

TARGET FOR COMMUNIST CONQUEST

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
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By Adm Arleigh
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The elimination of Communism from Latin America, says the author, is vital. He adds that the place to start is with the military.

SINCE the early 1920s Latin America has been a target for Communist conquest. The movement grew rapidly in the 1930s and 1940s, and by the end of World War II, taking advantage of our common effort against the Nazis, the Communists were operating openly in most countries of this hemisphere. They were represented in nine national congresses, one national cabinet, and had penetrated local government in several other countries. Their infiltration into labor movements and student groups was also widespread.

With the election of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1951, the Communists captured their first American country. Their failure to gain control of the Guatemalan military establishment was a tactical mistake which led to the overthrow of their regime in 1954. That the Communists profited by their mistake was evidenced by the dispersal of the July 26th movement in Cuba soon after Castro achieved power.

The coming of Castro has brought a new phase in the Communist attack on Latin America. Now for the first time, they have a full-scale, well-de-



fined operating base within the hemisphere. Castro has consolidated his power, and with Soviet and Chinese support is making a coordinated, stepped-up effort to subvert and control the people of this hemisphere.

In spite of our government's efforts, subversion emanating from Cuba is increasing. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs last February 19, John M. McCone, Central Intelligence Agency Director, stated, "Even before the October missile crisis—and with increasing rancor since then—Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities."

Beginning with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has held a minimum strategic objective for the security of the Americas: we would not tolerate any alien system in the hemisphere. In times of crisis, statesmen such as Adams, Monroe, Polk, Cleveland, Wilson—men who particularly used the Doctrine—recognized that this objective was absolutely imperative, and that if we failed to achieve it when threatened by an alien system, our security would be in peril.

It is not within the scope of this article to review in detail how, why, and when this strategy collapsed. But the collapse did not come suddenly in 1959, or in 1961 as some have maintained. We began in the 1930s to move away from the concept of strong US unilateral action in this hemisphere, partly as a result of an over-reaction to the periods of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson when the strategy of the Monroe Doctrine was applied at times for intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. We developed a worship of "world opinion" as if it were our strategy. This was a period when many Americans developed guilt feelings about our relationship with Latin America, and a period when many Latin Americans resented us.

As a result, we forgot that the lessons of history show a just peace to be the product of the wise and principled use of power. Hence, when confronted with Communism—a system far more

alien than those which worried Monroe and Adams—we were morally unprepared to act.

Throughout the history of the Western Hemisphere, while the techniques and equipment of war changed, the principal strategic weapon upon which the Monroe Doctrine rested was sea power. Spanish galleons and high-masted frigates gave way to ironclads and steam-driven ships, and finally, to mighty men of war. But the advent of modern weapons, with their tremendous destructive capability, caused us to forget the importance of the seas, and particularly of the Caribbean. We assumed that the future of mankind would depend on the ability to deliver nuclear weapons.

Now that Cuba is Communist, the importance of the seas and of the Caribbean has been brought forcibly to our attention. In October 1963, when the United States demanded withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, Premier Khrushchev complied quickly because he knew he did not have—and could not get—control of either the high seas or the Caribbean. Still, Soviet submarines were there, perhaps quite a few. The US Navy's anti-submarine forces flushed several to the surface. And the water around the Leeward Islands is good submarine water—deep, warm, and difficult for anti-submarine forces because changing thermal currents make it hard to trace submarines.

If these Soviet submarines had been nuclear-powered, or had they contained missiles capable of being launched from underwater, they would have represented a threat more serious than the Cuban land-based missiles. It is not reassuring to realize that such missile-carrying submarines could be based in unfriendly islands in the Caribbean and would not have to risk hazardous trips back and forth across the Atlantic to and from their home ports.

From our problems in Cuba we have two basic lessons to learn:

First, in a geographical as well as a strategic sense, it is of primary importance that the US keep the waters of the Caribbean open to Free World commerce and free from Soviet bases.

Second, and more important, the elimination of Communism from Latin America is the minimum strategic objective to be achieved if this nation and the whole hemisphere are to endure as we know them.

Today, Cuba has become a base where Communist leaders have dedicated themselves to the destruction of freedom, of the social order of the Americas, and of our free economic system. They have vowed to establish a Communist system throughout the Western Hemisphere. And they are doing their best right now to gain control of other Latin American countries.

Since the confrontation over Cuba last October, the Communists do not risk fighting us openly. But they are maximizing their strategy and tactics of political warfare—a weapon which we have not

yet learned to recognize as a weapon of war. Hence, we hesitate to use our power in sufficient quantity to defeat enemies employing it.

We can only develop a counter strategy if we remember that the aims of strategy relate to people, and to those in control of the people. We must keep in mind that just wars are fought to prevent the enemy from controlling our people.

Today, even national security must be described not just in military, but in political, scientific, and economic dimensions. Our ultimate objective in Latin America involves conditions conducive to a political order, which, with evolution rather than revolution, will move toward representative government in which power is balanced, initiative is widespread, and the marketplace is free.

