

Perspective on the Corps

As part of the confirmation process for Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., the Senate Armed Services Committee prepared a series of questions designed to elicit, in advance of the Committee's hearings, Gen Mundy's views on a variety of fundamental issues about the Corps. These formal questions and responses are reprinted here, as they provide valuable insight into the thinking of the Marine who is now the Corps' 30th Commandant.

DEFENSE REFORMS

The Senate Armed Services Committee has a deep and continuing interest in the complete and effective implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act and related legislation.

QUESTION 1A: Do you support the defense reforms mandated in 1986 by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Packard Commission, and the special operations and low-intensity conflict reforms?

ANSWER: I fully support the principal reforms recommended by the Packard Commission and mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I fully support the reforms regarding special operations and low-intensity conflict.

QUESTION 1B: What do you understand the role of the Commandant to be under the Goldwater-Nichols Act relative to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders?

ANSWER: My understanding of the law is that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as a Service Chief, performs his statutory duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy and is directly responsible to him. He assists the Secretary of the Navy in carrying out his responsibilities and keeps him informed about the military advice given by and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Commandant is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presided over by the Chairman. The Commandant, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense as provided for in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The Commandant has no statutory

role vis-a-vis the commanders of combatant commands. However, one of his most important responsibilities is to organize, train, equip, and provide combat forces to support the operational requirements of the combatant commanders.

QUESTION 1C: What role does the Commandant of the Marine Corps have with respect to the planning for and execution of military operations?

ANSWER: Planning and execution of military operations is the responsibility of the Unified Commanders. The Commandant serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a Service Chief.

By Department of Defense directive, the Commandant's primary responsibility is membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a member of this corporate body he is, by law, one of the military advisors to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. As such, he participates fully in the formulation of policy and strategy, and is a key participant in the deliberate planning process. Additionally, in times of crises, he plays an active role in the development of military advice provided to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and in the actions required to implement NCA decisions.

As the Service Chief, the Commandant is tasked by law to properly organize, train, equip, and provide Marine forces to the combatant commanders. Additionally, as the senior uniformed officer in the Marine Corps and the second senior uniformed officer in the Naval Service, he is best qualified to provide advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the capabilities and employment of Marine forces in particular and naval forces in general.

QUESTION 1D: From your perspective as a former Marine Corps Operations Deputy, do you believe that the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols relative to the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, are appropriate and workable?

ANSWER: Yes. I believe current law permits the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address any issue, develop their views—including a full range of options—and provide the best military advice possible to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and President. The JCS structure allows for free and open discussion of issues, consideration of different views from the unique perspective of each Service, development and evaluation of alternative courses of action, and deliberate formulation of comprehensive military advice. Consensus is not necessary and is not required by law, nor is it the ultimate criterion. More important, the law requires the full disclosure of contrary views, ensuring that the position of each Service Chief is included in the advice provided.

QUALIFICATIONS

The law requires that the Commandant of the Marine Corps must, unless waived by the President as necessary in the national interest, have significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour as a general officer.

QUESTION 2: Would you describe your experience in joint duty assignments and advise if a waiver was required in your case?

ANSWER: The Secretary of Defense requested, and the President approved, a waiver in my case. In the most stringent sense of the law, I have not served a full joint tour as a general officer.

However, I served in a joint equivalent assignment as a general officer from June 1984 to May 1986 as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade/Marine Striking Force, Allied Command Atlantic. I have served as the Marine Corps Operations Deputy in the Joint Chiefs of

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Staff, and I am currently assigned again as the Combined Commander of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic Marine Striking Force. These, and an earlier joint-equivalent assignment as a colonel, resulted in my designation as a joint specialty officer in 1989.

OFFICER PROMOTION PROCEDURES

In recent years, the Committee has been concerned about irregularities in officer promotion procedures, particularly matters involving the conduct and review of officer selection boards.

QUESTION 3A: In your view, what are the key attributes of a fair and equitable selection board process?

