basic problems of EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Liddell Hart, B H

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

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

By B. H. Liddell Hart

A BASIC QUESTION UNDERLIES ANY and all plans of Western defense. Can free Europe be defended? The answer—if we are honest, *and* brave enough to face hard facts—can only be that in the present conditions, and with present plans, effective defense is not possible. For defense in the real sense of the word, as defined in dictionaries, means to "preserve, protect, keep safe, by resisting attack."

At the present time, if nuclear weapons of megaton power are actually used, no country can hope to keep safe, or even to avoid fatal destruction. Moreover, as things stand, the NATO countries cannot even attempt to stop any strong invading force without using such weapons. Their ground forces are far too weak, compared with those of Russia, to maintain a prolonged resistance with conventional, non-nuclear, weapons. So they have to put their trust purely in the chances, much less certain, of deterring their enemies from attack by threat of nuclear retaliation.

The essential conclusion was put

clearly by the British Prime Minister when speaking at a dinner given in London to welcome Gen Norstad, the new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. For Mr. Macmillan there said:

"Let us be under no illusion; military forces today are not designed to wage war; their purpose is to prevent it. There will be no campaigns again like the old ones, with victory at the end of a long and balanced struggle.

"Total war today can only mean total destruction."

The Probable Conditions of Nuclear War

The largest bombs used in Europe during the last war were no more than 5 to 10 tons, and in the largest scale attacks—with forces up to a thousand aircraft—about 5,000 tons were dropped. The first atomic bomb, dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945, had an explosive force equivalent to 20,000 tons. Thus even in the infancy of nuclear warfare a single bomber could exert 4 times as much destructive power as a thousand had done previously.

The first operational hydrogen bomb, tested in March 1954, is known to have released an explosive force equivalent to 20 million tons—a thousand times greater than the original atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. One such bomb can destroy the largest city. Only a few would have to reach their targets in order to wipe out the main centers of industry and population in any country of Western or Southern Europe. Even one or two might suffice to paralyze the life of such countries, when account is taken of the vast stretch of the "fall-out" of deadly radioactive dust, as well as of the shattering moral effect.

If such weapons are actually used in war it is unimaginable that the war could continue, even in the "broken-back" way of which Sir Winston Churchill talked 3 years ago: "The conduct of war is a matter of *organized action,* which would be impossible in such a state of chaos." The NATO "shield forces" could not hope to maintain a defense when their sources of supply were destroyed, and their whole purpose would vanish once their homelands were destroyed. Any survivors would be fully occupied in collecting food and controlling mobs of starving refugees.

What Are the Prospects of Defense Against Nuclear Bombing?

The US Air Defense Command has openly admitted that even "a 90 per cent effective defense might not be good enough to guarantee national survival." Another American authority has stated that "At best—and this is very optimistic—we might intercept one out of every four Soviet bombers." It would be much easier for such bombers to reach and annihilate the more accessible vital centers of countries in Europe. In face of a menace of this scale, the NATO schemes of air defense and civil defense are no more than trifling with the problem. Even if a 100 per cent effective anti-aircraft missile could be produced on the scale required to annul all attacks by bombers, there is no early hope of a counter to the ballistic rocket.

The New Menace of Rocket Bombardment

On 13 February 1957, Britain's Minister of Defence, Mr. Duncan Sandys, publicly confirmed that there was "every reason to believe" that the Russians had developed a "rocket with a nuclear warhead" and that "the range of this rocket would probably be sufficient to reach Britain." By then, that admission understated the grim reality. For it was known from the evidence of radar-traced flights, that Russian rockets were reaching targets 800 to 1,000 miles distant. Moreover there was reason to believe that the Russians had successfully tested a rocket with a range of 1500 miles—sufficient to reach any of the American strategic bomber bases in North Africa and the Middle East.

Then, on 26 August, the Russians announced that they had carried out successful tests of an inter-continental ballistic rocket that could reach "any part of the world."

