Department of the Navy 1993 Posture Statement

Excerpts From A Report by
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Commandant of the Marine Corps
on the Posture and the Fiscal Year 1994 Budget of
The United States Navy and
The United States Marine Corps

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INTRODUCTION

Navy and Marine Corps forces available today and those programmed through the mid-1990s were conceived in an era of global confrontation. For decades, these naval forces have deployed globally to regional theaters to deter Soviet adventurism and to support allies and friends. Fortunately, the capability to deploy and sustain forward sea-based forces means that a great majority of the capabilities resident within today's Navy and Marine Corps forces are directly applicable to regionally focused littoral operations described in *The National Military Strategy* and the new Navy/Marine Corps White Paper . . . *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*. Consequently, while today's Navy and Marine Corps are being restructured and reorganized for new national needs and positive global change, the security environment for the U.S. military is a familiar one to the Navy and Marine Corps.

Continuing regional commitments in support of national needs and collective action with our coalition partners put increasing strains on the Department of the Navy budget as total obligational authority continues a slide begun in the mid-1980s. This paradox of continuing commitments and declining budgets is being resolved by fundamental changes in the way the Naval Service does business. Change and innovation are the order of the day—new organizational and operational concepts, increased joint interoperability, and where possible, the multiplier effects of new technology. Using new assessment tools and a joint perspective, our flag and general officers lead an interdivisional process of determining forces that can meet national needs, interests, and commitments. The fiscal constraints of the past several years hurt, but much of the change in the way programming decisions are made has been positive.

The extensive upgrade of fleet assets undertaken last decade, when followed up with planned aircraft modernizations, will provide vital naval forces for the first decades of the 21st century. Our task, therefore, is to tailor this extensive capability to a new world, and to maintain a ready Naval Service. As envisioned in *The National Military Strategy*, the Naval Service will be largely responsible for forward presence and initial crisis response. Consequently, Active and Reserve units of our Navy/Marine Corps Team packaged as naval expeditionary forces will support regionally focused joint force operations. This shaping of our future active and reserve Navy/Marine Corps Team will ensure flexible, capable, and self-sustaining combatant forces; versatile, high-technology, mine warfare capabilities; a tailorable, credible global deployment capability; continuous, effective, strategic deterrence; and, most important, sea-based, task organized naval expeditionary force packages for rapid response and seamless integration into joint and combined military operations.

Central to naval force shaping is the fact the Navy/Marine Corps Team is inex-

Command, Control, and Surveillance

The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to structure command and control capabilities to promote efficient joint and combined operations as part of an overarching command, control, and communications architecture that can adapt from sea to shore. We will also exploit the unique contributions which naval forces bring to littoral operations.

Our surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize exploitation of space and electronic warfare systems to provide commanders with immediate information, while denying and/or managing the data available to our enemies.

Battlespace Dominance

Battlespace dominance means that we can maintain access from the sea to permit the effective entry of equipment and resupply. This dominance implies that naval forces can bring to bear decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air. We must use the full range of U.S., coalition, and space-based assets to achieve dominance in space as well.

Naval forces must also have the capability to deny access to a regional adversary, interdict the adversary's movement of supplies by sea, and control the local sea and air. For the Naval Service, then, dominating the battlespace means ensuring effective transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to accomplish the full range of potential missions. This is the essence of naval adaptability and flexibility that are the keys to contingency response. Battlespace dominance is the heart of naval warfare.

Power Projection

Naval forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high-intensity, precise offensive power at the time and location of their choosing under any weather conditions, day or night. Power projection requires mobility, flexibility, and technology to mass strength against weakness. The Navy/Marine Corps Team supports the decisive sea-air-land battle by providing the sea-based support to enable the application of the complete range of U.S. combat power.

Force Sustainment

America's influence depends on its ability to sustain military operations around the globe. The military options available can be extended indefinitely because sea-based forces can remain on station as long as required. Naval forces encompass the full range of logistics support that is the critical element of any military operation. Forward logistics, prepositioning, and strategic sealift, coupled with strategic airlift, are the keys to force sustainment.

tricably bound to the joint Total Force as the maritime component of national security. All major operations will be joint, and therefore, naval programming uses six joint mission areas (JMAs) to conduct in-depth assessments of future force postures. They are Joint Strike, Joint Littoral Warfare, Joint Surveillance, Joint Space and Electronic Warfare/Intelligence, Strategic Sealift/Protection, and Strategic Deterrence. These six mission areas directly relate to the four operational capabilities of naval forces described in . . . *From the Sea:* Command, Control, and Surveillance; Battlespace Dominance; Power Projection; and Force Sustainment.

Hand in hand with joint force shaping, the Naval Service is aggressively pursuing improved naval doctrine. Effective guidance for littoral warfare will support joint operations from the sea through a full spectrum of national needs and interests. To support this effort, the Chief of Naval Operations realigned his headquarters to parallel the joint headquarters structure. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps established the Naval Doctrine Command and geographically collocated it with counterparts of the other Services. These unprecedented reorganizations rationalize legislatively mandated staff reductions to reshape the Naval Service. Despite lower manning, they maximize efficient Naval Service integration, coordination with joint and unified commander staffs, and cooperation with complementary Army and Air Force staffs. These lean and responsive staffs eliminate inter-Service redundancy, develop appropriate force mixes, and build upon the strengths of the Naval Service's new direction . . . *From the Sea.*

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OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The centerpiece of the Naval Service's new direction is to expand on and capitalize on its traditional *expeditionary* role. Its future force structure must be able to swiftly respond, on short notice, to crises in distant waters, provide a quick assembly of credible offensive power from the sea when required by national demands, and be able to sustain support for long-term operations. Fundamental to these taskings, naval force structure must also contain sufficient forces to provide unobtrusive *forward presence* that can be intensified or withdrawn on short notice. As the United States continues to reduce its overseas land-based Army and Air Force units, naval force forward presence is increasingly important in order to meet international treaty obligations, regional stability, and strategic deterrence responsibilities.

