

The opening and closing of hatch covers on non-self-sustaining container ships at sea will require some type of portable device that will be able to be lifted on board to accomplish this task. A winching device to harness the lifting power of the heavy lift helo might suffice.

A second engineering problem is the design of a high-speed winch and spreader bar combination that will allow the helicopter to hover over a ship's hold and reach deep into the hold to pull up a container. Perhaps a portable deck device like the hatch cover movement device could be designed.

We currently have the capability to

position containers for helicopter lift when the containership is moored to a crane ship (T-AC5). These portable deck devices would allow containerships to be offloaded by helicopters while underway, thus providing operational flexibility.

Of the maritime prepositioning force ships, only the *Waterman* class would allow helicopter lift of containers underway. The gantry style crane on the *Waterman* ships can position any container at any desired spot for pickup and then move out of the way during helicopter pickup. The fixed-base cranes on the Amsea and Maersk preposi-

tioning ships prohibit lifting anything from these ships by helicopter.

Granted, the lifting of containers from ships by helicopter is not without its operational and engineering challenges but the hardware and techniques already exists. It was done in 1972. We need to break out the manuals and start training our CH-53E and landing support Marines. We cannot allow ourselves to be held hostage to sea state condition three.



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Intelligence and Logistics, A Vital MAGTF Mixture

by LtCol Mary V. Jacocks

You can't 'fight smart' without intelligence—and that applies (two ways) to combat service support elements as much as it does to combat arms.

The formation of force service support groups (FSSGs) in 1976 represented a major change in Marine Corps structure. As these organizations have matured, organizational and doctrinal refinements have properly focused on combat service support. Unfortunately, the specific mission requirements for the FSSG G-2 section have yet to be adequately defined. The new *FMFM 3-21, MAGTF Intelligence Operations* outlines for the first time in a doctrinal publication some of the intelligence requirements of an FSSG; however, it offers just a beginning. Basically, our Marine Corps doctrine and, likewise, our schools continue to concentrate on intelligence support for the ground and aviation combat elements. It should therefore be of no surprise that the intelligence effort of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is often directed primarily to support of those same elements. Though the combat service support element (CSSE) is an integral part of the MAGTF, its intelligence requirements are seldom sufficiently emphasized by the MAGTF command element (CE).

I think any commander would agree that without the provision of critical combat service support (CSS), the battle would swiftly grind to a halt. A CSSE has combat and logistical intelligence requirements that are essential

to its operation and, consequently, are essential to the MAGTF as a whole. It is therefore crucial that the logistics commander be a full sharing partner in the MAGTF intelligence process; he has legitimate needs that are as critical to mission accomplishment as those of the other elements of the MAGTF.

As was clearly stated in the now defunct *FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence*:

In noncombat commands, combat intelligence provides a basis for security measures, for decisions as to the best use of the area of operations in accomplishing the mission, and for determining or anticipating future support requirements.

A CSSE requires the same tactical intelligence as the rest of the MAGTF and additionally requires greater in-depth information regarding such things as terrain analysis; exploitation of transportation equipment and facilities; lines of communication; utilities; and industrial, military, and government control centers. It is somewhat ironic that the smallest intelligence section of the MAGTF probably has, with the exception of the CE, the most comprehensive requirement for intelligence. The CSSE must be well attuned to the air, ground, and rear area situations, as well as the logistical ones. Intelligence support must always be assessed to ensure the needs of the logistician are met.

Lines of communication are a major consideration in the establishment of logistic and beach support areas. Special information is required on road and bridge capacities. At a minimum the logistics commander requires all-source information on all routes—land, water, and air—that can be used to move supplies, maintenance support, and reinforcements to operating forces. This should include geological, forestry, and climatological information, all of which is particularly useful to engineers. There must be enough information to identify possible alternative lines of communication, such information should include, but not be restricted to, locations and capacities for railheads, marshaling yards, inland waterways, and helicopter landing zones.

Comprehensive urban analysis studies are also quite important to combat service support. Textual and graphic data on built-up area densities, functional divisions of built-up areas, building construction patterns, industrial areas, petroleum storage, military installations, and air and port terminal information are all valuable to the logistical planner.