Those were the key words of the latest Russian announcement that has startled the Western parts of the world. The shock has been all the greater, since it has come so soon after the first test launching of an American inter-continental rocket, the 5,000 mile range Atlas—which ended in failure. Its immediate suc-



cessor, the Titan, is not yet ready for test—and even if successful is not expected to be ready for operational use until the 1960s.

If the Russian claim about their super-rocket is true, the effects on the world balance of power, and our situation, are likely to be far-reaching. It is a very ominous prospect. Experience of the previous Russian announcements that proved true, strongly suggests that the latest is likely to be well-founded. Time after time the Russians have proved successful in reaching some fresh stage of scientific or technical development years before they were expected to achieve it. The success of the "Satellite" has driven home the lesson.

In any case, the NATO countries of Europe, including Britain, all lie within range of the intermediate rockets which Russia has *certainly* got. Western Germany is in closest range of all. The only protection of these countries lies in deterring the Russians from launching an attack—by being able to retaliate with H-bombs. This ability to retaliate depends mainly on the American strategic bombing force, supplemented by Britain's relatively small force of jet-bombers. Here I would again emphasize that, whatever the value of such a force as a *deterrent* to enemy attack, it is of no real value as a *defense*. For if it were used, it would merely result in mutual suicide. That would be the inevitable outcome of war with H-bombs.



The Prospects of Deterrence

A powerful bombing force, armed with nuclear bombs, is a very strong deterrent to any attempt at delivering a knock-out blow with nuclear bombs or rockets, or even at overrunning the NATO countries by ground forces. For it would be the most hazardous gamble for Russia, or any other country, to base a war plan on the belief that the other side's power of retaliation could be nullified by a surprise blow—a new "Pearl Harbor" coup. A sudden and complete knock-out blow would be far more difficult to achieve than in 1941—and that had only a temporary success. For it would be almost impossible to ensure that every bomber on the opposing side is disabled, whereas even a few bombers that survived would be able, with H-bombs, to inflict tremendous destruction in reply. The dream of a complete knock-out at the start of war has become even more absurd with the development of ballistic rockets that can be launched from anywhere on land or sea.

Unfortunately, this "needle in a haystack" problem also casts grave doubt on the belief still cherished by the Allied military planners—in the Pentagon, at SAC, and at SHAPE—that once the bombers of the US Strategic Air Command are unleashed, they could annul Russia's power of nuclear attack within a few days. So we are brought back again to the conclusion that the only hope of preserving Europe lies in preventing war—and no longer, as in the past, in being able to win a war.

As for the prospects of success in preventing war, their best foundation is formed, ironically, by the lack of any firm foundation for aggressive planning — and the likelihood that the outcome would be as fatal to the attacker as it would be to his victim. It is the basic *uncertainty* of the outlook that does most to strengthen the existing deterrent to aggression—and particularly to any Russian attempt to overrun the free countries of Europe.

There appear to be only 2 conditions in which a deliberately planned onslaught would become more likely:

1) A change in American policy towards a renewed "isolationism," leading the United States Government to withdraw its forces from Europe, and revert to a detached attitude towards what happens in Europe.

2) The possible discovery and development by Soviet Russia of an effective means of countering, and *nullifying*, NATO nuclear retaliation against Russia's territory and forces. The situation would become perilously ill-balanced if Russia produced such a means in advance of the Western Alliance.

America has made much progress in developing anti-aircraft guided missiles to counter bomber aircraft, and it is all too possible that Russia has made similar progress. If Russia should produce an effective antidote to the bomber, and thus nullify our power of "massive retaliation," while at the same time possessing the power herself of bombarding the Western countries with atomic rockets, they would be reduced to a state of helplessness.

I have long thought that a likely sign of success in developing such a bomber antidote would be a bolder and more *intrusive* foreign policy on the Russians' part. That has been manifest recently. But it may be due simply to confidence in their new long-range rockets, coupled with the fact that the small

launching sites required for these are much easier to conceal, and more difficult to knock out, than bomber bases. But to gain the *certainty* of a decisive advantage, Russia would have to produce the counter not only to bombers but to ballistic rockets, and to be sure that the antidote was 100 per cent effective—which, fortunately, is a distant and dubious possibility.