Naval forces of the 21st century must not only meet the traditional requirements of command of the seas, forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift, but also must have the four key operational capabilities of *littoral warfare* identified in . . . *From the Sea.*

Command, Control, and Surveillance

The Department of the Navy is committed to providing a command and control structure that will exploit the unique contributions that naval expeditionary forces bring to littoral operations. Our goal is to ensure efficient joint operations through a command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^4I) architecture which can adapt from sea to shore. The information and data aspects must be user supportive and maximize information availability from all sources to all potential users.

Other key elements of the Department's strategy to enhance its command, control, and surveillance operational capabilities include expanding high capacity, multimedia communications to better support naval and joint operations; increasing joint connectivity; developing the means to ensure a common tactical picture to provide enhanced situational awareness; and upgrading surveillance systems while emphasizing near real-time/real- time delivery of surveillance data. The Department is pursuing several enhancements in support of these thrusts:

Copernicus: In support of an integrated approach to C^4I goals, the Department of the Navy has developed *Copernicus*, an overall C^4I architecture for the post-Cold War era and a blueprint for infusing cutting edge commercial technologies into C^4I programs. The Copernicus architecture recognizes that enhanced capabilities in battle management and interoperability of C^4I systems are prerequisites for joint and combined operations. Reduced to its core, the Copernicus architecture changes the C^4I system from a producer centered "push" to a user centered "pull" system while mandating open architecture, adherence to a common operating environment, and use of Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment whenever possible.

Near Real-Time Tactical Information: High capacity data distribution and a common near real-time tactical picture will be provided by Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) to E-2Cs, F-14Ds, F-18s, CVs, LHD/LHAs, CGs, and DDGs. The Navy Battle Group Passive Horizon Ex-

COMMAND,CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE (Dollars in Millions)	FY 1994
P-3 ASUW UPGRADE	151
E-2C UPGRADE	173
EA-6B UPGRADE	124
JOINT C3I UPGRADES FOR SURF PLATFORMS (CV, LHD, LPD, CG)	145

SELECTED INVESTMENTS

tension System (BGPHES) is being developed to provide enhanced signal intelligence (SigInt) surveillance beyond the line-of-sight horizon for CVs, LHDs, and LHAs, while the Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) will provide a digitized imagery capability to the same platforms. Significant communications upgrades include expanding super high-frequency (SHF) installations to provide Defense System Communications Satellite (DSCS) connectivity for all major platforms, while investing heavily in extremely high-frequency (EHF) terminals and the ultra high-frequency (UHF) follow-on constellation for jam resistance communications.

The cornerstone of C^4I programs afloat is the Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A), which processes sensor information and communications for all warfare mission areas and is scalable to support all levels of command from flagship to frigate. NTCS-A employs an open architecture which allows integration with other Services' systems, such as the Air Force CTAPS air tasking order (ATO) software. It has already been integrated with the Marine Corps Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) on the USS *Wasp* and USS *Saipan*. Further enhancing joint interoperability, the Marine Corps has signed memoranda of agreement with the Air Force/Air National Guard and the Army to help meet Marine component commander communications equipment and personnel requirements.

Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) Afloat: Fully recognizing that joint operations are the venue of the future, the Navy has developed a focused strategy to support optimum, affordable flagship C^4I configurations that both complement and become integrated with expeditionary requirements. By installing a number of C^4I system upgrades, such as SHF on flagships, and employing the principles of the Copernicus architecture, a quantum increase in C^4I capability has recently been achieved and fully demonstrated during the joint Exercise TANDEM THRUST 92. In that exercise, the Navy demonstrated the ability to conduct CJTF as well as joint force air component commander (JFACC) functions afloat. The ultimate goal is to provide all joint afloat commands with fully integrated command and control capabilities, with appropriate attention to the various command transitions, such as sea-to-sea, sea-to-shore, shore-to-sea, and shore-to-shore.

Space and Electronic Warfare: Besides improving its command, control, and surveillance operational capabilities, the Department continues to advance the doctrine and technology which support space and electronic warfare (SEW). This naval mission area targets an opponent's C^4I infrastructure. This major force multiplier fully exploits our technological advantages in order to disrupt, neutralize, and deceive the enemy, while providing friendly forces with superior intelligence.

Battlespace Dominance

Battlespace dominance is the heart of naval warfare. Naval forces must be able to deny access to a regional adversary, interdict his movement of supplies by sea, and control the local sea and air. To this end, the Department is continuing a vigorous program to meet the unique and challenging demands of providing forces that can effectively deal with projected threats including the stealth antiship cruise missiles; tactical ballistic missiles; shallow water/choke point diesel submarines; and, most notably, mine threats.