ANSWER: I believe that the key attribute in every promotion board is that our boards are objective and absent any external influence. The procedures are the same for all of our promotion boards, whether they be for selection to major general or captain, Regular or Reserve. Each eligible officer is aware of selection board procedures and what the boards consider in the way of their official records. Promotion boards consider only that information which is contained in the eligible officers' official personnel files. In addition, each officer is able to review his or her record prior to a board to see what will be considered, and is provided the opportunity to communicate with the board in writing.

I have been informed that DOD just completed an extensive review of the

Marine Corps' officer promotion procedures in January 1991 with the following findings:

- The Marine Corps is in compliance with statutory requirements.
- The Marine Corps procedures foster a climate of fair and equitable promotion consideration.
- The Marine Corps has ensured the independence and integrity of its promotion boards.

QUESTION 3B: What is your view as to the relationship of the integrity of the selection board process to the integrity of the officer corps?

ANSWER: Integrity is the basis for the special trust and confidence reposed in our officer corps. This relationship extends to our selection board process. The Marine Corps will continue to adhere to the spirit and letter of applicable laws and regulations governing the selection board process. Any breach of integrity in the selection process jeopardizes this special trust and confidence.

QUESTION 3C: What actions should be taken to ensure that the officer corps is familiar with the standards and procedures applicable to the officer selection board process?

ANSWER: A Marine Corps Order, which is distributed to all commands, outlines the standards and procedures applicable to the officer selection board process.

As a matter of professional military education, officers who have served as selection board members regularly discuss these standard operating procedures with their units and organizations.

In addition, our professional monthly journal, the *Marine Corps Gazette*, frequently offers articles about the process.

Finally, the Marine Corps offers career counseling to officers to explain, on a personal basis, the procedures followed by selection boards.

On balance, I believe our officer corps is well informed as to the selection board process.

QUESTION 3D: Are you committed to ensuring that the conduct and review of selection board proceedings are carried out in accordance with the spirit and letter of applicable laws and regulations?

ANSWER: As the President of three selection boards and a member of three additional boards ranging from selection to the grade of captain to ma-

jor general since 1983, I can assure you that I am committed to these principles.

As Commandant, I can assure you that I will continue my commitment to the complete independence and integrity of our promotion boards, and ensure that they comply with laws and regulations.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

QUESTION 4: From your personal perspective, what are the key lessons that are emerging from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM? As part of your answer, please address specifically the issues that have arisen in the area of Marine night fighting capabilities, mine warfare, and the role and types of amphibious operations.

ANSWER: I believe there are several key lessons from DESERT SHIELD and STORM. Among them are:

- Strategic Mobility. Overall, our strategic mobility forces were up to the task. Our deployment to Southwest Asia was a success. However, we must seek to continue to develop the most cost effective combinations of amphibious lift, strategic airlift, fast sealift, and merchant marine assets.
- Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (MPF). DESERT SHIELD validated our MPF concept. We rapidly deployed several brigades of Marines, with the necessary equipment and supplies to support 30 days of combat operations.
- Total Force Policy. DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM validated our Total Force Policy. We had balanced, well-trained Reserve units ready for active service anywhere in the world, including combat in the Gulf.

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- Night Fighting. Night fighting is a component of our maneuver warfare philosophy. We always seek to achieve surprise and attack the enemy from a position of advantage. Night vision technologies allow us to employ a

comparative advantage against our opponent. We had excellent night-fighting equipment, but not enough to equip the entire force. We especially need to ensure that our aviation units are equipped with precise target delivery and navigational systems for use in night and all-weather operations.

• **Amphibious Force Operations.** During DESERT SHIELD and STORM, naval forces with amphibious power projection capability deceived the enemy, tied down seven Iraqi divisions, and could have been employed decisively had the unfolding campaign necessitated. At the same time, additional sea-based forces secured the U.S. Embassy at Monrovia, Liberia, and Mogadishu, Somalia, evacuating endangered U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. In the aftermath of DESERT STORM, sea-based forces provided protection to Kurdish refugees and disaster relief to Bangladesh. These are clear examples of the flexibility and utility inherent in sea-based, expeditionary forces capable of the full range of amphibious operations.

• **Joint Operations.** DESERT STORM was a resounding example of the integration of Service-provided force capabilities into a cohesive joint force. We will continue to refine and improve our abilities in this area.

