

Domingo and Haiti.

Harlee will be most remembered as the "father of rifle practice in the Marine Corps." Although never a team shooter himself, his experience and instructional skills had major impacts as he captained the Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Teams of 1908, 1909, and 1910. A lasting mark was his development of the *U.S. Marine Corps Score Book and Rifleman's Instruction*, a forerunner of those that have been used by thousands of Marines firing for qualification and in competition. In an era that predated Parris Island, Harlee constructed the Marine Corps' first rifle ranges, first near Honolulu and then at Winthrop, MD, almost across the Potomac from Quantico. Capt Harlee and a small cadre of toughened enlisted riflemen spent the 1909-1910 winter living in wood and canvas huts as they constructed a range with about a dozen firing points, built crude barracks and messing facilities, and prepared to function as a school for marksmanship. Winthrop not only served as a training site for competitive teams, it was also the center to which posts and stations sent men to receive schooling in coaching. Before its disbandment in 1917, Winthrop trained many men and women from Washington, DC, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. Preliminary instruction commenced as soon as the ship got underway, ending three hours later upon arrival at the Winthrop wharf.

The Marine Corps teams and Winthrop were steps in Harlee's goal of seeing a Nation capable in marksmanship. Concurrently with his Marine duties, he served as assistant executive officer of the national matches, a director, and ultimately as the National Rifle Association's first vice president. His knowledge of range construction, operations, and training of riflemen led to his World War I assignment ashore with the Navy. He supervised that Service's construction of ranges throughout the country. The largest, 1,200 targets, at Caldwell, near Hoboken, NJ, enabled many a France-bound doughboy to fire a rifle for the first time.

That Harlee provided such valuable support service to the Great War effort is testimony to his ubiquity and uniqueness. With outside income, he was able to associate with many of Washington's political and social hierarchy. It enabled him to cut red tape, but it also put him at odds with several seniors in his own Service.

Although remembered for his roll in marksmanship, he was, as a lieutenant colonel in 1921, responsible for establishing the MCI. Initially, in cooperation with the International Correspondence Schools, Harlee ensured the continued expansion of MCI until it reached Marines wherever they served. At Quantico, it is told, there was a time when it appeared that virtually every Marine on post was enrolled with MCI.

sive officer, frequently in conflict with his supervisor, leading tough, fearless fighting enlisted men, many of whom could barely sign their name and some who could not do even that.


EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN: The American War with Japan. By Ronald H. Spector. The Free Press, New York, 1985, 589 pp., \$24.95. (Member \$22.45)

reviewed by Brian M. Linn

Eagle Against the Sun is the best single volume history of the Pacific War yet written. This newest addition to the Macmillan "Wars of the United States" series more than holds its own with the other fine works in the collection. In keeping with the current trend of military history, Spector presents not only an operational history but an analysis of the diplomatic maneuvering behind the Allied effort. Readers who are unfamiliar with the Pacific War will value the author's broad approach and ability to explain complex issues. Readers who are already students of the war will admire the solid scholarship and well-reasoned analysis that characterize this excellent book.

One of Spector's greatest achievements is his integration of the Pacific War into the larger context of World War II history. On the level of grand strategy he asserts that U.S. war policy was influenced by a combination of domestic political pressures, coalition commitments, and temporary compromises. The author further argues that U.S. operational strategy in the Pacific War was due less to prewar provisions such as War Plan Orange than to inter-Service rivalry and opportunism. Indeed, he concludes that many U.S. military operations in the Pacific demonstrated the ability of rival Services to resolve temporary difficulties while avoiding resolution of the fundamental problems. Confusion over missions and command led to a duplication of effort and some high-risk operations, as Spector notes in his treatment of Guadalcanal and Halsey's raid on Rabaul. However, it also lent flexibility and adaptability to the American effort. Military planners, whatever their motives or Service orientation, were able to react quickly to developments and take advantage of unexpected Japanese weaknesses.

Spector also does justice to many of the more overlooked aspects of the war. His treatment of the Japanese side illus-



The Marine from Manatee is a colorful addition to the more formal volumes that describe Marine Corps history. Written by his only son, a career naval officer who attained flag rank before retiring, the book relies heavily on the father's numerous communications to friends and relatives, many of whom resided in his adopted South Carolina. Harlee collated these shortly before his 1935 retirement as a colonel, into a volume titled *Kinfolks*. Author John Harlee has expanded beyond these narrow confines, utilizing such sources as *Arms and the Man*, now called *The American Rifleman*, newspapers of Washington and New York, and numerous Marine Corps historical files. The result is an easy reading, thoroughly interesting tale of the life of a Marine officer in the early days of the 20th century, a time when today's rapid means of communication were unknown. It reflects a time when a Marine officer wore nothing but custom tailored uniforms and civilian attire, and his tailor was frequently his broker, banker, and trusted confidant. The vignettes are those of an educated, energetic, aggres-

trates the problems that beset a military even more torn with Service rivalry than the Americans. He also emphasizes the importance of Allied intelligence, especially Ultra operations, and also points out the difficulties inherent in analyzing this information. The depth of Spector's research can be seen in his coverage of such neglected topics as the experiences of women and black soldiers, Allied prisoners of war, and Americans overseas.