At present, the Western powers' capacity for nuclear retaliation should suffice to deter Russia from launching a large-scale invasion of free Europe, or from attempting to paralyze the Allies' retaliatory power by a surprise blow. But, unfortunately, this power of retaliation is far less sure of proving a deterrent to smaller scale aggression, and it is thus much less of an insurance against the risk of an unintentional slide into an all-out war of mutual suicide.

The Problem of Tactical Atomic Action

A new, and very dangerous, complication has arisen from the decision in 1954 to equip the NATO ground forces, and their supporting "tactical" air forces, with tactical atomic weapons. It increases the risk that even a local conflict might soon develop into a war of mutual annihilation—unintended by either side.

During a visit to London early this year Gen Norstad had a private talk with a large number of members of Parliament. When pressed as to whether nuclear weapons could be used tactically, against the enemy's forces, without using them strategically, against the enemy's country, he is reported to have replied that in his own mind he found it impossible to draw a line between these forms of action. He left the impression that he could see no hope of stopping short of all-out war with H-bombs.

The arguments for providing the NATO forces with tactical atomic weapons has been that these weapons are essential to counterbalance the Red Army's much larger numbers of men. The soldiers responsible for defense planning naturally desire the maximum possible insurance, and it is not their responsibility to judge whether the *apparent* increase of battlefield insurance offered by atomic weapons is outweighted by the increased risk of chaos and collapse in the homelands. In bowing to the military argument for such extra insurance the statesmen may hopefully think that they can restrain its employment until the need is certain. But this is a frail hope. There is much greater risk in equipping armies with atomic weapons than air forces, since armies are posted in more advanced positions. Commanders will always tend to use every weapon they possess rather than risk their troops being overrun—and in that immediate concern are apt to lose sight of wider issues.

There would be great value in adopting tactical nuclear weapons if, by doubling the resisting power of the present NATO armies, they made it possible to repulse an invasion by the Communists' much larger armies *without* causing the general destruction by H-bombs of the countries on either side. But there is no sense in adding such costly tactical weapons to our armory if they are not considered a practicable *alternative* to strategic nuclear bombardment, and are certain to lead to all-out war — as Gen Norstad appears to think.



The Problem of "Graduated Deterrence"

The insanity of planning a defense that is bound to be suicidal has become so obvious, except to the planners themselves, that it has prompted a growing number of thoughtful minds to consider the possibility of graduated action, or "graduated deterrence" as it has come to be described—unleashing H-bombs only if it is clear that the enemy is making an unlimited attack and cannot be stopped by any lesser means. To evolve a workable plan of graduated action is certainly a knotty problem, requiring extensive study, yet at least worth trying as an alternative to world suicide.

The best chance would obviously lie in confining nuclear weapons to the immediate battlefield, and the chances would decrease in each successive stage of deeper use. At the same time, even the second stage in depth—their use against the aggressor's Lines of Communication area,

and his airfields there—would involve a heavy additional handicap, since the British and American forces will be operating overseas and their seaport advanced bases will be more vulnerable than the other side's land communications.

So there would be compensating advantages for the Western powers in confining nuclear action to the battlefield—which is also the most practicable differential, and perhaps the only one that will allow the defense a chance of profiting by unconventional weapons without precipitating an all-out war. One can, however, see possible ways in which a land-based attacker of strategic ingenuity might nullify a defense geared to tactical atomic weapons—which depend for effect on suitable targets, and are ineffective against dispersion or intermingling.

Is there any other way of increasing our defensive strength, and with a greater chance of avoiding all-out nuclear warfare? The safest course of all in defense would be to rely on conventional forces using purely conventional weapons. A better prospect of limitation is offered by the use of chemical instead of nuclear weapons. For chemical weapons are most effective in checking invasion and delaying all advancing movements on land, while far less effective against stationary forces and cities. It is absurd to forego the defensive use of mustard gas, the most obstructive yet least lethal of weapons, while adopting the use of nuclear weapons—which are weapons of mass-slaughter, and violate the lawful code of warfare on more counts than such a weapon as mustard gas, which is relatively humane.

