations of Latin America. All of these areas are currently dealing with active insurgencies that potentially threaten our interests and those of our allies. Latin America, for instance, is embroiled in wars against narcoterrorism and insurgency. Its proximity to the U.S. border makes it an area of immediate concern.

### **Strategy**

Our future strategy should be based on our ability to respond to a wide va-

riety of threats. The issues are complex and they increase the need for wisdom and a long-range perspective in our decisions. We must retain the ability to respond to unforeseen crises, or be content with the role of casual observer. Weakness, real or perceived, invites attack or at least abuse. Military strength takes considerable time and capital to build. We cannot allow ourselves to regress to an era of budget driven strategy. Rather, our strategy must be firmly based upon our enduring national interests and an assessment of the threat to these interests. We must, therefore, consider all elements of the equation simultaneously, and not focus on the most obvious one: improved relations with the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction of the Soviet threat.

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As a maritime nation, we cannot dismiss our geography and the unique requirements it imposes. We are dependent on the free use of the sea lines of communications and access to the natural resources of the world for our economic and security needs. For the past 40 years, we have been a maritime nation with a continental strategy, while the Soviet Union, a continental nation, pursued a maritime strategy. The changes in the international security environment provide a golden opportunity for us to reassess our position, take advantage of these changes, and pursue our goals in a manner consistent with our national character. Today's corollary to yesterday's "keep your powder dry" is "keep your naval forces at sea."

### **Naval Force Requirements**

Geography and today's international political climate validate the requirement for naval forces. Since World War II, naval forces have responded to over 80 percent of all international crises. Given the political and economic densities of the world's littorals, we can reasonably expect that the majori-

ty of international crises will continue to occur in areas accessible from the sea.

We are facing a future where access to overseas bases and support for forward based forces are decreasing. Deterrence and forward defense under these conditions put a premium on capable, mobile, logically independent naval forces able to demonstrate U.S. presence and power projection capability on the horizon of all but a handful of countries. Naval forces operating in international waters provide our decisionmakers with a "sheathed sword." They can be positioned off the coast, either over the horizon or in full view of a potential adversary, to convey our national intent. They are a visible representation of America's willingness to resolve a crisis diplomatically or politically, but also indicate that, as a last resort, we will "draw our sword" and respond militarily. The fact that the overwhelming majority of crises to which naval forces have responded since 1945 were resolved without military intervention further underscores the deterrent value of naval power.

### **The Corps**

A unique characteristic of United States naval power is the inclusion of a completely integrated, air-ground, force in readiness—the United States Marine Corps. We are a combined arms force designed to provide the Nation a ready crisis response capability. When required, we are capable of forcibly projecting and sustaining combat power into a hostile region.

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Following enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, which set forth the composition and functional responsibilities of the Armed Forces, your predecessors in these halls met again in 1952 to define more specifically the

roles of the Services. The record of those hearings provides insight into the intent of Congress, as it viewed the need for a Marine Corps, and the wisdom in the deliberations that took place concerning it. Our legislators envisioned a force of combined arms in the Active structure which, in partnership with the Navy, would provide the ready, expeditionary forces necessary to protect U.S. interests abroad. Being naval in character, yet oriented in function to the land and air, such a force could operate with the fleet around the world. This force would be independent of the requirements for overseas basing, yet able to provide the complete spectrum of response to "... minor international disturbances."

The lawmakers envisioned, beyond this purpose, that such an organization would be available for other "... duties as the President may direct." For almost 40 years, these requirements have been the blueprint for your Corps' strategic, operational, and program planning efforts.

Today, forces of combined arms are formed from the resources contained within our divisions, aircraft wings, and support units into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). These unique, flexible formations range from small special purpose forces to large Marine expeditionary forces of 50,000 or more personnel. MAGTFs can be configured as light, air transportable, self-sustaining expeditionary forces; as powerful assault forces capable of employment from amphibious shipping; or as mechanized forces to be flown to, equipped from, and sustained for an extended period by our maritime pre-positioning ships squadrons. ♪

We provide each of the warfighting commanders in chief (CinCs) of the unified commands with an array of force employment options that take full advantage of our capabilities and

multiple means of deployment. Marines embarked aboard our Navy's amphibious ships provide a self-sustaining, forcible entry capability that can be flexibly sized to mission requirements. As our access to overseas bases and overflight rights decreases, our reliance on this capability for crisis response will become even greater. Shortly after the turn of the century, however, over 50 percent of our current amphibious ships will reach block obsolescence. We must have your support for a vibrant amphibious shipbuilding program, otherwise, our Nation's ability to maintain forward presence around the world and to project and sustain power, when needed, will be severely reduced.