• **Mine Countermeasures.** Naval operations in the northern Persian Gulf were executed in the face of a significant threat from mines. Our inability to clear these mines in a timely fashion restricted these operations. Mines alone would not have prevented an amphibious assault. However, the risk from mines was a factor in deciding not to conduct a landing. Mines continue to be a low-cost, simple solution to restricting the employment of our maritime power. We must continue emphasis on finding a solution to this power projection problem.

AVOIDING FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES

QUESTION 5: DESERT STORM has demonstrated the need for some kind of system to aid weapon systems operators in distinguishing friends from enemies. What priority would you give such a program? What goals would you establish for it?

ANSWER: Our goal is not to suffer

casualties from "friendly fire." I believe that we must give the development of systems that can help us reach this goal a high priority. The problem is differentiating between friend and foe in the heat of battle. Our current efforts focus on:

- Improved identification friend or foe (IFF) systems that are compatible with existing and emerging command and control architectures.
- Better command and control of friendly fires and maneuver elements.
- Expanded joint and combined live-fire training during periods of low visibility.
- Participation in joint initiatives such as the Combat Identification Working Group sponsored by Training and Doctrine/Army Materiel Commands and similar programs at the Army's Center for Battlefield Identification at Fort Meade.

VISION FOR THE MARINE CORPS

If confirmed, you will have the opportunity to lead the Marine Corps during a period of significant change and to influence the shape of the Marine Corps as it approaches and enters the 21st century.

QUESTION 6A: What do you consider to be the most serious challenges and problems in the management and operation of the Marine Corps?

ANSWER: I regard our most serious management challenges to be maintaining the diversity of capabilities our Nation has come to expect from its Marine Corps. We must continue to develop plans that build on the foundation laid by previous Commandants, conform to the new international security environment, incorporate lessons learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM, maintain our readiness at high levels, and minimize personnel turbulence. My goal will be to continue to provide our Nation with the flexible, versatile, and capable expeditionary force that it created a Corps of Marines to be.

In 1952, the Committee Report that forwarded the Douglas-Mansfield Act to Congress to formally structure the Corps said that the Nation needs a combined-arms force-in-readiness, flexible in structure, naval in character, which can respond to expeditionary requirements on short notice.

The meaning of the word "expeditionary" is not well understood, nor is

it well articulated even by Marines. "Expeditionary" is not only a state of capability; it's a state of mind. Everything we do in the Marine Corps is aimed at the eventuality that where we're going won't have any facilities to make it easier. If there are, as in Saudi Arabia, it gets easier. Most of all, the platforms from which we operate—the ships—are expeditionary, floating, strategically and tactically mobile sea-bases. A "contingency" is a situation; "expeditionary" is a capability and a mindset. The finest military force in the world can't do much in a contingency unless it has the capability to get there credibly and the ability to adapt and to operate and sustain itself once there.

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Since the days of our Founding Fathers, the total United States military requirements have always exceeded the capabilities to meet them, except in time of war. That deficiency has, for the most part, meant having forces that are flexible, mobile, and available. As Gen Robert H. Barrow explained 12 years ago to this committee during his confirmation hearing, "By that I mean flexible (do more than one thing), mobile (go more than one place), and available (do it now). I reckon, sir, that describes the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps Team." His comments are as true today as they were then.

QUESTION 6B: What management activities and timetables would you establish to address these challenges and problems?

ANSWER: As I have mentioned, we intend to identify challenges confronting the Marine Corps as early in my tenure as practical. However, until I have had the opportunity to examine each issue more thoroughly, it would be premature for me to identify any

specific management activities or timetables that I intend to establish.

QUESTION 6C: *What do you believe the Marine Corps' highest priority should be in preparing for operations in the next century?*

ANSWER: Our highest priority has always been to provide a force that is trained, organized, and equipped to protect our Nation's vital interests abroad, support our allies, and perform such other missions as the President may direct. I see no need to change this basic reason why the Nation has a Marine Corps. Our priorities will continue to focus on a high-quality, well-led, well-trained, -equipped, and -educated force with modern weapons and combat systems.