The Problem of Deterrence and Defense with "Conventional" Forces

Now that the Russians are matching America in nuclear weapons, the paradoxical consequence is to revive the danger of invasion in a conventional way. For they may be tempted to venture on that kind of attack in the belief that, because of the "nuclear stalemate," the West would hesitate to unleash nuclear weapons—so long as the Russians limited their aims and their action. Hence the need for conventional defense, as a deterrent, is renewed. Is it really so impossible, militarily and economically, to provide adequate defense of this kind as the NATO Governments have come to assume?

Russia and her satellites, from a total population of 300 million, maintain standing armies of about 260 active divisions—of which perhaps 160 face westward. The NATO countries have a population of 230 million in Europe, and 400 million in total, yet produce barely 20 active divisions (of which the majority are not ready for action) to cover the western, and central, area of Europe.

In view of the number of divisions that the Soviet bloc can maintain, the question arises whether the NATO type and its supporting structure are needlessly elaborate and expensive. Given the will, and new thought, the answer could be found. It makes no sense that the NATO countries should continue to live in mortal fear of a group inferior in population and material resources, and remain impaled on the horns of a "defeat or suicide" dilemma. The economic difficulties of attaining the minimum ground strength required can be diminished by developing new tactics and organization.

The customary type of Western division has a "tail" of non-fighting men—to supply and maintain it—nearly 4 times as large as the Soviet type, and has more than double the number of vehicles, without being appreciably stronger in firepower. Yet, basically, the defending side—operating in its own territory—should not need as high a scale of supply and transport as an attacker coming from a long distance away, and should be able to make effective use of "light" and "local" types of force which require relatively little transport.

The New Possibilities of "Limited War" Strategy

It is essential to realize that while the H-bomb has become a check on the deliberate launching of an all-out attack, it has not reduced the

possibilities of "limited war" to the same extent, and may even increase them. The enemy can exploit a choice of strategic techniques, different in pattern but all designed to make headway for the aggressor while causing hesitancy on the other side in taking the fateful decision to order counteraction with nuclear weapons.

Such aggression might be made at a limited tempo—a gradual process of encroachments. It might be made at a fast tempo but to a limited depth—small "blitz" bites swiftly made, and as swiftly followed up by a conciliatory offer to negotiate. It might take the form of stirring up internal revolt in another country, and then infiltrating or parachuting reinforcements of "volunteers." It might also take a purely subversive form.

It is ironical that the more the Western powers have developed the massiveness of their strategic air force and the explosive force of the nuclear weapon the more they have tended to aid the progress of the new "mosquito" type strategy employed against them. Their own strategy should be based on a clear grasp of this concept, and their military policy be adjusted to fit it.

The Solution Proposed

What should be done to meet such a wide variety of dangers, ranging from total war to cold war? Can it be done without incurring a financial burden that will break us without a battle? The maintenance and improvement of the nuclear *deterrent* to war, especially to all-out war, remains the primary requirement.

But there is no need for a strategic bombing force of great size—as in the last war. With H-bombs, only a small number suffice to inflict overwhelming destruction, if they reach their target. So what counts is not quantity of bombers, but superlative technical *quality* and performance. That applies also to the long-range missle which is likely to supersede the bomber as the means of delivery. There is all the less need for quantity since the purpose is to prevent war, by deterring a would-be attacker, and not to pursue the now futile and obsolete aim of "winning a war."

Once NATO learns the wisdom of concentrating on deterrence, instead of out of date preparation for waging a great war, great savings can be made in bombing forces of the customary kind. For air defense, fighter forces add little to the deterrent compared with their cost, and would be of little avail. They can





be scrapped now—except such part of them as is required for co-operation with troops in "small" warfare—instead of waiting until the new missile-type air defense is ready. In all services, too, large savings can be made by cutting out preparations and stock-piling for a long war of the old unlimited kind.

