


Commandant's planning guidance frag order

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THE 31ST COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS



Commandant's Planning Guidance Frag Order

Issued 31 August 1997

by Gen Charles C. Krulak

1. INFORMATION

In July of 1995, we published CMC letter of 1 July 1995, a comprehensive document known as the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG was designed to share with all Marines, and those who serve with us, a vector for the future . . . a strategic direction to guide us in building the Corps our nation will need in the 21st Century. While the CPG was a mandate for change, it was constructed upon a bedrock of tradition and enduring values. The first of these is that making Marines and winning battles are the most important things the Marine Corps does for our nation. Second, the Marine Corps of the future will be built upon our five traditional

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pillars of strength: warfighting, people, core values, education and training, and our naval character. Lastly, as it always has been, the Marine Corps must continue to be the military force that is the most ready, when the nation is least ready.

2. FOCUS

In order to create the agile, adaptable, combined arms force the nation needs for the 21st Century, the Marine Corps is focusing its efforts on three areas: Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Innovation, and the Individual Marine; framed within the construct of the Combat Development System (CDS) and our Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS).

a. OMFTS. The strategic and operational environment of the 21st Century was the rationale for the generation and development of OMFTS. This is the Marine Corps' operational concept, and it will drive our doctrine, organization, training & education, and equipment strategies for the next century.

Making the Marines who will conduct OMFTS and equipping them with the tools with which to do so and win constitute the Corps' focus of effort.

b. Innovation. To win in the 21st Century, the Corps must "steal a march" on global change. How do we do this? By institutionalizing innovation and focusing our efforts on creating a Marine Corps whose material and human assets are versatile, agile, and adaptable to a wide range of operating environments. The Marine Corps must embrace the winds of change, make them our ally, and make them our force multiplier. We must be a forward-thinking, learning organization that strives, day in and day out, to improve our efficiency, to improve our effectiveness, and to challenge the status quo.

c. The Individual Marine. The Marine Corps' number one modernization and product improvement program will continue to be the individual Marine. Ultimately, people—not machines—determine our success in war.

3. CPG FRAG ORDER

MCO P3900.15 (Marine Corps Combat Development Process) calls for a CPG to be published within the first 6 months of every Commandant's tour as part of the CDS. A dynamic document, the CPG should be modified/updated as required during the tenure of the Commandant. In the case of the 31st Commandant's CPG, it is time to institutionalize, to clarify, to focus, and to capitalize on the gains made to date in the following CPG initiatives:

a. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). In operation since October 1995, this laboratory serves as the conduit for operational reform in the Corps. It is responsible for investigating new and potential technologies and evaluating their impact on how we organize, equip, educate, and train to fight in the future.



CBIRF rigged for incident response.

(1) Status. In February 1997, the MCWL conducted the first in a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), HUNTER WARRIOR. Like any experiment, HUNTER WARRIOR had successes and failures. The lessons learned from HUNTER WARRIOR are being compiled, and the early results are being fed into the CDS. The MCWL is actively preparing for its next AWE, URBAN WARRIOR (Fall 1998), in which we will look for new solutions to the future urban battlefield. URBAN WARRIOR will be followed by a third AWE, CAPABLE WARRIOR (Fall 1999).

The CBIRF must continue to forge ahead developing the concepts, doctrine, organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures to remain the nation's premier incident response force.

tactics, and equipment identified by the MCWL, through the AWEs, are fed into the CDS for institutional testing, development, and possible implementation or procurement. Additionally, we must improve the feed lines that allow the FMF to input its innovative concepts, tactics, and equipment to the MCWL for assessment. By 1 November 1997, I want a briefing that details the organizational linkages between the MCWL and the FMF, the CDS, MCCDC, MarCorSysCom, and HQMC, to include the management of R&D funds.

b. Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The CPG called for the development of a strategic organization—manned, trained, and equipped—to manage the consequence of the growing chemical-biological threat. The Chemical, Biological, Incident Response Force (CBIRF), activated in April of 1996, grew from that initiative.