Mine Warfare: Continued advancements in mine warfare are vital. Mine detection, avoidance, and countermeasures are necessary to ensure battlespace dominance in narrow seas, choke points, and coastal surf zones of the littorals. Extensive investments made in the last decade have begun to pay off with the ongoing impending delivery of 14 Avenger-class mine countermeasure (MCM) ships and the impending delivery of the first several of 12 Osprey-class mine hunting coastal (MHC) crafts. As a direct result of lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the Department is planning to convert one LPH to a mine countermeasures support ship (MCS). This conversion will provide required command, control, communications, and logistics support to air and surface mine countermeasure forces. Finally, an aggressive research and development effort is underway to meet requirements for shallow water surf surveillance, mine neutralization, improved influence mine clearance, and accurate mine locating devices.

Shallow Water Antisubmarine Warfare: Dominance in narrow seas, choke points, and littoral zones can be put to risk by submarines as well as mines. Systems incorporating advanced acoustic and nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies are essential to preserving the ability to operate in these areas. For example, the Advanced Deployable Surveillance System is being developed to make on-demand ASW support available for operations around the

BATTLESPACE DOMINANCE (Dollars in Millions)	FY 1994
MINE WARFARE	140
MINE COUNTERMEASURE SUPPORT SHIP	124
MK-48 TORPEDO SHALLOW WATER IMPROVEMENT	18
SH-60 B/F HELO PROCUREMENT	403
HH-60H HELO PROCUREMENT	144
DDG-51 PROCUREMENT	2643

SELECTED INVESTMENTS

world. Airborne laser systems will enable the fleet to localize shallow targets. A robust research and development effort, building on the technology base developed for "blue water" ASW, will meet the unique challenges posed by the shallow water environment.

Carrier-Based Air: We intend to continue the modernization of our carrier forces to provide a force of 12 carriers that meets the challenges of global presence, conventional deterrence, crisis response, and joint warfighting requirements. The final carrier to finish the service life extension program (SLEP) modernization and rehabilitation, USS *Constellation* (CV 64), is currently undergoing sea trials and she is scheduled to rejoin the fleet in late spring 1993. With the commissioning of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) in July 1992, two CVNs are currently under construction: USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74), scheduled to join the fleet in FY96, and USS *United States* (CVN 75), to be delivered in FY98. The Navy will request full funding for the ninth Nimitz-class carrier, CVN-76, in FY95 as the replacement for USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63) in 2003. Long-lead funding will be requested in FY99 for a 10th Nimitz-class nuclear carrier, CVN-77, which will be commissioned in FY 2007. All will replace older, conventional carriers, maintaining the 12-carrier force. These ships are critical to providing an operating base for littoral air operations, including complete facilities for the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and CJTF.

In concert with carrier modernization, the Department is investing in an aggressive research and development effort to define the replacement for aging A-6E attack aircraft and F-14 fighters. Central to this effort is the reduction of carrier-based fighter and strike aircraft to two basic airframes, the F/A-18 and the A/FX discussed later. In addition, we are upgrading EA-6B and E-2C aircraft to enable them to extend their capability and service life until a replacement aircraft is developed in the next century.

Carrier-based, rotary-wing aircraft are being modernized with the completion of the previously scheduled replacement of SH-3 Sea King helicopters with the SH-60F variant of the Seahawk. Additionally, these Seahawks will be upgraded commencing in FY97 with the airborne low frequency sonar (ALFS). Two new highly versatile HH-60H helicopters will be added to each carrier-based squadron to provide enhanced antisurface warfare (ASUW), combat search and rescue (CSAR), and special operations forces (SOF) capabilities.

Expeditionary Air: Marine tactical aviation, whether integrated with carrier air wings or conducting operations from land, offers a potent, seamless transition of air operations from sea to shore. The F/A-18, AV-8B, and AH-1W aircraft provide Marine ground forces with needed mobility and firepower beyond the limited armor, artillery, air defense, and naval gunfire available. The AV-8B Remanufacture Program will transform day attack Harriers into night attack/radar-equipped aircraft. Additionally, the AH-1W Night Targeting System (NTS) expands the operational capability of the SuperCobra to provide close-in fire support (CIFS) and assault fire suppression 24 hours a day. Marine avation ensures that Marine expeditionary forces remain versatile and mobile enough to respond quickly to crises, yet powerful enough to accomplish the mission.



APN TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY TRENDS

Organic to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is an expeditionary capability which allows its tactical aviation to operate in remote, austere locations. Marine wing support groups can establish and operate 3,800-foot expeditionary airfields (EAFs), inclusive of portable arresting gear, lighting, and matting to accommodate 72 aircraft. The EAF 2000 Program that relies on modular vice old building- block structures and the research for a more lightweight matting are improving the deployability of EAFs. During FY94, a 900-foot matting capability will be prepositioned with the Pacific Fleet Maritime Prepositioning Squadron. An enhancement initiative currently under joint review may allow prepositioning a full EAF 2000 on each of the three squadrons. Air Force and Navy systems effectively link with the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) providing connectivity throughout the joint force. Finally, aviation logistics can be deployed by either strategic lift or aboard an aviation support ship to provide an expeditionary intermediate maintenance activity.

Shore-Based Air: The Navy's P-3 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) program is being restructured to ensure the effective transition from open ocean to littoral battlespace dominance. The P-3's unique surveillance characteristics make it a force multiplier in the littoral environment. In concert with the restructured mission, the P-3 ASUW upgrade program has been developed from unified commands' CinC inputs as a cost-effective alternative to the terminated Update IV. The Navy's program also provides full funding for an operational service life extension that addresses readi-



SCN/NDSF TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY TRENDS

CMC Oral Testimony

by Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

The following remarks were made by the Commandant on 31 March 1993 when he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee to present the Navy Department Posture Statement and testify in behalf of the FY94 Budget.