QUESTION 6D: *What do you see as being the major technology thrusts of your tenure?*

ANSWER: Right now, I see three key areas of focus:

- **Sea-Based Power Projection Technologies.** We want to improve our capability to conduct short-notice crisis response or, if necessary, forcible entry from the sea. To do this, we must have modern force projection and battlefield mobility systems.
- **Command and Control (C²) Technologies.** We want to better see the battlefield; to better control friendly forces; and to better inform friendly commanders, share information and intelligence. In short, we want to better pierce the fog of war and "shape" the battlefield.
- **Night-Fighting Technologies.** In DESERT STORM our capabilities were far superior to the enemy's. However, we still have a way to go before all elements of our force operate as effectively at night as they do during the day. Night-fighting is the preferred war-fighting option. Emerging technologies can help us do it better.

THE MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD

QUESTIONS 7A and 7B: *What do you see as the role for the U.S. Marine Corps, both in terms of overall national security and as a partner in the Navy/Marine Corps team? What do you see as the Marine Corps' role in contingency operations? Are there any proposed changes that would diminish Marine Corps capabilities in this area?*

ANSWER: The Marine Corps' role, both in terms of national security and as a partner in the Naval Service, will remain much as it has been in the past. It is set in legislation, steeped in tradition, and proven in combat. We will continue to perform this traditional role in concert not only with our Navy partners, but as a component of the joint national arsenal.

We are chartered to be the Nation's principal force-in-readiness—maritime in character and expeditionary in nature, capability, and philosophy. Our expeditionary capability provides the Nation with a force that can deploy efficiently by all means of strategic lift, and effectively fight anywhere in the world. When we deploy, we go as a combat-ready, combined-arms team. Our naval expeditionary forces possess a full range of sustainable combat power.

The Marine Corps is tailored and trained to respond to crises in an effort to prevent them from becoming a contingency. If deterrence fails, we are organized to provide credible, rapidly deployable, well-sustained forces to respond to the contingency.

I have three concerns about any proposed changes in contingency and expeditionary capabilities:

— First, planned reductions in Marine Corps manpower in the absence of similar reductions in peacetime commitments will adversely affect our ability to accomplish our statutory roles and functions.

— Second, the projected decrease in amphibious lift will limit the Nation's ability to provide forward-deployed forces and sea-based crisis response and contingency capabilities to the combatant commanders.

— Third, the emerging National Military Strategy and supporting plans must continue to integrate our global naval contingency capabilities to achieve a sequential introduction of balanced, joint forces to support the unified commanders' requirements.

QUESTION 7C: *What do you see as the Marine Corps' role in special operations? Do you think the Marine Corps can make greater contributions in this area, particularly as it relates to working more directly with Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (CinCSOC)?*

ANSWER: The Marine Corps will continue to provide the Nation with

forward-deployed, general purpose naval expeditionary forces that possess an inherent capability to conduct selected maritime special operations. Marine Forces provide the regional combatant CinCs with a trained, equipped, and balanced air-ground team capable of conducting both general purpose missions and selected maritime special operations across the spectrum of conflict.

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Marine Forces have conducted special operations (with a small "s" and "o") throughout our history. In this regard, the historical involvement of Marines in what we know today as Special Operations may be useful. After its creation in 1775, the first expedition the Marine Corps was assigned was to embark in the good ship *Providence*, sail to Nassau in the Bahamas, and conduct a raid on the British fort there—not for the purpose of annihilating the garrison, but to steal the gunpowder for use by Continental forces and to spike the British guns to prevent their further effective use. This was the first landing of U.S. Marines on foreign soil, and it was the first amphibious raid—the benchmark on which Marine special operations have been based ever since. Subsequently, as the Corps pioneered the doctrine for amphibious operations in the 1930s, it prescribed a requirement for a small force to be inserted in advance of the main assault force for the purpose of conducting raids and special demolitions to destroy enemy critical command and control sites, disrupt avenues of approach into the objective area, and neutralize or destroy enemy shore batteries that could interfere with the subsequent landing. These

advance force operations were usually conducted by small, highly trained, specially equipped units, inserted by clandestine means, under cover of darkness when possible. Thus, beginning with its creation as an expeditionary force, and threading through the development of amphibious doctrine, Marines have planned and executed maritime special operations.