(1) Status. The CBIRF has deployed to support the Olympic Games in Atlanta, the Presidential Inauguration, and the Summit of Eight in Denver, Colorado.

(2) Future direction. The CBIRF must continue to forge ahead developing the concepts, doctrine, organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures to remain the nation's premier incident response force. This includes seeking out new detection and resolution technologies. Additionally, I would like the CBIRF to focus their efforts in two areas. First, on developing countermeasure and force-protection training and equipment support packages for deploying MEU(SOC)s. Second, on assisting federal, state, and local response forces in developing their own training programs on how to manage the consequences of a chemical or biological incident.

c. Transformation. The 21st Century battlefield will require our Marines to be trained to the highest standard, ready for any challenge, worthy of the trust of the people of this great nation of ours. To prevail on this battlefield, our Marines must have individual warrior skills second to none, they must have absolute faith in the integrity of their unit—their team—and they must be men and women of character. It was with the requirements of this warfighting environment in mind that we improved the process by which we turn young men and women into Marines, a process we call Transformation. The Transformation occurs in four phases: recruiting, recruit training, cohesion, and sustainment.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps formally instituted the Transformation Program in October 1996. The recruiting and recruit training portions of the Transformation Program are on track and have been institutionalized in our Recruiting Command and at both of our recruit depots.


(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on the gains and strengthen the new oppor-

tunities uncovered by the cohesion and sustainment portions of the Transformation Program. Therefore, I want DC/S M&RA to continue to re-craft our manpower practices, to the maximum extent possible, to facilitate team-building and unit cohesion across all MOSs. By 1 February 1998, I want a briefing that details our progress in the cohesion initiative and our plan for institutionalizing it throughout all MOSs.

d. Education. The CPG stated that education is central to all Marines—not just for a select few, but for all. It is imperative that we extend the opportunity to each and every Marine to expand their minds, giving them the intellectual agility essential for combat decision making. To do this, we must leverage technology to extend the classroom to each and every Marine, regardless of duty station. Additionally, we must take steps to ensure our PME curricula serve not only to build the leaders, thinkers, and warriors of tomorrow, but allow our non-resident students to complete their courses in a reasonable amount of time.

(1) Status. We have fielded Area Learning Centers at Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Camp Butler that serve as computerized classrooms for taking multimedia classes, conducting low-level simulations, accessing the Internet, and for video teleconferences. Additionally, we are progressing steadily toward our goal of making the majority of our MCI courses available "on-line." The MCU has spent the last year working to improve our non-resident PME curricula to ensure our officers and staff noncommissioned officers can complete their required courses without detracting from their primary billet responsibilities.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on the successes to date and exploit new opportunities. I want our education system to focus on creating the flexible, thinking warriors who are the trademark of a learning organization. Additionally, our education curricula, processes, and institutions must focus on and support our operational concept—OMFTS. Just as we did in the 1920s and 1930s with amphibious warfare, we need our best and brightest to concentrate their efforts on developing the doctrine, tactics, and procedures that will make OMFTS a reality in the 21st Century. Just as we are ex-



Urban conflict—a key theme in Marine training and a major focus of the MCWL.

ploring a new operational concept, we also need to explore new educational methods and procedures. New interactive technology offers us the opportunity to make learning our profession more rapid and user friendly. By 1 April 1998, I want a briefing from the President of the MCU that details how our educational processes can better support this goal.

e. Training. The CPG stated that training must be focused on winning in combat . . . progressive and practical . . . we must make the most of every [training] opportunity before we go to the field. The complexity and speed of combat operations on the decentralized, lethal, urban battlefield of the 21st Century mandate that we improve the standard and efficiency of our training—across the MAGTF—top to bottom.