As always, it's a privilege for me to represent the Marine Corps before those who raise, provide, and maintain our Armed Forces, and to report to you on the status of your Corps of Marines. It's an equal privilege to join with my naval shipmate, Adm Frank Kelso, in broadening your awareness of the capabilities the Navy and Marine Corps bring jointly to our national defense structure. A joint posture statement of our two Services has already been introduced. With your permission, I will add a few remarks.

In a book about U.S. Marines in Korea, a noted historian recorded this impression:

> One who will go where his colors go, without asking, who will fight a phantom foe in jungle or mountain range, without counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, without complaint, is still what he has always been, from imperial Rome to sceptered Britain to democratic America. He is the stuff of which legions are made . . . he has been called United States Marine.

Those words characterize, better than any I could offer, what Marines are all about, and what we do in the security interests of our Nation.

When I appeared before you last year, about 20 conflicts, confrontations, or crises of some sort were underway around the world. That number continues today. Also, when I appeared before you, I told you that on a routine basis there are about 22,000 Marines who operate forward around the world, away from their home bases and families for extended periods of 6 months to a year, to keep a lid on or to be prepared to respond to crises.

As I speak today, a year later, there are 30,000 operating forward around the globe. The percentage of our operating forces committed away from home last year at this time was 22 percent; at this moment, it is 30 percent. A year has passed; we have reduced the Corps by 9,000 more Marines, and the number operating forward has increased.

Just over 3,000 remain in Somalia, drawndown from the 11,000 we introduced there 4 months ago. The first of those units withdrawn back to California in late January is now entering its "lock-on" training period preparing for another 6-month deployment the latter part of this summer.

Another 9,000 Marines are embarked in amphibious shipping for 6-month deployments and are currently located 5,000-strong in the Mediterranean and in the Adriatic off Bosnia-Herzegovina where they have been maintained afloat almost constantly for the past 10 months; 2,000-strong off Somalia; and the unit which opened the door and did much of the work early in Somalia, 1,600-strong, is in the Western Pacific headed toward home bases near the end of its 6-month deployment.

Ten thousand Marines are still withdrawing from an exercise on the Korean Peninsula to their forward operating bases in the Western Pacific—bases that are only a few flying hours, or a couple of days sailing time, away from that volatile region should the need for them to return expeditiously occur.

I told you last year that the 9-1-1 phone rang six times in the previous 2 years in places like Liberia, Mogadishu, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Northern Iraq. It rang four more times this year: in Guam, Somalia, Haiti, and the Chuuk Islands; and while home from deployment at home bases, it rang twice more for 2,500 Marines in Los Angeles and South Florida.

This relatively unchanging commitment of Marines has been a constant over the history of our Nation and most specifically, during the past half century. It is the purpose of Marines, as your predecessors in these Halls defined and assigned our role, to be "expeditionary"—away from home shores and soil, as part of the naval expeditionary capabilities of our Nation.

This is why you have a Marine Corps; this is what its role in the defense of our Nation's interests is; this is why the historian described it as a legion.

Marines are a complementary component of our Nation's joint force team. As a combined arms, integrated, air-ground force capable of operating either from sea-based amphibious ships and aircraft carriers, or ashore, Marines are joined with the Navy to provide the instrument that enables the unified commanders in chief to maintain forces in the littoral regions of the world without relying on overseas permanent bases.

Marine formations blend easily into—or form—joint task forces for any mission required by one of our unified commanders. We have worked hard over the past year to improve even further the interoperability of our sister services with us, and us with them, to

ness, corrosion, and supportability concerns.

Surface Combatants: Heavily armed with tactical cruise missiles, antiair missiles, guns, and antisubmarine torpedoes, cruisers and destroyers provide uniquely flexible, extremely capable tools for effective battlespace dominance. Surface combatants will continue to provide protection for carrier battle groups (CVGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs). They will also increasingly be used to provide presence in areas where entire battle groups were used before: e.g., maritime interception operations, economic sanction surveillance, or even limited no-fly zone enforcement with standoff antiair capabilities. The continued modernization of these forces is being undertaken through the evolutionary upgrade of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. We will continue to build versions of this ship to replace retiring and less capable platforms into the early years of the next decade. The Department has also embarked on an aggressive effort to pull together technologies that will have sufficiently matured so that, by the early 21st century, we will be able to introduce a capable and affordable follow-on to the Spruance and Oliver Hazard Perry classes and complement the Burke class.

As a companion piece, several existing shipboard weapons systems are being improved to ensure that resident ordnance-

provide an even more synergistic joint team of national capabilities. The budget before you continues that effort toward increased interoperability between the Naval Services—Sailors and Marines—and the Army and Air Force in the areas of command and control.

With regard to our budget requests, our priorities remain essentially the same as last year:

- People.
- Continued development of a replacement for our aged CH-46 helicopter.
- Improvement of our command and control and intelligence systems.
- Improvement, through modernization, of the warfighting deficiencies learned from Operation DESERT STORM.
- And strong support for the Navy's ship construction plan that maintains and replaces adequate numbers of amphibious ships for employment of Marines.
- Finally, an O&M level that supports our personnel, training, equipment maintenance, and the other requirements that are vital to maintaining readiness.