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We can also deploy MAGTFs by airlifting Marines, helicopters, and tactical aircraft to locations where they can be aligned with either an MPS squadron or our pre-positioned equipment and supplies in Norway. In the first case, a brigade of Marines, as large as 17,000 personnel, 60 helicopters, and 70 tactical fighter aircraft can be deployed by strategic airlift to link up with one of the three MPS squadrons along the littorals of the world. Fewer than 250 C-141 equivalent strategic airlift sorties are required to deploy the entire force. To deploy this same size force, together with 30 days of sustainability without these strategically mobile, floating warehouses, would require approximately 4,500 sorties. This would severely tax our strategic airlift resources. The MPS brigades can be deployed, linked up with their equipment, and ready for employment in under 10 days. This unique strategic mobility enhancement and force deployment option is afloat now. It is an extraordinary program, set into motion a decade ago, and

available today. Its readiness is maintained by regularly scheduled exercises conducted around the globe. In a quantitative sense, the three MPS squadrons strategically disposed in the Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Atlantic Ocean enable the Nation to deploy at a cumulative cost of under 750 strategic airlift sorties, 51,000 Marines, 180 helicopters, and over 200 tactical aircraft in response to a crisis, regional conflict, or war. We are continuing to refine the structure of these maritime pre-positioned forces to provide increased flexibility when a force of less than brigade size is required.

In 1980, to strengthen the defense of NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization's) vital northern flank, the United States earmarked a brigade of Marines for reinforcement of this region. The supplies and equipment for the brigade are stored in underground storage facilities in Norway. A MAGTF of approximately 13,000 Marines can be airlifted to join with this equipment and be ready for operations in just 10 days.

The third dimension of our crisis response capability, or our ability to reinforce rapidly our forward-deployed amphibious forces, rests in our three Marine Air Contingency Force packages that are on ready alert throughout the world every day. These forces are light brigades, poised for world-wide deployment via strategic airlift, beginning within four hours of notification. They are a means of deploying Marine forces rapidly to a crisis, or of rapidly expanding the capabilities of amphibious or maritime pre-positioned forces already committed.

The Nation has at its call today a Corps capable of service at sea, on land, or in the air; a Corps highly trained, well equipped, with high levels of sustainment, completely integrated as an air-ground package, and not dependent upon the mobilization of a single Marine to respond to crisis or meet its wartime commitments. With a combination of amphibious ships, MPS and land pre-positioning, and strategic airlift, you can deploy the Corps where you need it, and when you need it—NOW!

#### **Current Operations**

The past year has once again been a period that validated our aggregate utility and our focus on low- to mid-intensity conflict. Marines responded to crises throughout the world in Leb-

anon, Panama, and the Philippines. Naval forces responded to crises in Lebanon on two occasions. The Lebanese Civil War in February and the hostage crisis in August of last year found Marine expeditionary units, with special operations capabilities, as part of a naval task group poised off the coast for potential evacuation operations. Two years ago, Marines deployed to Panama in April of 1988 to augment the Marine Security Force ashore at the canal. In May of last year, following the violent election campaign in Panama, a company of Marines with their light armored vehicles was deployed to reinforce U.S. forces. Finally, in December of 1989, all of these Marines participated in Operation JUST CAUSE.

Perhaps the most visible representation of the utility of naval forces was the crisis response to the recent coup attempt in the Philippines. Four Marine combat elements responded immediately. The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was already en route to the Philippines to participate in an exercise. Marines from the brigade were flown in to augment the security forces at the Subic Bay Naval Base. A Marine expeditionary unit, embarked aboard ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, was standing by off the coast and prepared for operations. A company of Marines from the Marine Corps Security Force at Subic Bay reinforced the Marine security guards at the American Embassy within minutes after the coup attempt. Finally, an air contingency force of 2,000 more Marines stood by on four-hour alert on Okinawa ready to deploy by airlift to the Philippines if required.