I want our education system to focus on creating the flexible, thinking warriors who are the trademark of a learning organization.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps has aggressively instituted new and improved training programs during the last two years. We have added the Crucible to recruit training; we improved the syllabus at Marine Combat



A long-range combat patrol in HUNTER WARRIOR. Such experiments help us identify the optimum structure for OMFTS.

Training (MCT) and the School of Infantry (SOI); the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) is giving our warfighting staffs the training they need to fight their MAGTFs more effectively; and we have a new Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP) that improves how we train in aviation. Additionally, the Marine Corps is applying new concepts and technologies in modeling to develop the simulators and simulations that will make our training as realistic as possible.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on the gains realized through our new training initiatives and exploit the opportunities resident in modeling and simulation to increase our warfighting efficiency and effectiveness. Most importantly, we must ensure our training programs develop warriors with the right tools for warfighting in the 21st Century. I want to ensure our training is realistic, aggressive, and of the highest quality. Train like you fight—fight like you train must be the rule of the day. Accordingly, by 1 April 1998, I want a briefing from the Director T&E Division (in conjunction with CG MCCDC and DC/S Aviation) on how we can most effectively and efficiently achieve this goal. An update on the Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation Program shall be included in this brief, detailing our progress to date and the extent to which we can improve and integrate all of our simulators.

f. Structure. The challenges associated with warfighting in the 21st Century mandate that the Marine Corps reassess, and if necessary redesign, our structure and organization. As such, the CPG called for a comprehensive review of the Marine Corps' structure. As the military force that must be the most ready when the nation is least ready, we must ensure the Corps' structure is optimized for OMFTS and success on the battlefield.

(1) Status. In the wake of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), we chartered two Force Structure Reviews: the Active Force Structure Review (AFSR) and the Reserve Force Structure Review (RFSR). While these reviews were conducted separately—they were coordinated. The purpose of these reviews was to define the most effective, capable, relevant, and realistically attainable force structure for the Total Force Marine Corps today. These reviews identify structure that, when cut, will allow us to reallocate Marines to, and increase manning in, our operating forces. The reviews delivered their findings on 2 August 1997.

(2) Future direction. By 1 June 1998, I want DC/S PP&O, CG MCCDC, President of the MCU, and the MCWL to create an OMFTS Working Group responsible for developing a framework for what an OMFTS force should look like in the 21st Century. In the Spring of 1999, following the Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), the Corps will establish a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG). This review group will utilize the framework developed from the OMFTS working group, and the lessons learned from the HUNTER WARRIOR and URBAN WARRIOR AWES, to ensure we are structured to conduct OMFTS in the 21st Century. The goal is to publish a Troop List for a 21st Century Marine Corps in the Spring of 1999.

g. Doctrine. The CPG identified several deficiencies in Marine Corps doctrinal publications—they were not fully linked to tactics, techniques, and procedures, and they were not being updated in a timely manner.

(1) Status. The MCCDC Doctrine Division and MCU, assisted by the FMF and the Naval Doctrine Command, initiated an aggressive overhaul of our doctrine and its development process. Nine keystone doctrinal publications flowed from this overhaul:

Warfighting (MCDP 1), Strategy (MCDP 1-1), Campaigning (MCDP 1-2), Tactics (MCDP 1-3), Intelligence (MCDP 2), Expeditionary Operations (MCDP 3), Logistics (MCDP 4), Planning (MCDP 5), and Command and Control (MCDP 6). All of these new doctrinal publications will be published by January 1998.

(2) Future direction. Since doctrine is the foundation for our tactics, training, and education, it is imperative each and every Marine understand these new doctrinal publications. I want CG MCCDC and the President of the MCU to ensure our resident and non-resident PME curricula support this new doctrine. Additionally, our curricula must explain how this new doctrine relates to the conduct of OMFTS. In conjunction with the Education briefing due by 1 April 1998, I want a briefing that details our strategy to attain these goals.

h. Logistics. The CPG challenged us to identify "potential opportunities for streamlining, eliminating duplication, and improving efficiency through organizational change to provide fully integrated logistics support to the Marine Corps."