Our posture statement addresses these, but let me stress the importance of the first.

The Marine Corps is people; we operate people. We have equipment and systems to help people get there and to support them in doing what they must when they arrive, but in the Corps, it is people that are the capability I described earlier. This is not exclusive to the Corps, and relates to some Army units also, but it is predominant in the Marine Corps more so than in any of the other Armed Services. We are people intensive.

A submarine, a bomber, an aircraft carrier, a strategic transport aircraft, or an armored division is the instrument that provides a capability. It takes people to operate the instrument, but it is the thing—the instrument—that delivers the capability.

The Marine Corps' instrument is a battalion, a company, or a squad of Marines—people! We support the people with systems; but it is the formations of people, not the independent systems, that deliver the capability. The unit of measure for the capabilities Marines deliver is not the number of divisions or aircraft wings we maintain in bases in the United States waiting to be sent to war; rather, it is our ability to generate from those divisions and wings the numbers of battalions and squadrons to maintain the forward operating expeditionary forces for presence and crisis response, and then, to bring them together to fight as divisions or wings when crisis erupts into conflict.

Reductions in Marine Corps end strength translate directly to a loss in capability delivered and used on a day-to-day basis—not to reductions in overhead, bureaucracy, or excess capacity in the number of divisions, wings, or brigades in our inventory.

Some 77 cents out of every dollar you provide directly to the Corps is used to buy and support people; 6 cents purchases our ground weapons and equipment; the remaining 17 cents goes toward training, operating, and maintaining readiness and our bases.

Taken together, FY94 procurement funding and operational and maintenance funding are at the lowest point since the 1970s—the days of hollow forces. The Corps' procurement account at $480 million is one-third of what it was 2 years ago. Our operation and maintenance account is strapped, having fallen over 20 percent in the past 7 years. This decrease has occurred while requirements continue to grow. Virtually all flexibility has been removed from that appropriation.

Any further budget reductions to Marine Corps accounts, now, or as far as I can see into the future, will, of simple arithmetic necessity, come from people—a direct reduction in a vital national capability that is in full use today and for which the demand in the past year has only increased.

As you know, certain appropriations managed for efficiency by the Navy directly support the Marine Corps. For example, all aircraft, aviation weapons, and fuel to fly are managed financially in the Department in a single account. This arrangement is similar to the management of chaplains, corpsmen, and research and development funding. In effect, these are Marine Corps dollars managed for efficiency in Navy accounts.

When all these various accounts are added together, the Marine Corps request and Adm Kelso's request for funds to support Marines total 4.8 percent of the monies requested in the President's budget—a nickel out of every dollar.

In addition, we strongly support the additional one percent—the penny—that will pay for the Navy amphibious force ships and crews. Together, for just under 6 percent of the total defense budget, the Nation will continue to receive the extraordinary national security benefit that comes from the sea in the form of ships, planes, and its legion of Marines.

I appreciate the privilege of reporting to you on the status of your Marine Corps, and even more, the support the Congress has provided for 217 years to maintain us.

I look forward to your questions.

USMC

based capabilities keep pace with the threat and ship system improvements. A significant improvement under development is Standard Missile Block IV which greatly improves high-altitude and cross-range capability. It also offers potential integration into a sea-based theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD).

Integral to surface combatant capability are embarked, fully integrated SH-60B LAMPS MK III helicopters. These aircraft have proven to be vital force-multiplier elements to both ASW and ASUW battlespace dominance missions and provide significant surveillance and coordination advantages in the littoral environment. The Department has included the Block I upgrade, which provides these aircraft with the Penguin air-to-surface missile, for fleet introduction starting toward the end of FY93. The Navy's program also continues development of the Block 2 upgrade which will provide significant improvements in both ASUW and ASW capabilities, including an imaging radar and the Airborne Low Frequency Solar (ALFS).

The 170-foot patrol coastal (PC) Cyclone-class ship has been built and is now being introduced to the fleet. These 13 ships, although funded by the U.S. Special Operations Command and part of the naval special warfare community, will be manned by Navy surface warfare qualified

personnel. With a primary mission of coastal patrol and interdiction (CP&I), the PC is expected to play a significant role in littoral warfare.

Submarines: Tremendous national investment and effort produced today's very successful American nuclear submarine force. This force is dependent on an exceptionally unique industrial base. Although sufficient numbers of nuclear submarines are in the fleet today, special care must be taken to ensure we retain the industrial capability to replace today's submarines when they retire. Currently programmed submarine building leaves a gap in production that, if not properly addressed, threatens the nation's ability to retain this critical technology.

In the midst of continuous world technological and political changes, the Navy's attack submarine (SSN) force remains a flexible, stealthy, and powerful rapid response and JTF asset that can sustain itself almost indefinitely. It offers the ability to project power both covertly and overtly, control the surface and underwater battlespace, and deliver weapons or special operations forces ashore. To fully utilize advanced American nuclear submarine technology and capability, the Department is procuring two Seawolf-class (SSN 21) submarines and is doing concept definition studies for the new attack submarine of the 21st century. These ships, along with the existing and improved Los Angeles class (SSN 688) ships will provide the country with a modern, capable submarine force well into the 21st century.

