

Soviet Missiles Much Improved

by Capt Barry F. Fetzer

The Soviet Union recently has fielded a number of new antiaircraft weapon systems. These weapons have justifiably been the cause of intense controversy within military pilot circles. Few of the new weapons capabilities and limitations are known. Even unclassified pictures of the systems are rare. Questions arise as to why the Soviet Union, a nation already rich in antiaircraft weapons and technology, should want to field so many new and varied antiair weapons. One reason is certain. The Soviets recently have learned a hard lesson in weapon system countermeasures. During the Yom Kippur War and more recently in the Israeli war in Lebanon, many of the Soviet's first line antiaircraft weapons were rendered ineffective or were destroyed. This lesson in countermeasures has forced the U.S.S.R. to produce an array of new weapons that should give even the bravest pilot some pause.

Some of the new weapon systems that pose the greatest threat are mentioned below:

• **SA-10**—A very fast, long-range,

highly maneuverable missile capable of extremely high acceleration. The system is radar guided and is currently designed on a static mount but may evolve to a mobile system when introduced to the Soviet motorized rifle division. The system is designed particularly for killing cruise missiles and other low-flying targets.

• **SA-11**—A possible replacement for the SA-6, the SA-11 is a system with a triple or quadruple missile launcher mounted on a tracked vehicle similar to the one used with the ZSU-23/4. The weapon has been seen being used alongside SA-6s—one SA-11 per SA-6 battery. The missile is radar guided, with high acceleration, and high speed. It reportedly has a good low-altitude capability.

• **SA-13**—The SA-13 is a tracked vehicle replacement for the SA-9. It mounts a new generation of infrared seeking antiaircraft missiles. The missile is very likely to have a cooled seeker head and the system may include a laser designator.

• **SA-14**—A replacement for the ag-

ing SA-7, the SA-14 is comparable to our own Stinger missile system. It is a hand-held weapon capable of seeking the infrared energy emitted from the exhaust plume of an aircraft. It too may incorporate a laser designator and is likely to include identification, friend or foe (IFF) equipment.

Additionally, there are indications that the Soviets are developing a new generation tracked antiaircraft vehicle to replace the ZSU-23/4.

These new weapons, though formidable, are not the sole reason for concern. As the Soviets procure the SA-10, 11, 13 and 14, they will be more likely to loosen any export restrictions that have been in effect on the older systems. Recent news broadcasts confirm that this weapons export trend has begun. This trend means that many of the most likely adversaries of U.S. Marines may, in the near future, obtain deadly, high technology, antiaircraft weapons—weapons which undoubtedly would reduce the capability of a Marine air-ground team to accomplish its mission.

We must intensify our training efforts against this proliferation of antiaircraft weapons and develop appropriate doctrine, structure, and system to offset its impact. Our ability to fight in "every clime and place" depends on how well we counter such emerging capabilities.

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Leadership

Morality and Command

by Capt A.W. O'Hara

Good officers make mistakes—in judgment and in action. Some are taken to task for their errors; others are counseled. How they are treated depends largely on the personality and style of the commander, and commanders vary greatly.

How does the junior officer learn what is expected of him? Is he totally dependent on the wishes of his commander or are there broader guidelines? The *Uniform Code of Military Justice* contains specific information on infractions, crimes, and punishments. However, of greater concern to most officers are matters that fall into the area of judgment. Particularly when confronted with questions of morality or ethics, to whom does the officer turn? Must he simply conform to his commander's desires? Can he refer to The Basic School as the keeper of the code? Is there something that tells him that of-

ficers do this or do not do that? When he commands his own unit, what will he require of his own subordinates?

Many of these questions may seem rhetorical to some of our senior officers. Perhaps these men grew up at a time when the distinction between right and wrong seemed clearer. Possibly they developed a strong personal moral code in their youth or through trial and error. However, to the younger officer, the product of the sixties and the seventies, distinctions are not so clear.

In the late fifties and sixties, a moral evolution took place in the United States. This period in the life of the Nation was characterized by a questioning of traditional values and the modification or abandonment of many of those values. Sexual mores underwent the most obvious change, but even more significant to military professionals was the change in attitude away from per-

sonal responsibility for the group. The well-being and enjoyment of the individual took on great importance; concern for the welfare of the group was replaced by an attempt merely not to hurt others—a significant shift.

Popularly identified as the "Now" generation, youth turned increasingly inward in search of meaning, but even introspection became distorted as drugs were used to enhance perception. Immediate solutions were demanded for complicated national problems, and impatience itself seemed to become a virtue.

Educational institutions yielded substantial control to students. In an effort to encourage personal freedom, many colleges and universities abandoned a core curriculum. Degrees were granted for varieties of programs engineered by students rather than by educators. The outcome often reflected great specialization but very little general education. It produced accomplished mathematicians, for example, who had difficulty expressing themselves in word or in print.