Last year also saw Marines involved in the fight against the flow of illegal narcotics into our country. Aviation, intelligence, and ground reconnaissance support was provided to law enforcement agencies operating in the Caribbean and along the southwest border. Marines working closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) helped train their agents before they deploy to South America, and assist DEA in planning its active operations. These activities concentrate on the supply side, but perhaps even more important, we are attacking the demand side of the equation with equal vigor. Active duty, Reserve, and retired Marines were and remain actively involved in youth antidrug edu-

cation programs throughout the country. Our work with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, both in law enforcement and social service, has forged a formidable partnership in support of our President's goal for a drug free society. At home, Marines assisted with humanitarian relief efforts following Hurricane Hugo and the San Francisco earthquake, and participated in the Alaskan oil spill cleanup operation.

The diverse missions accomplished by Marines throughout the past year illustrate the broad utility of the Corps to the Nation in any form of crisis. The day-to-day high level of readiness of all Marines enables us to concern ourselves with the question "How quickly can we get there?" and not, "Are we ready to go?" Whether via amphibious shipping, strategic airlift, pre-positioning, or a combination of all three, Marines can respond to a crisis with the combat power required, and equally as important, the sustainability to win.

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As a military service, our responsibility is to provide forces to the combatant commanders that are structured, trained, and equipped to meet their needs. Using the direction contained in National Security Decision Directive 219 and the mandates contained within the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, our planning process is driven by an assessment of the threat, a review of the national strategy, and the identification of operational requirements needed to execute our strategy.

Using the foregoing planning process, we have completed three of the plans that will guide our Corps into the 21st century. The first, the *Marine Corps Campaign Plan*, provides a common direction to Fleet Marine Forces and the supporting establishment. It focuses our policies, programs, and studies to meet long-term and contin-

gency requirements. The second, the *Marine Corps Long-Range Plan* projects Marine Corps concepts, capabilities, and goals 10-20 years into the future. The third, the *MAGTF Master Plan*, focuses on operational concepts and requirements at all levels of employment through the year 2000. The *Master Plan* places an increased emphasis on low- to mid-intensity conflict. Using the goals initiated in the long-range plan, it establishes priorities for mid-term operational requirements. This plan is the cornerstone of our planning, programming, and budgeting actions.

The Marine Corps participates fully in the Department of Defense's collective planning efforts throughout our own planning process. All that we do to build, train, deploy, employ, or sustain our operational forces is done in coordination with the Department of the Navy, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the combatant CinCs. To be specific, the Marine Corps' Service planning process is fully integrated with, and responsive to, both the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. For example, the *Marine Corps Long-Range Plan* and the *MAGTF Master Plan* are designed to interact with the development of national military strategy, the Defense Planning guidance, and the Program Objective Memorandum. Each document is designed to be responsive to change in the security environment to include the threat, national military strategy, and fiscal realities.

The benefit from this revised process is an identifiable linkage, traceable from strategy, through Service planning, down to the capabilities and expenditures for specific programs. Our planning drives the six primary elements that contribute to our warfighting capabilities: doctrine, structure, equipment, manpower, training, and education.

#### **Innovation**

Our maneuver-oriented doctrine reflects an understanding of the operational requirements of modern warfare. The diversity of threats requires a doctrine which addresses the wide range of combat situations that Marines will likely face. *Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting*, published last year, is the first of our keystone doctrinal publications. It articu-

lates our operational philosophy and provides the authoritative basis for how we fight. It provides not just guidance for combat actions, but, more importantly, a way of thinking about combat in general. *Warfighting* is the philosophy for our profession of arms. This year, it will be complemented by the publication of: *FMFM 1-1, Campaigning*, *FMFM 1-2, Marine Corps Role in National Defense*, *FMFM 1-3, Tactics*, and *FMFM 2, MAGTF Operations*. As long as Marines are well trained in fundamental individual and unit skills, and leaders have been conditioned to adapt quickly, improvise, and act based on their estimates of the situation, the Marine Corps will measure up to our Nation's requirement for military flexibility and readiness in an uncertain world.