(1) Status. In order to meet this goal, the Marine Corps has completely reviewed its logistics and acquisition strategies, looking for ways to improve our efficiency and responsiveness. We have identified several new concepts that will help us to achieve this goal, ultimately increasing the Marine Corps' warfighting potential.

(2) Future direction. Two of the concepts we identified—precision logistics and activity-based costing—offer significant advantages and shall be implemented immediately. By 1 December 1997, I want a briefing from DC/S I&L that details our plan for institutionalizing the precision logistics concept, to include measures of effectiveness for equipment readiness, material costs, order ship time, and repair cycle time. Additionally, by 1 January 1998, I want a briefing from DC/S I&L and DC/S P&R that provides a plan of action for expanding the implementation of activity-based costing throughout the Corps.

i. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C⁴I). The CPG stated that to prevail in the 21st Century, the Marine Corps must be able to "reach and ex-

ecute effective decisions faster than our adversaries, in any conflict, on any scale." In order to accomplish this, our C⁴I system must be of the highest quality, designed from day one for joint interoperability, and operated by warriors trained to the highest standard.

(1) Status. We have made tremendous progress in developing systems, concepts, and policies that will improve our C⁴I capability. The Enhanced COC developed by the MSTP and the MCWI, and the restructuring of the Intelligence Officer community are just a few examples of our progress in this area. But, we need a higher degree of C⁴I cohesion to field an OMFTS force for the 21st Century.

(2) Future direction. It is time to coordinate, synchronize, and standardize the Marine Corps' C⁴I efforts. AC/S C⁴I, in conjunction with CG MCCDC and CG MarCorSysCom, shall develop a plan to improve upon, coordinate, synchronize, and standardize our command and control efforts in order to achieve a completely DOTES integrated Marine Corps C⁴I system by 2006. By 1 April 1998, I want a briefing that details this plan. Additionally, in conjunction with this brief, I want an update on the Marine Corps' Intelligence Plan.

j. Aviation. The CPG called for the Corps to enhance Marine aviation's expeditionary utility by reducing the type/model/series of the aircraft we operate, obtaining an all short-takeoff/landing (STOVL) capability, and improving the efficiency of our operations.

(1) Status.

(a) We are making steady progress in reducing (necking-down) the number of different type, model, series aircraft we fly in order to better execute OMFTS in the 21st Century. The V-22 will replace our CH-46 and CH-53D, and the advanced-STOVL Joint Strike Fighter (ASTOVL JSF) will replace the FA-18 and AV-8. The AH-1 and UH-1 will be upgraded and eventually replaced by a follow-on aircraft in the 2015 time frame. The CH-53E and EA-6B will receive upgrades and remain in service. Especially critical are aircraft such as the V-22 and the ASTOVL JSF. The advanced

Since doctrine is the foundation for our tactics, training, and education, it is imperative each and every Marine understand these new doctrinal publications.

warfighting capability, operational agility, and basing flexibility of these platforms are tailor made for OMFTS operations.

(b) As critical as Marine aviation is to OMFTS, we need to ensure that when it comes time to fight, our aircraft, our aviators, and those who support them are in the highest possible state of readiness. The Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP) was designed to do just that. The MACP, implemented in October 1996, concentrates on improving the way Marine aviation operates in ten areas: unit manning, material condition, time to train and retention, training efficiency, unit capabilities, sortie-based flying program, simulation, readiness reporting, TEEP management, and OPTEMPO reduction.



The V-22 and the ASTOVL JSF are critical for Marine aviation.