Several significant undersea weapons and communications upgrades are included in the Navy program to meet littoral warfare needs. The most significant of these is the Mk-48 advanced capability torpedo modification program which provides the means to improve the Mk-48's performance. Also included are efforts to improve the capability of submarine sonar systems to perform in all environments including shallow water, improve communications connectivity between SSNs and battle group assets, and enhance minefield location systems.

Theater Missile Defense: Over 15 countries are estimated to have programs to take advantage of ballistic missile technology. Armed with conventional, biological, chemical, or even battlefield nuclear warheads, these systems could pose a serious challenge to American and coalition combat forces. Battlespace dominance by naval expeditionary forces will depend on the ability to field an effective theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). The Department of the Navy TBMD program is being developed in concert with the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO). Our goal is a layered defensive capability against a wide range of theater ballistic missile systems.

The first phase of the program involves modifications to the Navy's Aegis weapons system and the Standard Missile Block IV. Additionally, the Marine Corps is upgrading the Hawk missile system air defense command post, and TPS-59 radar. These Navy and Marine Corps modifications will provide littoral area defense capability to protect fleet concentrations, amphibious objective areas, and other vital assets ashore.

The second phase of the program is to provide a theater defense capability. This phase requires development of an exo-atmospheric interceptor. This effort will leverage SDIO technology developments, and interactive information and data transfer technology described above. Combining these diverse technological developments will allow naval expeditionary forces to combine with other joint combat forces in an overarching grid of theater area TBMD.

Another important aspect of theater missile defense, as well as individual ship self defense, is the Cooperative Engagement Concept. This capability will provide real time, extremely high rate transfer of sensor data to all units in the information net. An operator on a ship or at a land-based missile battery will have available all the information on the net, effectively extending his platform's sensors to the fullest range and widest area of the most distant unit in the net. This over-the-horizon capability will give the local commander the ability to defend himself and shoot his intercept munitions at targets that may not have yet been detected on his own sensors. The Cooperative Engagement Concept is a major force multiplier and a convincing counter to new high-tech threats such as sea-skimming cruise missiles. Tests have already been conducted, aimed at tying together Navy surveillance assets with Marine Corps Hawk units, Army Patriot units, as well as Air Force AWACS. The goal is to integrate all systems in a seamless, joint solution to the theater missile defense problem.

Power Projection

Only the United States can globally project sustained power from the sea. This capability is itself a strategic deterrent that contributes to regional stability, which supports U.S. interests and promotes U.S. values abroad. Additionally, the U.S. Navy will continue to be responsible for the prominent sea leg of nuclear strategic deterrence.

The concept of naval expeditionary forces in . . . *From the Sea* expands the application of principles of maneuver to the projection of maritime power in littoral regions. Operational maneuver from the sea applies technological advances in speed, mobility, communications, and navigation seamlessly and rapidly to exploit enemy weaknesses. Naval expeditionary forces can employ the advantages of maneuver at sea through continuous operations from CVBs and ARGs over the horizon to inland objectives.

Implicit in the capability of tailored, sea-based naval expeditionary forces is credible and sustainable forcible entry. New technology means that assault forces may be physically dispersed for simultaneous power projection at multiple points. These forces—

POWER PROJECTION

(Dollars in Millions)

	FY 1994
A/FX (R&D)	399
F/A-18 C/D PRODUCTION	1745
F/A- 1 8 E/F (R&D)	1414
V-22 (R&D)	78
AV-8B REMANUFACTURE	145
PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS	642
LHD CONSTRUCTION	894
ATACMS DEMONSTRATION	23
CH-53E HELO PRODUCTIONS	297
AH-1W HELO PRODUCTIONS	143
ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT (R&D)	22

SELECTED INVESTMENTS

concentrated electronically and informationally—command, control, and support landing forces in a seamless projection of power from the sea. They must be able to locate and defeat mines and other antiship defenses, while they deceive and disrupt the enemy. Naval expeditionary forces will continue to provide the CinCs with the operational depth of naval power projection with task-oriented and -sized Marine expeditionary forces; sea-based medium range attack aircraft; and long-range, sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. Critical to success of operational maneuver from the sea is the rapid transition from sea to shore. Amphibious lift must have not just the capacity to move at least 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) across the ocean, it must also have landing craft and aircraft that can move them and their equipment rapidly ashore. Also required is naval surface fire support that can concentrate intense suppression of enemy opposition to the landing forces. Navy SEALS and special boat unit personnel are an integral part of the naval expeditionary force to support amphibious operations and participate in littoral warfare missions.

Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces: Marine combat forces are organized into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) to meet operational requirements. MAGTFs, composed of elements from Marine command elements, divisions, wings, and force service support groups, operate as integrated combined arms teams. They have organic tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. Ranging in size from a special purpose MAGTF to a Marine expeditionary force, these task organized, self-sustaining, rapidly deployable units provide a range of combat power from short duration amphibious raids to large scale forcible entry amphibious assaults that can dominate the landward portion of the littoral battlespace.

A significant percentage of the combat power of the MAGTF is generated by Marine aviation. Marine aviation includes vital air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, airspace control, and electronic warfare to expeditionary forces. Uniquely trained, organized, and equipped for deployment on aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, or from austere forward-operating bases, this capability provides a tremendous enabling force for sequential buildup of land-based tactical aviation.