When considering intelligence support for the CSSE, there is a tendency to associate requirements solely with the movement of supplies forward to support combat forces. Although supply is an important CSS function, there are other significant tasks to be accomplished by the CSSE. Engineers, for example, are normally tasked to build a prisoner of war (POW) compound, as well as field fortifications for the combat and combat support organizations. Medical support will ultimately become involved not only with the care and evacuation of friend-



ly casualties but also with refugees and POWs. Maintenance support is a complex proposition under optimum conditions and under combat conditions a trying task. It is the early identification of facilities located in the force beachhead area or area of responsibility that will enhance logistical operations. Existing prisons usually become POW compounds; schools, churches, and hospitals can become medical and refugee handling facilities. Factories/industrial areas may become maintenance and storage areas. Additionally, construction materials can be identified, located, and exploited in conjunction with engineering efforts. This useful exploitation of urban facilities necessitates that the CSSE commander be considered when the target list is formulated.

Besides the "typical" logistics-related intelligence, the CSSE must work with the elements of traditional tactical intelligence—the enemy, weather, and terrain. There must be total awareness of the ground, air, and rear area situations. Besides the fact that the combat service support area (CSSA) will often be in range of enemy indirect fire and is typically a target for such fires, the CSSE will have elements dispersed throughout the area of operations, often moving with, but not attached to, the ground combat element; these elements must be provided vital threat information through the CSS chain of command. And CSSE force protection is only part of it. The rapid pace of modern warfare has made it essential for the CSSE commander to anticipate types of emergency resupply and possible locations for that supply effort. Knowledge of the location, size, and order of battle of enemy forces combined with an awareness of the friendly concept of operations allow the CSSE commander to forecast the type and amount of ammunition resupply that could possibly be required and to begin study-

ing the area to formulate options on how best to accomplish such resupply should the need arise.

Access to information/intelligence that is commonly referred to as "air intelligence" is also critical to the CSSE. Besides the traditional enemy air threat to the CSSE, there is a need for up-to-date information on the enemy air defense threat. Helicopters are normally stationed adjacent to field hospitals for the purpose of extracting wounded from forward units or for medical evacuation to the rear. When such a situation exists, the CSSE must be prepared to brief the pilots on the enemy air defense threat. This is a CSSE intelligence requirement often overlooked until the need suddenly arises.

Whether or not the CSSE commander is designated the rear area security coordinator, the CSSE has a vested interest in the rear area situation. A CSSE in the field can be characterized by multiple installations dispersed throughout the area, extended lines of communication, limited security forces, and possibly large numbers of indigenous personnel who may, or may not, be sympathetic to friendly forces. These long lines of communication and the inherently dangerous indigenous personnel situation make security a major CSSE concern. Its installations are prime rear area targets. Threat forces that might be encountered in a rear area include airborne or special operations teams, bypassed forces, sabotage and reconnaissance units, and nets of direct action agents. The use of aerial surveillance and counterintelligence teams are essential for the protection of rear area assets.

Due to the nature of logistical planning on the modern battlefield, the intelligence requirements of the CSSE are valid and every bit as time sensitive as those of the aviation and ground combat elements. All elements of the MAGTF must be aware of the

type of information required by the CSSE and ensure that such information is reported in a timely manner.

Operation DESERT STORM highlighted the importance of CSS; all of a sudden sustainability could not be "played notionally," as is so often done in exercises. All of the requirements for intelligence mentioned in this article were, to some extent, validated during that operation. An indication of how important logistics-related intelligence was to the mission is the fact that the I Marine Expeditionary Force commander considered the location of water sources in Kuwait to be one of his most vital essential elements of information just 96 hours prior to G-day. The G-2 of the Direct Support Command (2d FSSG), which provided direct CSS to the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions and forward elements of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, was always a key participant in the discussion of operational plans; the commanding general of the Direct Support Command always considered the "intelligence picture" prior to making a decision.

The FSSG is not "just the recipient of intelligence" to be briefed or placed on the "read board" for general consumption. Convoy debriefs and engineers are good sources of information, information that must be assessed and forwarded to higher and adjacent commands, as appropriate. The CSSE commander must be kept aware of how the enemy, weather, and terrain are going to effect his mission. This necessitates a constant assessment of the situation, an assessment that must be more CSS mission-oriented than the CE intelligence summary and one that may not even be in total agreement with the CE position. In order to keep up with the ground, air, and rear area situation, as well as the specific logistical intelligence requirements, and to provide the commander with the intelligence critical to the mission, the FSSG/CSSE requires a viable G-2 section. The structure currently exists, though minimally, for such a section. In this era of drawdowns, however, there is a danger here. Unless the billets are filled and the personnel properly trained and employed, the CSS commander cannot be supported as he should be.

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