Adults, too, were caught-up in the ex-

clement; however, their views were often less positive. Chaos seemed imminent at times. Many churches were undergoing crisis; reliance on organized religion and church attendance were declining. Marriages were failing at the rate of 25-30 percent nationally—50 percent in some areas. Racial tensions were high, touching off widespread rioting. Newark and Watts burned while the world watched on television. Polarization and hostility were gripping the population over issues ranging from the display of the flag and hair length to the use or nonuse of soap and water.

The country found itself in a moral vacuum, which was exacerbated by an unpopular war and by disillusionment with the government. Finally came the Watergate scandal—even the Presidency seemed corrupt. It was a turning point—one that seemed to mark a depth beyond which we refused to go. It summoned the desire of the Nation, tired from dissension and weak from indecision, to look toward rebuilding.

Out of this turmoil, the most socially turbulent period in recent history, came the junior officers of today. These men and women are the product of homes and schools that were in transition and may not have imparted those values that we hold important. Few have received more than perfunctory religious training, and fewer still have studied either philosophy or ethics. On what, then, will they base their actions and decisions? Will a situation take on the importance in morality that it holds in tactics?

The role of the commander takes on increased importance in this setting. Not only is he responsible for the training and physical welfare of his men, but also for their moral and spiritual growth. The commander must be willing to shoulder this burden if his young leaders are to develop. This is not to relegate the commander to the position of a chaplain. Rather, it is to recognize his duty to his subordinates and to their professional growth.

Tactics

Evidence of Doctrinal Paucity

by Maj K.W. Estes

I'm an interested observer of Marine infantry doctrine and organization, and I read the commentary from the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines on the new infantry battalion structure (*MCG*, Jun83) with great anticipation and even greater reward. Not only does this commentary

That the commander is being tasked with a job left incomplete by parents, churches, and schools is unfortunate, but it is a compelling reason, nonetheless, for him to mold his junior officers. The commander would not question his duty to teach respect for authority or obedience to orders even though these, too, should have been mastered prior to service. He cannot, then, fail to provide his officers with the moral tools they will require to withstand the strain of leading men in war.

Where do these tools come from?

Religious training provides a basis for moral conduct; however, it is not within the province of the military to teach religious doctrine. Ethics, though, may provide the answer in our secular environment. Based on natural law, ethics is a system in which right and wrong can be examined through reason rather than revelation. In combination with an individual's religious beliefs, ethics develops a code by which a man's character is strengthened. It can help remove the feeling that everything, even morality, is relative.

How does the commander teach his subordinates?

He has many methods at his disposal, but two of the most effective are personal example and counseling. The actions of any commanding officer are scrutinized by his men, especially when he has dared to set a demanding standard of conduct. Subordinates have the right to expect the highest standards from one who leads them. Of all duties in the military, command is the only one that is always voluntary. No man need accept the burden if he is unwilling to live up to its requirements.

Almost as important as personal example in guiding subordinates is counseling. By this I mean that the commander should give timely feedback to his junior officers concerning their behavior and his expectations. The value of this counseling is directly proportional to its timeliness; semiannual guidance at fitness report time has little

meaning in these matters. Furthermore, counseling need not wait until a problem exists. Commanders should not hide their basic views and beliefs.

I recall one commander who taught that taking care of the men is more than an idle phrase, more even than a matter of commonsense, it is a moral responsibility. He taught this in the most effective way possible—by seeing to it himself. No preacher, this commander, but a fine educator.

The question arises at this point, how do we know what to teach? If each commander teaches something different, would that be any better than what we do now?

Earlier in this article, I asked if The Basic School should be the keeper of the code. On reflection, I would say that it should at least be a teacher of the code. The Basic School, along with Amphibious Warfare School and the Command and Staff College, should each include a course in ethics. In this way, officers at many different levels could be exposed to this formal system of thought throughout their careers. In a very few years, all levels of the Corps would be imbued with one value system understood by almost everyone. Our schools currently teach valuable nonbattle skills, such as writing and speaking. Would it not be equally prudent to prepare our leaders in *what* to say, as well as in *how* to say it?

Junior officers remain junior for only a short time. Their experiences and lessons during that time will determine their futures and the future of our Corps. Few men plagued by indecision and moral weakness will develop into the courageous leaders required on today's training fields and tomorrow's battlefields.

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† The prize winning article in the 1982 Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest, published by the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Jun82, dealt with the same subject as Capt O'Hara's article. It is worth reading. If you need a copy, drop us a note.

first. Under the subheading of doctrine, LtCol Beeler exposes our current doctrinal paucity by noting the dearth of guidance pertinent to the new weapons and structure in manuals, handbooks, and schools. He then rationalizes that such guidance should probably come from the field anyhow and concludes by hoping that some of the void can be filled from insight gained the hard way by his battalion.

But even more telling is the evidence of doctrinal paucity implicit in the

provide excellent insight into the peculiarities of the reorganization, but it also illustrates—both implicitly and explicitly—the poor state of affairs in Marine Corps doctrine.

One scarcely knows where to begin, but let's look at the explicit evidence