As in the past your Marines will continue to use our warfighting philosophy as the basis for innovation in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment development. Implicit in our mission as a force in readiness is the requirement to update our warfighting structure and operational requirements. By studying the security environment and anticipating change, we have been able to identify requirements, sometimes before they are realized or commonly accepted, for the doctrine, operational concepts, equipment, and techniques needed to meet evolving strategic and tactical needs. Responding to the requirements of expeditionary warfare, Marines took the lead in the development of amphibious doctrine and equipment, close air support techniques and aircraft to include vertical takeoff high performance jets, the helicopter, the vertical assault concept, the light armored vehicle, and sea-based pre-positioning.

Recognizing that threat conditions are changing, we have responded by refining our structure to be more responsive to the new security environment. These actions have resulted in several enhancements to our MAGTF structure, doctrine, and equipment. For example, we have been working in partnership with the Navy toward an improved ability to project forces more rapidly over extended distances. The ability to project power from over the horizon, bypassing first line enemy defenses to insert forces deep to inland objectives, is an operational maneuver requirement needed to meet the warfighting

needs of our Nation well into the 21st century. Over-the-horizon operations will dramatically expand the number of areas into which we can project power, provide tactical surprise, and allow us to fully exploit our warfighting enhancements.

### **MAGTF Enhancements**

Building on the achievements of the last decade, we have enhanced our capability for low- to mid-intensity conflict. Our efforts enabled us to improve the existing capabilities of our MAGTFs without adding manpower. Using a bottom-up approach, we began with the basic infantry squad and concluded with the development of the requisite support functions needed to maintain and sustain our MAGTFs in combat. While fiscal constraints have forced the cadre of three infantry battalions (3,000 Marines) in 1989, we have been able to develop an optimal and flexible infantry battalion structure as the building block for all force structure and manpower initiatives.

We have enhanced our infantry battalions. Selective additions have improved their mobility, firepower, and sustainability. We have added a fourth maneuver company to our infantry battalions to improve their flexibility and reconnaissance capability. Similarly, each of our reconnaissance and combat engineer battalions have been improved by the addition of a fourth company. In addition, infantry scouts have been added to our light armored infantry battalions. We are also improving our existing civil affairs and psychological warfare capabilities. These changes have been accomplished in part by reducing heavier units from our Active structure and moving them to our Reserves, and by streamlining our command elements and combat service support units. These adjustments have improved the ability of our expeditionary forces to control and influence larger areas while employing Marine tactics that have previously been proven to be relevant to today's low- to mid-intensity threat environment.

The intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination capability of our MAGTFs has been dramatically improved with the creation of surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence (SRI) groups. The SRI group consolidates these critical capabilities, and

links the MAGTF's command element to national intelligence systems. This capability, together with its resident air, ground, and logistics elements, has enhanced our ability to provide a rapidly deployable joint task force headquarters to the CinCs. Simply stated, we have sharpened our teeth and shortened our tail with enhancements made from within our existing force structure.

### **Research, Development, and Acquisition**

We have traditionally looked to the future for innovative ways to improve existing capabilities and develop new ones. A streamlined and more responsive research development and acquisition process has made it possible to place the best equipment in the hands of our Marines in the shortest time.

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Our priorities in research, development, and acquisition programs are based on the procurement of systems necessary for projecting forces from the sea, onto the land, from distances well beyond the horizon. Our intent is to increase our ability to operate with added mobility and flexibility. The same vehicles used to project forces ashore must become our tactical mobility vehicles for operations on land. Our foremost priorities are: a medium lift helicopter replacement, an advanced amphibious assault vehicle, and more lethality and capability for our light armored vehicles.

### **Medium Lift Replacement**

No Marine Corps requirement is more pressing than the need to identify a solution for the replacement of our medium lift assault capability. The aging CH-46 helicopter is entering its 26th year of service life. While it has served us well, we can no longer expect it to carry Marines in harm's way on the modern battlefield. Precision guided munitions and hand-held surface-to-air-missiles place these 30-year-old helicopters and the Marines

they carry at risk. The decision to cancel MV-22 procurement has caused us again to reexamine available alternatives. This process is currently ongoing. Critical to our requirement is that any replacement must include the capability to:

- execute explicit strategic surprise and deception.
- execute true over-the-horizon operations.
- deliver a rapid concentration of forces.
- extract and redeploy forces at critical times.
- enhance force survivability.
- navigate and communicate at night and in adverse weather conditions.