We can turn now to what is required to meet the local and limited types of aggression that form our most likely risk — frontier "bites," quick or gradual, and internal outbreaks fomented from outside. To tackle these, the need is for an extensive gendarmerie backed by mobile forces of high efficiency, in a state of constant readiness—like fire-brigades.

A short-service conscript army is badly fitted for such tasks; a relatively small professional army would be much better. It could be usefully supplemented, however, by a superior militia type force, locally based.

In tackling these "small war" emergencies we have got to reckon with the possibility that, if the "fire" is not quickly quenched, it may spread—and develop, unintended by either side, into an all-out war.

In this "new model" army, which I visualize, the active troops might be of two types. The striking element would consist of a number of handy-sized armored divisions, mounted entirely in cross-country vehicles that can move off the road. They would be trained to operate in "controlled dispersion" like a swarm of hornets, offering little target to a nuclear bomb or missile if such were used. The other type, for policing and for mobile defense, would be "light infantry" divisions. They would also be completely capable of moving off roads—but not through mechanization. Their cross-country capacity would come from lightness of equipment.

Besides these mobile forces, it would also be a good insurance—especially against the new risk of a conventional type invasion—if the continental countries were to create militia-type forces—organized to fight in their own locality, and maintain themselves from local stores, distributed in numerous small underground shelters. Such forces, a superior form of "Home Guard," would provide a deep network of defense, yet need much less transport than the present NATO type, be much less of a target, be less liable to interception, and become effective with far shorter training—so relieving the present burden of conscription.

Such a reorganization would provide the NATO countries with a chance of effective defense without the extreme peril of resorting to nuclear weapons—and thus strengthen the deterrent.

For the prime need today is to reinforce the H-bomb deterrent, which has turned into a two-edged threat, by developing a non-nuclear "fire-guard" and "fire-extinguisher" —on the ground, and ready for use without hesitation or delay.

The Scale of Forces Required

To provide a reasonably adequate "fire-guard" and "fire-extinguishing" force in Europe is not nearly as big a problem as is apt to be assumed, when considering the problem in the old terms of defense.

Even on the old basis—of capacity to meet a full-scale invasion by the Soviet armies—the Western planners came to the conclusion, in 1950-51, that a Covering Force of 34 divisions should suffice to check a surprise assault on the front between Austria and the Baltic. Of that number, 18 were to be M-day divisions, ready for immediate action (5 American, 5 British, 5 French, 3 Belgian, 2 Dutch), and 16 were to be ready for action in 3 days. While the NATO plan was subsequently expanded to a target of twice that number, the doubling was to be in the form of reserve divisions that could be mobilized to match the corresponding mobilization of the Russian reserves. In other words, the expanded plan was a product of the customary picture of a lengthy struggle in the old style.

In the light of experience, a Covering Force of 34 active divisions held out a good promise of checking an attack by 70 to 100 enemy divisions—the maximum that seemed possible, on a logistical calculation, in the initial stage of a war, and whatever the number of reinforcements that might be mobilized on the Soviet side, it would be difficult to utilize more than double that total, if as many, in a long-distance advance westward. So a NATO Covering Force and reinforcement, of the scale projected in 1950-51, promised a good insurance.

Now the problem has changed, and in the process the scale of ground forces required has diminished. For the Russians could hardly count on being able to carry out a massive invasion of long extent without precipitating a suicidal nu-

clear war. The most that they might hope to bring off is a sudden pounce of a limited kind, brief in time and short in extent. That is a possible venture, and danger, for which NATO should be prepared.

What strength could the Russians employ in such a pounce? There are 22 Russian divisions in East Germany (of which 18 are of mobile armored type), and 2 in Poland, while the Communist East German Army comprises 7 divisions. The shock force for a surprise stroke might possibly be raised to 50 divisions by stealthy reinforcement without alerting the West—although an assault on that scale is the less likely because it would produce a greatly increased risk of bringing on all-out nuclear war. Nevertheless, it may be wise to reckon with the "Worst Possible Case."