Today's forward-deployed amphibious forces have been honed in training and equipment to more effectively accomplish these traditional functions as well as to accomplish a variety of humanitarian assistance, nation building, and evacuation types of operations that are, by any definition, not conventional military operations, but are individually and separately "spe-

larly coordinates with USSOCom on items of mutual interest. Marine Corps units regularly train and operate with USSOCom units. The capabilities these highly trained general purpose forces possess complement and support, but do not duplicate, those unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces under USCinCSOC.

MARINE CORPS RESERVES

During recent years, the Marine Corps Reserves have been given a greater potential warfighting role by having newer aircraft and equipment placed under their control.

QUESTION 8A: *Do you intend to explore innovative ways of using the Marine Corps Reserves to achieve Marine Corps goals and to ensure a robust Marine Reserve is retained?*

ANSWER: I do. Marine Corps Reserve forces were a mainstay to us during the execution of Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. They responded and performed magnificently, and if our Active structure diminishes in the future, we will become even more reliant on our Reserve to provide staying power. The Nation needs a "robust" Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps Reserve is a vital part of our capability. I will seek ways to make them even more responsive and useful in the future.

QUESTION 8B: *What are your plans for increasing the contribution of the Marine Corps Reserve program?*

ANSWER: The Marine Corps Total Force policy works. The contributions of Marine reservists were out of all proportion to the numbers called to active duty. Modernization of the Reserves will continue to be a priority with the Marine Corps—a priority that will require continued resourcing.

QUESTION 8C: *What was the involvement and experience on the use of Marine Reservists during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, particularly combat type units?*

ANSWER: During DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) (drilling units) were deployed as an integral part of the Active force around the world—in Norway, Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. Most importantly, SMCR infantry, artillery, tank, engineer, and civil affairs units were fully integrated in all combat operations in Southwest Asia.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) filled in at bases and stations, Headquarters Marine Corps, in the Kuwait Theater of Operations, and developed and manned an extensive hospital liaison and casualty support structure throughout the European Theater which, thankfully, did not come into extensive use, but was a model of effective organization had it been required.

Individual Ready Reserves (IRRs) were recalled to provide individual replacements and to fill key mobilization billets. Similarly, a number of our retirees were recalled to provide casualty assistance teams and fill important mobilization billets.

QUESTION 8C (Addendum): *Is it accurate that USMCR personnel were awarded 25 percent of all the Purple Hearts awarded to Marines?*

ANSWER: The correct figure is 15 percent.

STATUS	TOTAL	USMCR
KIA	24	2
WIA (Incl POW)	92	15
TOTAL	116	17

QUESTION 8D: *What is the significance of the shifts in the position of the Marine Corps Reserve, which was once a separate assistant chief of staff position, by first placing it under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and then dual-hatting the position as the Inspector General?*

ANSWER: Consolidating the Reserve Affairs and Manpower Departments is totally consistent with the Corps' Total Force Policy. This consolidation action, accomplished in FY89, was a key element of the Headquarters reorganization and has effec-

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tively contributed to cohesion of the Total Force.

Because Title X constrains the authorized number of general officers in the Marine Corps, several general offi-

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cial." By integrating the capabilities of the Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) platoon deployed with each amphibious ready group with the specially trained and equipped Marine forces, all forward-deployed amphibious forces provide the unified commander to whom assigned with a direct action capability, if required, in an "in extremis" situation. Thus, CinCs have at their disposal a general purpose force capable of a wide spectrum of appropriate, maritime-related special operations. As recently as yesterday's news, Marine general purpose forces continued to conduct these "special" operations alongside Special Operations Forces in northern Iraq and on their own in Bangladesh.

While we do not have any forces assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom), we do have a very close working relationship. We have Marines assigned to USSOCom's headquarters as well as his subordinate commands. The Marine Corps regu-

cers must be dual-hatted. General officers are assigned to dual-hatted responsibilities based on the requirements of the billets and the experience of the individual.

This problem will become even more acute in the next few years as the Corps executes a programmed reduction of 13 percent of our general officers. We simply do not have sufficient generals to command our operational formations, meet our joint manning requirements, and man key staff positions such as a separate Reserve Affairs Chief.