Having stated this requirement as our most pressing need, I should mention that whatever alternative is adopted, it will not be inexpensive. We urgently need to identify and procure a medium lift assault airframe that will survive the threats, provide the needed mobility, and be able to remain in service well into the next century. I can assure you that our reputation for frugality will not be tarnished in this effort and that the weapons systems we identify will be both mission capable and cost effective.

#### **Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle**

To complement our vertical assault capability, we are pursuing the development of an advanced amphibious assault vehicle. This program is critical to gaining a true over-the-horizon power projection capability. The high-water-speed-technology demonstration vehicle has validated the concept of producing an amphibious vehicle capable of rapidly moving the elements of the MAGTF from amphibious shipping located over the horizon to inland objectives.

#### **Ground Combat**

Our ground combat capability was improved by the Soldier-Marine Enhancement Program of last year. Funds were provided for the continued development and procurement of more lethal infantry weapons and improved "soldier items" to include lighter, more comfortable load-bearing equipment, field gear, survivability items, communications equipment, and navigation aids. This important program enhanced the warfighting capability of our Marines and is sincerely appreciated.

To expand the operational capabilities of the light armored family of vehicles we intend to continue expansion of this program to acquire an assault gun variant and an air defense variant. This lightweight, readily transportable, highly mobile asset is proving its worth in Panama today. With an expanded capability, it will add tremendously to our ability to operate at any level of conflict, particularly at low- to mid-intensity conflict levels. Recognizing the extraordinary potential of these vehicles, the Army recently requested, and we provided to them, 18 vehicles to equip a scout element in the 82d Airborne Division.

#### **Aviation**

We are continuing to improve our aviation assets by upgrading the avionics of our fixed-wing aircraft and enhancing the night vision capability of our helicopters. To lower operating costs and increase commonality, we are reducing the number of types/models/series of aircraft in our inventory by procuring in-production aircraft to meet our requirements. We will procure the F/A-18, the CH-53E, the AV-8B, and the AH-1W for our Active and Reserve squadrons.

#### **C<sup>4</sup>I<sup>2</sup>**

We are also upgrading our command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperable systems to enhance our ability to exchange secure, near real-time tactical information in joint and combined operations. Our new Intelligence Center at Quantico will be a model fusion center for all-source intelligence, and it will focus on low- to mid-intensity conflict. The center will ensure that the collection and production of intelligence is tailored to the Marine Corps' unique mission requirements.

The Corps' focus on low- to mid-intensity conflict over the past 2 years has driven us to some major decisions, not only in our procurement plans, but most importantly, in the direction the Marine Corps will take in the next 10 years. We have concentrated on those capabilities that will keep us responsive to our Nation's future requirements. This translates to weapon systems that can get to the fight quickly and influence the battle after they arrive. Heavier and less-deployable systems will take a lesser priority. It was this realignment of our priorities, and

the realities of reduced funding levels, that prompted us to terminate the M1A1 procurement.

#### **Manpower**

Regardless of the threats that will face our Nation in the future, the military strategies we will develop to deal with them, or the equipment we will invest in to execute the strategy, our ability to preserve our national security will rest, as it always has, on the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. Whether in the point squad, the lead airplane, or manning a ship at sea, people are our most valuable asset. They must "stand in harm's way" in complex circumstances on a daily basis. Accordingly, the main effort of our manpower programs and activities will continue to focus on recruiting, retaining, developing, and safeguarding quality Marines.

#### **Where Are Your Marines?**

Sixty-eight percent of your Marines are assigned to our operating forces. They serve throughout the world with the Fleet Marine Forces, with the security detachments on ships, posts, and stations, with the State Department, and with other national agencies and U.S. commands. We demand that these Marines, as well as the remaining 32 percent who comprise the supporting forces, be decisive, self-reliant, and versatile. They are capable of independent action and, when called upon, we expect them to lead in combat. Because of the serious responsibilities and demands we levy on our Marines, we will not compromise our standard of excellence.