(2) Future direction. The Marine Corps will continue our neck-down strategy. The MACP, like any plan, is a dynamic one and should be reviewed periodically to ensure it is meeting its objectives, and to offer improvements or modifications as necessary. By 1 March 1998, I want a briefing from DC/S Aviation detailing the progress of, recommended changes to, and our plans for institutionalizing the MACP.

k. Individual Warfighting Equipment. The CPG called for the Corps to improve both the quality and the way we procure our Marines' personal warfighting equipment.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps has implemented a one-time 782 gear issue. The Re-

serve Force completed its one-time issue on 31 July 1997, and the Active Forces are scheduled to begin their one-time issue on 1 October 1997, to be complete by 1 October 1998. Additionally, the Corps changed the way we procured individual warfighting equipment. We can go directly to industry, find gear that is already in production, and, if necessary, modify it for our use, test it to our standards, and get it to the fleet in the shortest amount of time. This program has already borne fruit. The new infantry combat boot will be included as a sea bag issue item on 1 October 1997; the entire Corps will have new Gortex parkas and trousers by December 1998 (35,000 sets have been issued already); a new bivy sack has been fielded throughout the Corps; a new combat tent is in source selection; and a new modular load system and modular body armor are currently being tested. This new strategy has shaved a significant amount of time off the old procurement cycle—saving the taxpayers money—and, more importantly, giving our warriors the best gear possible.

(2) Future direction. We must capitalize on our success in off-the-shelf procurement practices and exploit new opportunities to equip our Marines with the most up to date—and highest quality—warfighting equipment. By 1 March 1998, I want a briefing that details our progress on the one-time 782 gear issue and a plan for institutionalizing this program throughout the Corps.

l. Fitness Report. One of the priorities listed in the CPG was to ensure that . . . our manpower management processes and policies are fair to our Marines and to the Marine Corps. The CPG identified the Fitness Report as a notable shortcoming in this area and tasked DC/S M&RA to fix the problem.

(1) Status. The Marine Corps developed a completely new Fitness Report, designed from the ground up, to accurately assess the skills and potential of the individual Marine. In this new report, a picture of the whole Marine is created by assessing observed performance in four major areas: mission accomplishment, leadership, intellect and wisdom, and individual character. The new report will eventually be fully automated, featuring a reduction in the time to complete the report, a built-in test to look for administrative errors, and an electronic filing system.

(2) Future direction. From July to September 1998, DC/S M&RA will conduct a comprehensive training program, designed to educate the Corps on the new Fitness Report System. Reporting commands will stop submitting the old reports on 30 September 1998. From 30 September to 31 December 1998 a moratorium will be in effect, where no Fitness Reports will be submitted or written. DC/S M&RA shall implement the new Fitness Report throughout the Marine Corps on 1 January 1999.

m. Marine Mail. An innovative, forward-looking, learning organization must have a vehicle to solicit ideas from all of its members. Marine Mail was created for just that reason. Marine Mail was not designed to bypass the chain of command. The CPG directed the use of Marine Mail to answer three questions. First, what aren't we doing that we should be doing? Second, what are we doing that we should do differently? Third, what are we doing that we shouldn't be doing?

(1) Status. Many thousands of Marine Mail messages have been received and answered. The ideas generated through the Marine Mail system are making an impact on how the Marine Corps conducts business.

(2) Future direction. I intend to expand the scope of the Marine Mail system, adding a fourth question: What new concept, idea, tactic, or piece of equipment should the Marine Corps investigate to improve its warfighting capability? I want to encourage every Marine who has an idea that will improve our warfighting capability to submit his or her idea via Marine Mail.

4. LEANING INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

The Marine Corps revolutionized the art of warfare with the introduction and perfection of the air-ground, combined-arms team. The beauty of combined arms is that, if planned for and executed properly, it places our adversaries in a position from which they have few good choices. If they attempt to avoid the effects of one of our capabilities, they expose themselves to exploitation by another. The combined-arms team is, and will remain, the foundation of the Corps' warfighting capability, but the changing nature of warfare requires us to extend that foundation to other areas of our national power projection spectrum.