What strength does NATO need as an insurance against it? Operational analysis of the later stages of the last war shows that Allied attacks against the Germans rarely succeeded unless the attacking troops had a superiority in strength of *more than 5 to 1,* accompanied by domination of the air—and sometimes failed with odds of nearly 10 to 1 in their favour. On the Eastern Front, where the Russian attacker had no such decisive domination of the air, the Germans often held their own against attacks delivered with a superiority, in men and weapons, of 7 to 1—or even more. The ratio of space to force is apt to be the crux of the problem—subject to the state of morale and the relative mobility of the opposing forces. The issue tends to turn on whether the attacker has room for maneuver—to outflank, or penetrate weak stretches in the opposing network of fire.

Yet even on such a very wide front as that in Russia it became evident that a well-conducted mobile defense could be maintained indefinitely unless the attacking side had an *overall* superiority considerably exceeding 3 to 1. It may be wise to make a larger allowance for the unequal quality of the present NATO forces (with their mixture of nationalities and of training systems), and for increased efficiency on the Russian side. Even so, they ought to be able to hold their own with a ratio of 1 to 2, while a ratio of 2 to 3 should ensure a safe margin.

On that basis, a mobile force of 20 active divisions should be a good insurance against a sudden "pounce" by the Soviet troops that are on the spot, while a force of some 30 divisions should suffice to check even the possible but less likely scale of assault that might be achieved by stealthy reinforcement prior to the pounce. *Numerically,* the lower insurance figure has been attained with the formation of the first batch of German divisions, and the higher insurance figure will be within close reach when the rest of the promised 12 German divisions are formed. Thus, in terms of numbers, only a small further effort is required from the other member countries; the return of the 4 French divisions that were sent to Algeria would bridge the gap.



But the insurance cannot be regarded as good until the state of readiness for action is much improved. The proportion of "M-day" divisions is too small. No less important is their suitability, for kinds of action that are most likely to be needed—i.e. quenching a local outbreak of "fire" before it spreads, or repelling a sudden pounce by mechanized or airborne forces. These two kinds of action call for different types of force—"light infantry" divisions primarily in the first case; armored divisions primarily in the second case. And in either case, the addition of a localized militia would increase the insurance at comparatively little cost.

The present type of heavily armed infantry division, which is now the preponderant element in the NATO "shield force," is much less suitable for either of these kinds of action. The "light infantry" division would cost less and require less "tail" (of non-fighting personnel), so that more divisions could be provided from the same amount of money and manpower. That would be an aid towards making "fire-extinguishers" available for the small countries such as Denmark, that lie on the flanks of the main, "Central Europe," front—dangerously exposed to a Russian pounce. Moreover, in the event of nuclear weapons being used, the 3 types of force proposed are better suited to survive than the present "heavy" infantry division.

This reflection brings us back, in conclusion, to the problem of tactical atomic weapons. It would be better if such weapons had never been introduced. Not only have they increased the risk of local conflicts developing into total war, but they may even turn to our disadvantage—now that the Russians have also got them. For besides the vulnerability of our seaport bases, static defense positions may prove more vulnerable than a well-dispersed attacking force of armored type. There is reason to think that the Russians have gone ahead of Western armies in developing methods of dispersed and invisible advance.

But since the Russians have got the tactical atomic weapon, the Western forces can hardly discard it. It is bound to be kept as "a card up the sleeve"—though we should be wiser to keep it well up the sleeve than to play it at an early stage. It should be regarded as a "last but one" resort—and it would at least be worth using it, in a limited way, before unleashing strategic nuclear action against the hinterland.

We are left with the problem of

how the tactical atomic weapon can be kept without making the NATO forces so dependent on it, and their organization so entwined with it, that they are incapable of effective action in non-nuclear ways. To embody any form of such weapon in divisions, or even in corps, is a short-sighted policy — however attractive it may look. The best solution is to abstain from organizational integration, except at the highest levels—in other words, to allot the weapon only to special nuclear-weapon detachments that can be kept "attachable," high up the sleeve.