#### **Quality**

We have recognized for a long time the link between our readiness and the caliber of our recruits. Supported by the resources Congress has provided, our recruiters have answered the call to recruit first-rate Marines. Last year, 95 percent of our accessions were high school graduates with fewer than .5 percent falling in mental category IV. These Marines are bright, highly motivated, and eager to learn. The Corps' efforts to recruit quality Marines will not diminish.

#### **Retention**

We continually are aware of the importance of retaining the quality Marines we work so hard to find and

train. We have been successful in keeping most in the Corps, but we must do more to keep quality Marines with critical skills on board. Retention management programs, like the Aviator Retention Bonus, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, and duty station incentives, are crucial to us. They provide the tools necessary for retaining good, experienced Marines. These programs reduce our dependence upon new accessions, lower training costs, and contribute to stability and unit cohesion.

#### Total Force

Our emphasis on manpower quality is enhanced by our commitment to the total force concept. The responsiveness and preparedness of our Active forces will continue to benefit from the support of the Marine Reserve and our civilian manpower resources. We have taken steps to ensure that the Marine Corps Reserve is adequately structured, equipped, and trained to assume a larger role in augmenting and reinforcing the Active forces when employed in high-intensity conflict. Similarly, our supporting establishment is highly dependent upon the skills and professionalism resident in the 20,869 civilians for whom we seek funding in FY91.

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Retirees continue to be a part of the Marine Corps family. In fact, they are an integral part of the total force and play a vital role in our mobilization and contingency plans. Retirees provide an experienced and tested wartime resource in numbers and skills too valuable to ignore.

We provide personal support for our retirees on an individual basis. At the Headquarters level, we have a Retired Affairs office which aids retirees in all personal administration matters.

This office has a toll-free telephone number and provides assistance with identification cards, dependent eligibility, spousal annuities, foreign employment, service record verification, and a whole host of other personal matters of interest to our retirees. The Marine Corps Finance Center has a dedicated Retired Pay Branch which manages all pay related matters for our retirees. This branch also has a toll-free number for use by retirees. Every other month, we send each of our retirees *Semper Fi*, a publication from the Commandant which provides them up-to-date information on their rights, benefits, and responsibilities as retirees. Of course, our retirees are always able to utilize the Family Service Centers at our major installations.

#### Force Management

The Officer Force Management Review Panel (OFMRP) conducted a comprehensive review of our officer corps this year. The recommendations of the panel have provided us a blueprint with which to validate all of our officer military occupational specialty (MOS) requirements. It also will allow us to correct grade and MOS imbalances and justify some increase in field grade authorizations under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). These actions will not adversely affect our ability to maintain a healthy officer to enlisted ratio.

Our active duty enlisted Marines are benefiting from the continuing improvement of enlisted career force controls. These controls are active measures taken to balance the population of first-term Marines with our requirement for Marines of specific grades and MOSs. The results are standardized promotion timing, some relief from critical MOS shortages, and an appropriate level of experience for each grade.

#### Quality of Life

Concomitant with readiness and retention are the quality of life programs that affect the lives of our Marines and their families. Our quality of life efforts feature concerned leadership, realistic training, sound education, discipline, including self-discipline, unit cohesion, and a strong sense of taking care of our own. “Esprit de Corps” and our leadership philosophy foster a high

quality of life that instills values and attitudes that transcend each Marine's actual period of enlistment. In the words of our 13th Commandant, General John A. Lejeune:

These men are in the formative years of their lives, and officers owe it to them, to their parents, and to the Nation, that when discharged from the service they should be better mentally, physically, and morally than when they were enlisted.

Today, we continue to emphasize the importance of the Marine family because of the increase in the number of married Marines. I still am concerned about the high cost of living that requires two incomes to maintain the minimum requirements for food, clothing, and shelter, and that there are Marines serving their country who are living on food stamps.

Maintaining our family housing is critical to our quality of life program. Our facilities maintenance, repair, and construction programs reflect quality of life requirements and the replacement of aging facilities and infrastructure. Whole house rehabilitations of Government quarters are examples of how we intend to do the most with the resources we have. With your support, we have maintained the quality and availability of our family housing. We are devoting considerable effort to this important area, but the expanding dependent population and our limited resources hold us at the perpetual break-even point.