a. The Changing Face of Warfare. Factors such as shifting economic centers, increasing urbanization, resource shortages, environmental disasters, and cultural strife, when combined with a rapid infusion of accessible high-technology weapons and information systems, will change the way our nation projects military power—and the way our adversaries counter us. In the 21st Century, our adversaries will not make the same mistake the Iraqis did in DESERT STORM. They will attack us asymmetrically, pitting their strength against our weakness, whether that lies in the military, political, or domestic realm. For example, in future conflicts, data lines of communication may be just as important as sea lines of communication—and our adversaries, whether they are third world nations, transnational actors, or crime syndicates, will attack them.

b. Operational Concept. In the next century, we will have Marines conducting humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and high-intensity combat all in the same day and in the same operating area. This mission depth will require Marines to work side by side with other government and non-government agencies. What is lacking at this point is an operational concept for comprehensive command and control that weaves the diverse capabilities of the different entities into a coherent campaign plan. This can result in a lack of coordination creating friction, reducing our tempo and allowing our adversaries opportunities to exploit our political, military, or domestic seams. This will not suffice in the 21st Century. The Corps' future operating environment will require our forward-deployed, sea-based forces to quickly and efficiently integrate the intelligence, operations, and support assets of the entire spectrum of national power. This spectrum includes military, academic, industry, government, and non-government agencies and assets.

In the 21st Century, our adversaries will not make the same mistake the Iraqis did in DESERT STORM. They will attack us asymmetrically, pitting their strength against our weakness, whether that lies in the military, political, or domestic realm.

(1) Future direction. This operational concept should define a new command and control capability that unifies the efforts of the intellectual, experiential, and operational capabilities of all the elements of our national power. The operational concept should ad-

dress the following requirements:

(a) The ability to proactively study the structural underpinnings of emerging problems, crises and conflicts around the world, and offer workable interventions.

(b) The ability to identify the potential strategies, tactics, and asymmetric counters that our opponents will attempt to use against our nation and our allies both militarily and domestically—and to develop pre-emptive options against them.

(c) A decision-making and solution-development partnership with business and industry that harnesses the power and potential of their management, research and development, production and distribution capabilities, and their entrepreneurial spirit.

(d) The ability to look for ways to ensure our humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or conflict termination efforts avoid costly duplication of effort between military, government, and non-government agencies—and to ensure our efforts most effectively address the source of the problem.

(e) The ability to quickly and efficiently coordinate the generation of resources in the incipient phase of a crisis.

(f) The ability to study ongoing operations for new developments, threats, or opportunities.

(2) Tasking. I desire that this operational concept combine and coordinate the intellects, assets, and capabilities of the military, academic, industry, government, and non-government agencies to achieve a combined-arms effect that can effectively address the warfighting challenges we will face in the 21st Century. Including a virtual staff at its core, this new warfighting command and control concept must contain the ability to leverage technology to “reach back” to the various agencies, organizations, industries, and individuals’ expertise—wherever they may be located—during wargaming, mission planning, and the execution phase of an operation to ensure our solutions and actions are sound, efficient, and effective. This operational concept may well define a new command and control organization, able to orchestrate the capabilities of all the elements of national power in a unified effort, to meet our national security objectives in the 21st Century. By 1 April 1998, I want CG MCCDC and DC/S PP&O to produce this operational concept, with its associated C⁴I requirements, for my review.

5. SUMMARY GUIDANCE

Preparing our Corps for fighting and winning our nation’s battles in the 21st Century will require the maximum effort of every Marine. The initiatives laid out in the CPG, tirelessly implemented by the Marines, sailors, and civilians on our team, have begun the process of building the Marine Corps our nation will need to prevail on the battlefields of the future. The focus of our efforts, and the enduring centerpiece of the Corps, is the Individual Marine. Each and every initiative laid out in the CPG and this Frag Order serves to improve and empower the Individual Marine, to build cohesive teams ready for the chaotic and lethal battlefields of the 21st Century. The power of the Corps resides, as it always has, in our warfighting competence, our innovative approach to problem solving, our infectious can-do attitude, and the honor, courage, and commitment of the individual Marine.



The Crucible—a step toward empowering the Individual Marine.