The New Development of Strategy

Old concepts, and old definitions, of strategy have become not only *obsolete,* but *nonsensical* with the development of nuclear weapons. The development of long-range rockets, to replace the manned bomber aircraft, makes the absurdity even clearer. To aim at "winning a war," to take "victory" as your object, is no more than a state of *lunacy.* For a total war, with nuclear weapons, would be fatal to both sides.

There is no sense even in planning for such a war—for a World War III, as it is often called. In the present stage of scientific development, the destruction and chaos would be so great *within a few hours* that the war could not continue in any *organized* sense.

Yet it is astonishing to see the extent to which old-fashioned concepts continue to influence military planning. They are repeatedly revealed by the use of out-of-date terms, and the pattern of exercises. This is shown even in the use of the word "sword" for the *deterrent*—which is mainly provided by the US Strategic Air Force—and "shield" for the NATO ground forces. For the "sword" could not be *used,* actually, without producing mutual suicide. It is like the old ceremonial Japanese sword dedicated for committing *hara-kiri.* And the old word "shield" does not suggest the kind of protection required to meet the nibbling, erosive forms of aggression that have now become more likely than "sword-thrusts." A shield is not a suitable protection against wasps, nor against incendiary fires.

Strategy—which aims at military victory—should always be subordinate to Grand Strategy, the realm of statesmanship which is concerned with the ultimate state of peace. This has too often been disregarded in the past. Now, more than ever Grand Strategy must be in the driving seat.

Statesmanship, in the H-bomb age must control not only the aims but the operations. It should direct military defense planning, and the formulation of military doctrine. Hence statesmen and their diplomatic advisers must have a greater knowledge of military technique than they needed in the past. That is as important as the need for soldiers to submit to political direction. Even if we do not go so far as to merge the function of the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, they and their expert advisers must combine much more closely.

It is a new version of Plato's dictum that the affairs of the world would not improve until either the philosophers became the rulers or the rulers became the philosophers.

USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Junior Marine

HAVING BEEN BORN INTO THE MARINE CORPS and having cut his eye teeth on a swagger stick, my 6-year-old son, Mike, was a little more than unhappy when I was assigned for duty under instruction at the Army Security Agency School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. To him the only man in uniform who matters at all is a US Marine.

We had been at Fort Devens about 2 weeks when this event occurred:

At dinner one night I asked Mike what he had been doing all day. His reply was that he had been playing Marines, with all the other boys. "Don't you mean playing soldiers?" I asked. "No Sir, Daddy, they play soldiers, I play Marines!"

Capt Dale Thornton

Subtle Reprimand

WE OF THE 2D BN, 6TH MARINES were living in tents in 1941 at newly opened Camp Elliott near San Diego. One of the Marines in my squad seemed to have adopted a "don't give a damn" attitude and our rather youthful squad leader hadn't had much success in getting him to cooperate.

One day our corporal approached our taciturn, tobacco chewing Gunnery Sergeant and explained that he just couldn't seem to straighten his problem child out. The Gunny listened patiently, nodded, then strolled down the row of tents to the living quarters of the rebellious private and stuck his head through the tent fly. "Get your gear ready, Jones, you're being transferred," he said . . . and without another word, he continued his stroll along the duckboards and vanished around the tent at the head of the Company street.

Jones proceeded to pack his sea bag, fold up his cot, turn in his equipment to the company storeroom and get dressed in the proper uniform. Some 2 hours later the Gunny appeared again on the company street and found Jones in front of his tent sitting on top of his seabag perspiring freely in his freshly donned khaki, but ready to go. "Where am I going, Gunny?" he asked. The Gunny answered, "To the third squad, Jones . . . that's 2 tents down." . . . and without another word or a backward glance, continued his leisurely stroll down the company street.

Maj J. R. Kearney