Our 18 family service centers handled approximately 300,000 contacts last year. We are improving our responsiveness to the needs for relocation and deployment support. With increasing success, the Employment Resource Center Program assists spouses in finding employment and assists retiring and separating Marines in obtaining civilian positions.

We are in step with the Military Child Care Act of 1989 regarding child care programs. We have reduced the child-to-staff ratio in our child development centers and have improved our compliance inspection program. We are planning to expand the Family Day Care Program this year through extended certification efforts.

Medical care for our Marines and their dependents remains a high priority. We are still experiencing shortages in the numbers of doctors, nurses, and

corpsmen required. The new CHAMPUS Reform Initiative has been helpful in improving timely payments of claims; however, we are still seeing many late payments. I respectfully ask that you continue to monitor and correct the deficiencies in these programs.

Many of these quality of life issues have a significant impact on our retired Marines. They are confronted with the increased cost of living expenses, reduced medical care, and finding employment. We make every effort to assist our retirees in solving these problems, but as we reduce our defense spending many of the programs that impact on them will be affected. We cannot afford to ignore the needs of our retirees, one of our most valuable national resources.

### **Training and Education**

We have made significant changes in our training and education programs over the past year. I would like to express my appreciation for the interest and support you have provided. With your help we have achieved a virtual renaissance in training and education throughout the Corps.

We derive our training and education philosophy from the realities of tomorrow's warfare. The improvements in training and education will enable the Marine Corps to quickly respond to changes in the world order, witnessed in the past year and expected in the future. We determined that Marines must be proficient in both the science and art of warfighting. They must be tougher and better educated. The Marine Corps' ability to respond rapidly, to fight and to win, requires enhanced combat training and an enduring professional attitude of every Marine. It is an attitude which recognizes that the study of the profession of arms is a way of life. Our program ensures that every Marine, from private to general, Active or Reserve, is either attending a formal school or participating in a structured self-study program.

To meet this challenge, we have addressed all areas of training and education from boot camp through top level school. Our program derives its focus from short notice, high tempo, combined arms, maneuver-oriented conflict. The Corps' success will depend upon thinking leaders with the mental agility to apply the lessons of history to the complexity of the battle-

field. All of our schools stress decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. They emphasize rapid planning and strive to replicate the chaos and uncertainty of the modern battlefield. We teach our students to expect the unexpected, to use initiative, and to prepare for combat across the full spectrum of conflict. We place particular emphasis on low-intensity operations.

### **Training**

Our entry-level training is now more combat oriented than ever before. There are no rear areas or occupational specialties which do not require a warrior. All Marines, regardless of MOS, train rigorously in infantry combat techniques.

Marine Battle Skills Training (MBST) is a comprehensive training program designed to develop and sustain basic combat skill throughout a Marine's career. The program includes extensive firing of individual and crew-served weapons, basic knowledge of field skills, rugged battle drills, and combat oriented conditioning. It is organized into progressive, mutually supporting stages which begin at boot camp and follow Marines throughout their service. Along with this program we have made major improvements in combat marksmanship, close combat, combat water survival, and physical training.

### **Education**

The Marine Corps University, established last year, marks a major step forward in our professional military education. It has cognizance over all Marine schools of professional military education. The university includes the NCO schools, the SNCO academies, The Basic School, the Amphibious Warfare School, and the Command and Staff College. We have staffed the Marine Corps University with a first-rate military and civilian faculty.

Two new programs will be offered at the university beginning in September 1990: The School of Advanced Warfighting and The Art of War Studies. The School of Advanced Warfighting will be offered to select graduates of Command and Staff College. The officers selected will remain at Quantico for an additional year of study. The curriculum will prepare them for assignment to key positions in our MAGTFs and high-level joint and

combined staff billets. The course will emphasize the operational art of war and a thorough review of the dynamics of joint and combined warfare.

The second program, The Art of War Studies, is designed to educate selected senior officers in the art and science of warfare. This program is the foundation of our efforts to ensure we have a first class faculty at our Command and Staff College. Students will study conflict throughout the spectrum and will be well versed in the doctrinal concepts of warfighting. Graduates will be assigned to a two-year follow-on tour as a member of the Command and Staff College faculty.