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND SEALIFT

For decades, we have understood the need to provide more capability to lift our combat and support forces. Sealift is a very important component of this capability. This was shown by the outstanding performance in the Persian Gulf of the maritime pre-positioning ships, the fast sealift ships, and the Ready Reserve Force. Inadequate sealift now, and the likelihood of further declines in the future, is a serious deficiency. In addition, the goal for lifting the Marine Corps in amphibious shipping has been reduced in the current budget from one Marine expeditionary force and one Marine expeditionary brigade (MEF+MEB) to one of carrying two and one-half MEBs. These are very substantial reductions from previous goals.

QUESTION 9A: *Do you support efforts to expand sealift capability?*

ANSWER: Yes, I support efforts to expand our Nation's sealift capability. During the first 60 days of Operation DESERT SHIELD, sealift transported 85 percent of all cargo, and by Day 120 that figure was well above 95 percent. Only the assault echelon of an amphibious task force is carried aboard amphibious ships. Sustainability and unit equipment that is not actually required to initiate an assault is transported in merchant ships as the assault follow-on echelon. Clearly, we need more sealift.

QUESTION 9B: *What do you believe is the appropriate balance to be struck between amphibious shipping and sealift, including maritime pre-positioning shipping?*

ANSWER: I believe that the mix of three amphibious MEBs and three MPF MEBs is the right balance. This mix will fulfill the requirements in the National Military Strategy for an ade-

quate forward-deployed amphibious presence and amphibious forcible entry capability, together with the rapid heavy reinforcement that MPF demonstrated so well during the early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The *DON Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC Air Support Requirement Study*, approved by the Secretary of the Navy in April 1990, is our baseline for assessing future levels of expeditionary capability. That analysis indicated that no less than three MEBs of amphibious lift is required to support a two-ocean contingency response while maintaining minimum forward presence elsewhere.

QUESTION 9C: *What is your personal view about the continuing decrease in the goal for amphibious shipping?*

ANSWER: I view the continuing decrease in amphibious lift with great concern. We should consider this decline in light of the tasks levied on naval forces in the new National Military Strategy. The decrease in overseas basing and access portend that future military options will be heavily dependent upon sea-based forces.

Our amphibious forces fulfill three broad missions. First, they provide visible forward presence around the globe. Second, with carrier battle groups, they provide ready forces in key areas to respond quickly in the early stages of a crisis. Third, they provide a robust forcible-entry capability in support of our combatant commanders' regional contingency plans.

QUESTION 9D: *What is your personal view about the appropriate level of amphibious shipping and what the future year defense plan contains in this area considering both new construction and retirements?*

ANSWER: The appropriate level of amphibious shipping is a function of the tasks levied against naval forces in the National Military Strategy—specifically, the day-to-day tasking we are expected to meet, the magnitude of crisis scenarios we plan to respond to, and the degree of risk that we accept. Today, that strategy requires us to provide ARG/MEU(SOC) forces in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Western Pacific. This level of forward presence stretches today's amphibious forces to the limit. Future programmed force

reductions will only make matters worse.

During the current 6-year program, driven by budgetary constraints, the Navy plans to phase out 24 amphibious ships. These retirements, prior to the end of the ships' nominal 35-year service lives, represent a significant reduction, not only in aggregate lift, but also in the number of ships available for forward presence and contingency response. This force reduction will result in the inability to respond simultaneously with a MEB in two oceans while maintaining minimum presence elsewhere, or to respond to a single regional crisis of a magnitude similar to DESERT SHIELD. I note with concern that these reductions in existing sealift are scheduled to occur in the same timeframe as we are considering acquisition of new sealift assets for rapid deployment of forces from CONUS.

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The current shipbuilding program includes LCAC, LSD cargo variants, LHD, and a new start for the future amphibious ship (LX). As these new ships are commissioned, I believe the ship retirement schedule is the best means to adjust the total lift attainment.