While *Eagle Against the Sun* offers the best narrative account of the war yet written, it is anything but a simple recitation of events. Spector is not afraid to examine American failures or single out specific individuals or institutions for praise and blame. While the author, a major in the Marine Corps Reserve, may be accused of bias, his generally favorable view of the Marines is based on solid scholarly grounds. Few histo-

Criticism of this excellent study may appear as gratuitous sniping, but there are some ways in which it could be improved. The text needs more maps—there is only one map of the Pacific that appears on the inside covers. The decision to cite only the main sources in the footnotes and bibliographic essay is a disservice to readers who may wish to read up on specific campaigns or theaters. Finally, there should be a concluding chapter in which Spector reiterates his key arguments: the one-page summary really does not do justice to the rest of the book. Hopefully, some of these weaknesses may be cleared up in subsequent editions.

That *Eagle Against the Sun* should be read by everyone interested in World War II is perhaps obvious. What may be less obvious is that Spector's work is indicative of the growing excellence of American military historians. In his ability to explain opposing perceptions, his lucid and coherent writing, and his excellent scholarship, Spector demonstrates that there is no distinction between an excellent military history and an excellent history. Both the author and the editors of the "Wars of the United States" series are to be commended for this fine work.

FM 22-100 Military Leadership. Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, October 1983*

reviewed by Col D. J. Myers

Who ever heard of writing a book review of a Field Manual? That generally is not done, but this particular manual, *FM 22-100 Military Leadership*, should be an exception. Most Marines have read extensively on leadership, including the older *FM 22-100*. Unfortunately, it was written like most FMs—dull and boring, full of many laundry lists of important items.

This new manual is fantastic, and the format is unique. One reads this manual as he would a good novel that he can't put down. It is written specifically for the company level and below, but don't be misled, for there is more than enough material for all leaders from the fire team to the division.

The book starts by describing the battle for Little Round Top at Gettysburg conducted by the 20th Maine commanded by

* Anyone interested in obtaining the manual should contact the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Col Chamberlain. It goes into details with diagrams about why and how it occurred along with background leading up to it. From there it proceeds to a future battle involving an Army mechanized battalion. This particular battalion is in the defense with Companies A and B up and Company C in reserve. The battalion is attacked by a combined armies unit, and Company B breaks and runs, causing the division front to be in jeopardy. The reserve company conducts a coordinated counterattack and retrieves the situation.

The brigade commander calls in a staff officer and directs him to interview the battalion's leaders and men to determine what happened. He wants to know if Company B's performance is a possible indication of a larger problem.

The reader is an observer as the staff officer interviews the battalion commander, company commander, platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and troops. He is privy to the analysis and the following recommended actions. The reader is allowed to listen to the different styles of leadership practiced by the commanders and draw his own conclusions about what really happened and why.

With these two stories as an introduction, the manual then moves on to the heart of its subject. The fundamentals of leadership are explored and highlighted as the text unfolds. The manual expands on the good and bad examples of both battles to stress leadership principles. Techniques used by the leaders are constantly referred to as the manual proceeds through the principles and traits. In addition, historical examples from Vietnam, Korea, World War II, and World War I are repeatedly cited to reinforce major points. The reader is never bored.

The Army theme of "be, know, do" is stressed throughout the entire manual. One may think of that only as an Army theme, but I say it is a leadership theme and leadership is universal.

The manual includes 10 chapters such as: The Application of the Leadership Concept; Professional Beliefs, Values, and Ethics; Leadership That Provides Direction; and Leadership That Motivates. Appropriate excerpts from S.L.A. Marshall are cited throughout, especially in relation to combat leadership. There is even a vignette on leadership in the motor pool.

Each chapter includes a summary at its end in order to once again reinforce the major themes. These summaries



rians will dispute Spector's positive assessment of Marine prewar amphibious planning, fighting spirit, and ability to learn from mistakes. MacArthur, on the other hand, emerges as a general whose greatest successes were often over self-created difficulties and at the expense of his American and Australian troops. This is especially true in the later Philippines campaign, where MacArthur's celebrated sweep through the southern archipelago was achieved at the expense of an unnecessarily bloody stalemate in northern Luzon. Readers may object to some of Spector's interpretations, but they must applaud his reasoned examination of the war's great controversies.