MAGTF mobility and firepower are also greatly enhanced by Marine helicopters. In that regard, replacement of the CH-46E and CH-53D airframes is the Department's number one acquisition priority for the Marine Corps. We have initiated a Dynamic Component Upgrade Program for the CH-46 as an interim measure until the medium lift replacement aircraft can be procured. MV-22 development continues under a new engineering and manufacturing

development (EMD) contract while various helicopter options are also evaluated. The Department has provided for production funding within the FYDP for the selected alternative. In addition, modernization of the attack (AH-1) and heavy-lift (CH-53E) helicopter fleet is successfully moving foward.

Besides conventional combat, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, forward-deployed MAGTFs, usually a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), can conduct select special operations from the sea. Though not considered special operations forces, the special operations capable MEU, or MEU(SOC), provides CinCs with a wide range of crisis response options. The MEU(SOC) is available for immediate response, as well as prolonged presence at sea or ashore. Their enhanced capabilities support combat missions and noncombatant operations such as evacuation, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

In order to remain versatile, the Corps is continuing an aggressive modernization effort. To acquire and maintain state-of-the-art capabilities, the Marine Corps is pursuing a broad range of integrated MAGTF C^4I programs. Current deficiencies in navigation and night-fighting will be addressed. Research efforts focus on tactical mobility, ground weapons, the intelligence flow to the local commander, assault amphibious vehicles, and countermine capability.

Amphibious Lift and Maritime Prepositioning: To effectively transport, provide a presence, and deploy highly capable Marine expeditionary forces, the Department is continuing to modernize and tailor its amphibious forces with an eye toward providing an over-the-horizon, high-speed insertion capability. While baseline force structure studies indicate a higher 3.0 MEB lift requirement, our lift capacity is fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEBs. This smaller force must be carefully tailored with the flexibility to meet a broad range of national needs and interests. To meet CinC forward presence requirements, analysis indicates the force should support 12 ARGs. Vital to this capability is the continued modernization of the Navy's amphibious shipping. To this end, the Department has included a sixth Wasp-class LHD in the FY94 budget, which was partially appropriated in FY93. Also, the Department is aggressively developing a new class of amphibious ship to replace the aging LPD, LKA, LST, and LSD-36 class amphibious ships.

Expeditionary operations are further enhanced by the 13 ships in three maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) squadrons. Each MPS carries 30 days' combat equipment and sustainment for 16,500 Marines. The supported Marine force requires only 250 strategic airlift sorties to deploy. Positioned in the Eastern Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific, the MPS squadrons, when married up with associated Navy and Marine forces, provide the geographic combatant CinCs with a new dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness.

Medium Range Strike Aircraft: The A/FX is the Department's top priority joint aircraft development effort for the Navy. It is intended to provide an all-weather replacement for the aging A-6 medium attack bomber. A joint Air Force/Navy program, the A/FX will introduce necessary stealth technology into carrier-based aircraft. Also, it will fulfill Air Force tactical aircraft requirements, capitalize on new technology, minimize costs, and ensure joint compatibility of Navy and Air Force assets. In the near term, the F/A-18 strike fighter will capitalize on the battle-proven C/D models to provide increased payload, longer range, and greater endurance. It is a highly capable, near-term improvement to sea-based striking power. The first E/F aircraft will enter fleet service near the turn of the century.

The Naval Service's sea-based aviation strike capability is being tailored, not only by the development of the F/A-18 E/F and A/FX aircraft, but also through an innovative integration of four Marine air squadrons with carrier air wings. Carrier air wing integration delivers some immediate joint interoperability improvements by expanding the integration of Navy and Marine Corps assets to complement Service capabilities and minimize warfighting duplication. These carriers, deployed with specially packaged air wings and their supporting arms, are precisely tailored to provide a range of crisis response options. These discrete force packages provide the CinC and diplomatic negotiators the distinct advantage of being easily withdrawn if the crisis abates.

Naval Surface Fire Support: Naval surface fire support (NSFS) provides for the projection of power from the seaward to the landward area of littoral operations. It supports operational maneuver from the sea by destroying or neutralizing enemy emplacements. It enables the landing of Marine expeditionary forces from the sea in the face of enemy opposition. While naval aviation forces are crucial to NSFS, they cannot do the entire job when intense, concentrated, all-weather fire support is required for the suppression of opposition to the landing force. They must be supplemented by a sea- based fire support system capable of neutralizing a variety of enemy targets. The Navy has contracted with the Center for Naval Analyses for a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) to determine the best system, or combination of projectile and missile systems, required to obtain the necessary NSFS capability. The analysis will review existing weapons, as well as those under development.

During FY94 an advanced technology demonstration will be conducted to evaluate the capability to utilize a modified Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) from a seagoing platform to successfully engage a land target. The Navy is also conducting a Gun Weapons System Advanced Technology Program to identify and exploit emerging technologies needed to construct the naval gun weapons systems of the next century. Liquid propelled and electro-thermal-chemical guns are being studied. Autonomous rocket-assisted, precision-guided munitions with target recognition systems are also being explored. The selected systems will provide a high volume of accurate, all-weather, medium-range fire support that will be responsive to the maneuver commander and will augment and enhance naval aviation and strike munitions.

Long-Range Cruise Missiles: Tomahawk cruise missiles that proved so successful in DESERT STORM will continue to provide a key element of deep- strike power projection capability for the foreseeable future. The Navy's procurement plans include bringing inventory levels up to projected needs for the next several decades. Additionally, the Department is continuing to pursue the next evolutionary upgrade called Tomahawk Block IV, expected to be ready for fleet introduction later this decade.