SELECTED EARLY RELEASE PROGRAMS

QUESTION 10: *What is your view of the Selected Early Retirement Program and what are the criteria that you believe should be applied in determining who should be selected for early release?*

ANSWER: Authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the Selective Early Retirement Program is a means of managing necessary reductions in the number of officers on active duty. It is an institutionally painful process, in that a specified number of officers—who have been and are contributing to the Marine Corps—must be told to terminate their active service before reaching the mandatory retirement point. This difficult process is necessa-

ry to manage the decreasing number of officers the Marine Corps will be authorized under currently projected end strength reductions. From a more positive view, the program also facilitates the upward movement of bright young officers awaiting promotion and their opportunity to serve in increasingly challenging assignments, gain experience, and make significant contributions to the Corps in a variety of areas.

The selective early retirement process has been used twice by the Marine Corps in the past four years. In each case, boards of general officers were appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, on recommendation of the Commandant, to select a given number of officers for retirement. The precept given the board was to examine each officer's potential for continued long-term service and his or her qualities to excel as an operational commander or in assignments supporting an operational commander. I believe these basic criteria are sound, and when matched against an officer's record of service in a variety of past assignments, they serve as a valid basis for determining those whose contributions have been significant, but whose future potential in uniform is limited.

I should note also that the Selective Early Retirement process is based on respect for the privacy of the individual officer. No official promulgation of the names of those selected is made. Each selected is notified in person by a general officer, and then formally by a personal letter. The subsequent retirement proceedings make no reference to whether the action is voluntary or involuntary.

In sum, the process is far from an officer being found unfit for duty or otherwise undesirable for retention. Rather, it is the institution's means of asking selected officers to step aside early, without loss of dignity, in the interests of the institution. As the Marine Corps reduces its officer strength at the rate of about three percent per year, I anticipate that selected early retirement boards will continue to be required as a management tool. I believe the procedures and the criteria under which the boards have been conducted in recent years remain valid.

WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE

QUESTION 11: What are your views on FMFM 1, which contains the Marine

Corps' warfighting doctrine? Do you intend to keep this focus, and what are your views on maneuver warfare versus the traditional firepower/attrition approach?

ANSWER: Maneuver warfare is a state of mind as well as a philosophy of warfare that is the cornerstone of Marine Corps warfighting doctrine. The publication of *FMFM 1* codified the philosophy and is the basis upon which we will institutionalize this doctrine in the Marine Corps.

Maneuver, by definition, is the application of both movement and firepower against the enemy to achieve a decision. More than that, however, the philosophy of maneuver doctrine is to out-think, out-act, and plainly out-smart an opponent—defeating him using speed, surprise, and disorientation rather than annihilation. This warfighting philosophy is the basis for all Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures and is now woven throughout current Marine Corps warfighting publications. Further, it is taught at all levels of Marine Corps Schools and practiced in our training and operations.

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To Marines, who usually fight outnumbered, the value of *FMFM 1* is that it focuses on methods that produce the desired results without producing needless casualties.

SURVEILLANCE, INTELLIGENCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE GROUP

QUESTION 12: How well did the new organization of the Surveillance, Intelligence, and Reconnaissance Group work during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM? What improvements can be made in this area?

ANSWER: The reorganization that will result in the fully fielded surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence groups (SRIG) was still occurring when DESERT SHIELD began. The SRIG functioned as an administrative headquarters. According to initial reports, it functioned reasonably well.

The lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM are still being collected and evaluated by our Battlefield Assessment Team. When the team completes its work, we will be able to better assess the performance of this vital combat support organization.

“THE WAY AHEAD”

QUESTION 13: Secretary of the Navy Larry Garrett, Chief of Naval Operations Adm Kelso, and Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen A. M. Gray recently published an article entitled “The Way Ahead.” Is there anything in that article, particularly as it relates to the Marine Corps, that you would disagree with, differ on, describe differently, or place additional or less emphasis on? Is there anything which you feel needs to be added?

ANSWER: The article is appropriately titled. “The Way Ahead” is a step ahead by our naval leaders in refocusing naval thought and naval strategy towards America's defense needs for tomorrow. The article begins the process of orienting naval power on an unpredictable new world order and a new National Military Strategy, under circumstances of reduced resources for defense. I believe it to be a sound blueprint for the future.