A planned research center will be the repository for historical records, studies, and analyses of expeditionary amphibious warfare. This research center will support the university as well as being available to Marines worldwide.

We have also established the Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico. This Wargaming and Assessment Center assists us in validating changes to our concepts, doctrine, and plans. In an austere fiscal environment, wargaming is an accepted, cost-effective substitute for expensive field exercises. We are tailoring and conducting wargames for all levels of war. Since March 1988, we have conducted over 30 wargames for the formal schools, operating forces, and Reserve units of the Marine Corps. Additionally, our Commandant of the Marine Corps Policy and Strategy Series provides wargames for flag and general officers of the Marine Corps and other Services, CinCs, and the senior leadership of civilian agencies. In October of last year, we conducted an indirect warfare/counterinsurgency game centered on the Philippines. The issues that we addressed during the game proved to be both timely and important. This year, the center will conduct a counternarcoptic game focused on policy and operational decisionmaking.

Our Professional Reading Program was designed to improve the operational literacy of our Marines. We have seen a dramatic increase in the number of Marines who are reading about their profession. Since the profession of arms is becoming more complex, and with the increased reli-

ance on technology, we sometimes overlook the most sophisticated computer of all, "the human mind." Our training and education programs are designed to tap the intellectual and physical resources of our Marines and apply them to our profession of arms. Our training and education programs will institutionalize the changes we have made.

#### Conclusion

We have always emphasized training, education, and discipline in everything we do. Our contributions to the Nation over the years are the result of the vision of exceptional leaders translated into battlefield performance by trained Marines. We are continuously shaping and tailoring our expeditionary forces to meet the unique requirements of a variety of conflicts and the countless deterrence deployments throughout the so-called peri-

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ods of peace. Our expeditionary tradition and flexibility has prepared the Corps to respond almost by instinct to the tasks ahead. We have trained for years to achieve a high state of readiness. We are ready to deploy by any means available—ship, air, rail, or road. We can escalate combat power to meet whatever we encounter, and we can operate with relative self-sufficiency or as part of a joint task force. Today, our training and education programs prepare Marines to respond to and overcome whatever challenges a rapidly changing world order dictates.

The Marine Corps has been modernized from the bottom up. This modernization has prepared us for the

most probable threats of the future. The most important elements of any threat however, are capabilities—not intentions. While we are seeing a reduction in the Soviet threat, the potential for conflict among the emerging nations of the world is increasing. Two years ago, we charted a course for the Marine Corps that would enhance our ability to respond to the changing international security environment. This has enabled us to build upon the existing structure of our MAGTFs, with their organic air support and combat service support, for self-sustaining, maritime expeditionary operations in low- to mid-intensity conflict.

Based upon the need for a force in readiness and the belief that her Marines will prevail in crises, our Nation

has made a significant investment in her Marine Corps. We provide a high return on that investment. Naval forces have been the Nation’s force of choice in 80 percent of our military crises since the end of World War II. With this in mind, it is important to note the Marine Corps provided significant forces in over 50 percent of these situations. This is our return to the Nation for approximately 5 percent of its defense budget investment. In short, the investment has already been made, the forces already exist, and the expeditionary capability is already resident in your flexible, useful, and ready-now force of combined arms called Marines. Your Corps will continue to take what you give us, do what is required—and more. USMC

Our request for FY91 is as follows:

(\$ MILLIONS)			
Appropriation Table	FY89	FY90	FY91
Military Personnel	\$5,679.0	\$5,794.3	\$5,918.6
Marine Corps			
Reserve Personnel	315.0	314.5	336.4
Marine Corps			
Operation and Maintenance	1,839.9	1,808.7	1,948.1
Marine Corps			
Operation and Maintenance	77.4	77.4	86.1
Marine Corps Reserve			
Procurement	1,291.8	1,075.2	782.1
Marine Corps			
Family Housing	156.0	152.4	137.5
Marine Corps Allocation			
Military Construction	275.5	178.1	142.0
Marine Corps Projects			
Military Construction	4.7	16.3	8.9
Marine Corps Reserve Projects			
Stock Fund	32.8	19.8	25.6
Marine Corps			
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$9,672.1</b>	<b>\$9,436.7</b>	<b>\$9,385.3</b>