Advanced Precision-Guided Munitions: Collectively, precision attack programs provide the ingredients which enable the projection of power when and where required. Our precision-guided munitions road map outlines four tactical envelopes for projected standoff weapon delivery, and our goal is to neck down to four weapons systems—one for each of those envelopes. Approaching an objective from the sea, we may first project power ashore using our longest range system, the sea-launched Tomahawk. As discussed above, it is a key element of our deep- strike power projection capability. Closing in range, we will utilize the air-launched SLAM for area standoff requirements. Closer still, three important joint air-delivered systems will significantly increase our power projection capability—Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), a USN-led program providing significant point defense standoff capability, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), a USAF-led program with powerful close-in lethality, and Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM). These "smart" weapons systems will significantly enhance our flexible yet powerful application of force while increasing platform survivability.

Nuclear Strategic Deterrence: Nuclear deterrence remains a fundamental pillar of the Nation's security, despite revolutionary changes in the world. The continuing national commitment to nuclear deterrence is fully supported by the Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force. As older land systems are retired, the 18-ship Ohio-class (SSBN-826) and their resident C-4 and D-5 Trident missiles will assume a central role in nuclear deterrence.

Force Sustainment

To support national needs through international coalitions or unilateral action, the United States depends on the uniquely American capability to sustain military operations anywhere. With almost 99 percent of national military lift capacity, naval logistics forces encompass the full range of support needed for any military operation. These forces include a comprehensive and responsive logistics support system, including fast sealift and airlift, replenishment ships, mobile repair facilities, advanced logistics support hubs, and naval construction forces. In addition, force sustainment depends on naval forces acting in their traditional role of protecting troops and equipment with unimpeded sea lines of communication in and en route to the theater.

Sealift: The recently completed Department of Defense Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) examined lift requirements through the end of the century. This study considered the national needs for rapid power projection from afloat prepositioned assets and from locations within the United States. The results were used to develop



WPN/MPC/OPN TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY TRENDS



a revised Strategic Sealift Implementation Plan (SSIP) which proposes an additional two million square feet of prepositioned cargo capacity and three million square feet in sealift cargo capability. The SSIP, recently forwarded to the Congress, provides a quantitative and qualitative determination of new construction and conversion activities required. Using $2,463 million in funds already appropriated in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), the Department expects to award contracts for conversion of existing ships and new construction in FY93. Deliveries of the conversions are anticipated to start in 1995 and new construction in 1997 for a total of 20 new fast sealift ships.

Protection: Although there is no other major maritime power that can challenge U.S. command of the seas, there are regional naval powers that could attempt to harass or interdict American and friendly shipping in support of a contingency or crisis response. Traditional Navy missions of protecting the transport of Army heavy divisions and other shipping in support of JTF operations are still required. One recent example of the importance of this mission was the escort of tankers in the Iran/Iraq War. Likewise, littoral warfare depends on continued command of the seaward side of littoral areas during expeditionary operations. Consequently, to support sustainment of forces ashore, Navy surface combatants and submarines are still required in their traditional roles to dominate the battlespace at sea.

Combat Logistics Forces (CLF): The Combat Logistics Force has been realigned to emphasize support for naval expeditionary forces engaged in littoral operations. This highly versatile CLF force is built around a concept of "station ships" to support theater operations and "shuttle ships" to keep the theater CLF assets supplied. The station/shuttle ship concept provides maximum flexibility to meet both peacetime and theater combat logistics needs and can be sized to meet the needs of a variety of force options. The Navy is also in the process of revising its CLF force balance between Military Sealift Command and active Navy assets to best meet the missions of station and shuttle ships. The station ship force is anchored around six new AOE-6-class oilers, the fifth of which was contracted for this year, the sixth is planned for FY99. The shuttle ship force is centered around the Military Sealift Command T-AO/T-AFS classes and middle aged AE-26-class ammunition ships.

Expeditionary Combat Service Support (CSS): The Marine Corps and Navy continue to maintain and refine active force CSS capabilities for support of routine MAGTF deployments and short notice expeditionary operations. Reserves of both Services maintain additional CSS for expeditionary operations in support of major regional contingencies. The Naval Service is unique among the Services in that the Marine Corps maintains sustained CSS for a major contingency in the active force.

CONCLUSION: THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TODAY

Throughout America's history, naval forces have played a significant role in defense of the nation—ready when needed, relevant in force composition and employment, and fully capable of meeting national needs. Presented today with a new strategic environment, the Navy/Marine Corps Team has prepared to meet the exacting challenges of promoting and defending American interests both at home and overseas. To do so has required:

- a reorientation of maritime strategic thinking;
- development of new concepts of operation;
- restructuring of naval organizations; and
- a renewed emphasis integrating doctrine with training.

While reorienting our maritime strategic thinking, the Naval Service has never shifted its focus from readiness. Readiness is well-trained, quality people. So long as we take care of our people, we will have good ships, good battalions. Our people are our focus. They deserve to live and work in a challenging environment that respects the sacrifices that they make in long deployments away from home and family. While much has changed in the world, our Sailors and Marines and their readiness to support and defend their country remain the bedrock of the Navy/Marine Corps Team. USMC

>The above is an abridgement of the Navy-Marine Corps' 1993 Posture Statement. The original 49-page document was presented to Congress on 31 March 1993 by the Chief of Naval Operations as acting Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.