GEN GRAY'S INITIATIVES

*QUESTION 14: The current Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen A. M. Gray, has initiated a whole series of innovative changes in Marine Corps doctrine, training, and organizational structure, to include warrior training, professional reading lists, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) complex, to include the Warfighting Center and the Marine Corps University, the emphasis on maneuver warfare and *FMFM 1*, and a 1 May 1989 paper on how the Marine Corps will train and fight, to name only a few. Do you plan any changes in any of these approaches and, if so, what is the nature of the planned changes?*

ANSWER: The stewardship of the Marine Corps is a responsibility and privilege that 29 Marine officers be-

fore me—including Gen Gray—have borne with honor and distinction. If confirmed, I will inherit a magnificent tradition from these former Commandants, who have each made personal

66 The stewardship of the Marine Corps is a responsibility and privilege that 29 Marine officers before me—including Gen Gray—have borne with honor and distinction. If confirmed, I will inherit a magnificent tradition from these former Commandants, who have each made personal contributions to bring the Marine Corps today to be the national institution the American people and their elected leaders have come to expect—a well-disciplined, responsive, economical, operationally focused, and combat-ready naval force. 99

contributions to bring the Marine Corps today to be the national institution the American people and their elected leaders have come to expect—a well-disciplined, responsive, economical, operationally focused, and combat-ready naval force.

I particularly want to recognize the contributions of our most recent Commandants, who have been singularly influential in shaping the Marine Corps of today. Gen Chapman held the line for Marines when it was fashionable and seemingly desirable to relax professional and military standards. Gens Wilson and Barrow focused their efforts on joining, training, and maintaining the high quality of Marine that you see today. Beginning under Gen Barrow, and continuing under Gen Kelley, the Corps was completely outfitted with new, or improved, equipment and weapons and achieved the highest state of peacetime sustainability in our history—to include the development of the maritime pre-positioning concept. Gen Gray took this superbly manned, impressively equipped force and honed, dramatically, its operational focus,

with emphasis on warfighting and combat development processes.

I plan to build on Gen Gray's efforts as each Commandant has done with the work of his predecessor. During my watch, the Marine Corps will continue to refine and to improve on those ideas and concepts that are his legacy—especially, the high standards of professional education, operational competency, and combat readiness.

The deep respect and profound admiration that I have for my predecessors demand that I continue to lead the Marine Corps along the path that they have so clearly laid out for me. The American people expect the best from their Marines, they have always received it, and I intend to ensure they always will.

LESSONS LEARNED

QUESTION 15: BGen Paul K. Van Riper, the deputy commander for training and education at the MCCDC, writing in the June 1991 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette on lessons learned from Operation DESERT STORM, observed that "the Marine Corps lacks published MAGTF doctrine; in fact, we do not have a single manual on MAGTF operations" and "the organizational structure of the MEF is not designed for wartime operations, especially sustained operations ashore." These

66 I have already initiated—in my capacity as a Force Commander—to clearly define the role and functions of MAGTF command elements vis-a-vis the force headquarters, and to clarify the role of the component headquarters in a joint task force. These issues are working at present, and I will pursue them aggressively. 99

appear to be key areas for improvement. What is your view as to what needs to be done in this area, and would you propose to make the improvements BGen Van Riper believes are necessary?

ANSWER: Prior to its publication in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, I was provided a copy of BGen Van Riper's report of his observations during Operation DESERT STORM. As soon as I read

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it, I penned him a letter indicating my strong endorsement of the points in his report. They are universally valid.

I have already initiated—in my capacity as a Force Commander—to clearly define the role and functions of MAGTF command elements vis-a-vis the force headquarters, and to clarify the role of the component headquarters in a joint task force. These issues are working at present, and I will pursue them aggressively. I share also Gen Van Riper's view that the capabilities of the MAGTF command elements must be strengthened in a variety of areas. Most important, as he suggests, is our need to codify doctrine and procedures.

Clarifying, strengthening, and implementing the ideas put forth by him, and others with similar views, will be one of my areas of immediate emphasis.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

QUESTION 16A: Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION 16B: Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION 16C: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of the Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commandant of the Marine Corps?

ANSWER: Yes.