With this in mind, we must strive to develop a broader strategy. Even if the Monroe Doctrine had been applied in past years to eliminate an alien system from the Hemisphere, this would have been only a beginning.

First, we must have an improved approach toward Latin American institutions. The Church,

universities, and social classes all have decisive roles to play, but I would like to discuss in particular the institution of the military.

We have already noted that the military in Guatemala was the bulwark against Communism, and this is generally true throughout Latin America. The military is probably the most internally democratic institution in Latin America. With the exception of the Church, it is about the only institution where an individual can enter from the lower classes and emerge to high rank and responsibility. It has, by and large, social mobility.

At the same time, some members of the armed services in Latin America lean toward authoritarian and state-controlled programs both in economics and politics. Since the military is probably



Troops of Guatemalan "liberation army" ousted the Communist regime after a short reign. Failure by the Communists to gain control of the military was a blunder, says Adm Burke.



the most decisive single influence in Latin America, we have a great and beckoning opportunity to influence the military in the direction of representative government, free enterprise, and power balance within the state.

What our Navy has already accomplished might well be applied to other institutions to develop confidence. A few years ago we began assigning destroyer-type ships to engage in maneuvers with navies of those Latin American countries who desired to participate. The effects of such cooperation were forcefully demonstrated during the Cuban crisis last fall when several Latin American countries offered ships to assist our blockade.

Another example is the US Army's Civic Action Program—a Peace Corps operation begun long before the Corps was conceived. Army units supervise and work with natives on a people-to-people level in small rural communities on water purification, housing, road construction, small port facilities, schools, and other projects.

The second element in our broad strategy must be directed towards encouraging free and stable market economies. Military strategy is devoted to the cure of an infection which has developed to the need of surgery. But economic strategy has the larger role of developing and maintaining a healthful climate in which the dignity and creativity of man may flourish.

However, prosperity cannot be imposed by an outside agency. Any significant change must be accomplished by the people within a country—by the plans and efforts of those who live there.

Since 1958 US private investment in Latin America has fallen off to practically nothing. Besides the decline in foreign investment, native Latin Americans have withdrawn an estimated \$10 billion capital and shipped it off to Europe and the US. Next to the presence of Communism in Cuba, the hemisphere's worst problem is this flight of capital.

Not only Latin Americans, but often some in the US appear to lack appreciation of the value of private enterprise in the foreign market. In the face of a barrage of propaganda against free enterprise, it is difficult for private businessmen in Latin America to operate and make the important contribution of which they are capable. And if public spokesmen for the United States do not defend and endorse the free enterprise system which has contributed so much to our own growth and strength, then Latin American policies which weaken free enterprise are likely to predominate. As a result, the ultimate good of the Alliance for Progress will be put off further into the future.

The third element of our over-all strategy must be a better approach to the problems of productivity and diversification. To obtain the capital goods necessary for industrialization, Latin American nations must expand their dollar volume of exports. Nearly all these countries, however derive

50 per cent or more of their exchange earnings from only one or two commodities. A few are almost entirely dependent on one commodity and they suffer severely when the international price levels fluctuate. So until Latin America can diversify its export commodities and other goods, it is likely to continue to suffer from the world market price fluctuations which have been so common over the last decade.

Both exports and the general standard of living in Latin America can be improved greatly if modern management, labor, capital, and technical methods are applied to agriculture. Land reform programs, in particular, must be centered around increased productivity and not around fractionalizing and splintering production limits.

The fourth element in our broader strategy must be to encourage sound local government. Our government-to-government aid programs in Latin America have been carried out primarily at the level of the national governments, and hence have given an overemphasis to centralized government—to the neglect of local government.

Traditionally, local and state governments in Latin America have been assigned a minor role—a factor which has damped the economic and social development of these countries. The development of sound local government should be encouraged, particularly since an untapped source of revenue is readily available to them in the form of a property tax.

Professor William Stokes, at our Center's (The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, of which Adm Burke is now Director—Ed) Conference on National Security, noted that we ought to be concerned not only with what we are against, with prohibiting further encroachments of Marxism-Leninism, and eliminating what is already there. We must also concern ourselves with "the alternative attitudes and values, with the alternative economic concepts and ideas, and with the alternative political methods, forms of organization, and procedures."

He is right. We have not done nearly enough to mobilize our best minds and skills within this country—experts in land productivity, taxation, industrial pioneering, local management, education—to establish rapport with key individuals and groups in Latin America.

To summarize: our minimum strategic objective is to thwart and eliminate Communism from the hemisphere as an alien and intolerable system. Our larger objectives are manifold, but a first step toward them is to establish a national priority to marshal the best people we have in search of ways to share with our Latin American neighbors the lessons of our own successful experiences. Then the Alliance becomes one for true knowledge out of which can spring the climate for progress—not of totalitarianism such as the Soviets seek, but of creativity, initiative, and self-reliance.

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