

Hart, considered that the British and American tanks sacrificed too much power and performance for what was gained in the way of fire control and communications refinements. As to the well publicized Russian artillery, the German generals appeared to be less impressed than would be expected, for they claimed their artillery fire direction to be superior to the Russian.

It was Von Kleist's opinion, and on the basis of his experience he certainly should know what he was talking about, that the Red fighting man was a "first rate soldier," a tough fighter who could carry on without "most of the things other armies regarded as necessities." As to Russian generalship, Rundstedt observed that "none were any good in 1941," but the Red leaders improved greatly as the war went on. It seemed to be the consensus of German generals that Marshal Zhukov was the best of Stalin's commanders. Budenny, on the other hand, was described by a captured Russian officer as "a man with a very large mustache, but a very small brain." Capt Hart thoroughly explores the subject of Russian command capabilities, and comes to the verdict that the German generals felt that the upper and lower Russian levels of command were the strongest, with the intermediate grades the weakest. Blumentritt gave several examples of intercepted orders that seemed to indicate that the Russian commanders in the field grades were in as much danger from their superiors as from the enemy. Such orders as "Why do you fail to attack? I order you for the last time to take Strylenko, otherwise I fear for your health" and "Why is your regiment not in the initial position for attack? Engage at once unless you want to lose your head" would make it appear that being a Russian officer was not always vodka and caviar.

The Normandy landing provides another important portion of the book. Rundstedt, never very optimistic about stopping the landing or advance inland, was in frequent disagreement with Hitler's headquarters over the conduct of the defense. Even after the landing, which according to German sources was not a complete surprise, Rundstedt fought one battle with the Allied troops, and another with Jodl at the supreme headquarters. Usually it was a matter of trying to get permission to commit reserve forces, something that Hitler permitted only begrudgingly, and usually too late. In face of the increasing force of the Allied offensive Rundstedt wanted to withdraw from Caen to the line of the Orne. Hitler again refused to permit any withdrawal. All this interference from Jodl and Hitler resulted in Rundstedt recommending that Hitler relieve him from command. Hitler's decision was probably influenced, as Capt Hart relates, by Rundstedt's sharply worded reply to one of Keitel's telephonic inquiries as to the situation. After hearing the pessimistic report Keitel is said to have asked "what shall we do," to which Rundstedt replied: "End the war!

What else can you do?" Needless to say Rundstedt's request to be relieved was approved. JDH

Pearl Harbor to Halsey — Doolittle Raid . . .

THE RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC — Samuel Eliot Morison, 411 pages, illustrated, charts. Boston: Little Brown and Company. \$6.00

From amidst the welter of words about World War II written chiefly by non-historians, many of whom write with a hurried pen, often cramped by limited glimpses or cabined by official restrictions, it is a welcome relief to read an authoritative work by a professional historian. For such is *The Rising Sun in the Pacific*, Volume III of Prof Samuel Eliot Morison's monumental history of American naval operations in the war. Whereas, the first two volumes of Prof Morison's projected series of 13 volumes dealt with the Atlantic theatre of operations, Volume III is the first of eight volumes that will cover the war in the Pacific, and it details the background of events leading up to the war with Japan, and covers the period of America's purgatory from Pearl Harbor to the Halsey-Doolittle raid.

Prof Morison writes trenchantly and knowingly of his subject, as may well be expected, since the well-known Trumbull Professor of American History at Harvard is both a sailor and a scholar. Presently a captain in the Naval Reserve, he was originally assigned by President Roosevelt in May 1942 to write a naval history of the war. Subsequently he witnessed all the major Navy operations, discussing details with bluejackets and admirals, poring over action reports and war diaries, and combing official Japanese data for authentic records.

In its extraordinarily well informed and detailed passages dealing with the incidents leading up to Pearl Harbor, the reader is constantly reminded of the consciousness of guilt, that must be borne by every American for the gross neglect of their naval establishment which resulted in the treacherous but skillful attack on our Navy. Dr Morison documents what was as plain to commanders and civilians at that time as it is today, that "one may always have peace at some price."

The author does not hedge in assigning the blame. The evidence is inscribed in history. Failure on the part of both the Navy and the Army at all echelons of command to be prepared for the possibility of attack by a potential enemy, at a time that anyone who read the daily papers would be able to discern as a time when war was imminent, is the conclusion that must be reached with regard to the debacle that resulted in the loss of the old Battle Force Pacific Fleet. Failure to estimate the capability of the enemy was the order of the day. Says Dr Morison bluntly, "Although often warned of this manner of thinking, military men are apt to base action upon what they think the enemy will do, rather

than explore and make a correct estimate of everything he can do. No matter what they are told at school or War College they will concentrate on their own ideas of probabilities, and exclude extraneous possibilities."

Prof Morison writes of the subsequent Japanese naval actions with a crisp and incisive appraisal. His treatment of the Japanese plan for the invasion throughout the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere depicts most graphically their development of amphibious tactics, and sketches most realistically the employment of the Japanese version of amphibious warfare in their ambitious conquests. However, it is the opinion of this review that Prof Morison executes a skid into the scuppers of history when he erroneously and gratuitously credits the Japanese with being "the first nation to develop fully the technique of ship-to-shore attack"; surely an accomplishment that they did not possess exclusively. For history does not support the assumption, nor does the footnote to the statement bolster the inference, unless we choose to ignore the significance of the facts that stem from the American Navy's operations at Vera Cruz and Guantanamo Bay where landing troops were integrated into the structure of the fleet. There was marked the beginning of the American acceptance of the theory of the balanced fleet. Marine readers, however, will not be so surprised to learn the fact, twice mentioned in a later chapter by Capt Morison, that the amphibious trained 2d Marine Division was poised in the Pacific area but being held by higher authority for an important objective.

American activity described by the author in the soul-searing months after Pearl Harbor was widespread and varied, extending all over the vast Pacific, and fraught with diverse factors—the loss of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake, the anxious preparations on the part of America for a two-ocean Navy, the heroic attempts to aid the Dutch and the British, the struggle to prevent the Japanese from reaching New Caledonia or Australia—any one of these conceivably might demand a volume in treatment. The author, however, has skillfully chosen the incidents that high-light the progress of these actions and has developed them into such a fascinating and readable narrative that the whole picture is authoritatively chronicled.

Punctuated throughout with gripping passages such as the account of the valiant but neglected drama of the glorious USS *Houston* in the battle of Sunda Strait, which is described as "one of the most gallant episodes in American naval annals," and the tragic falterings of Adm Fletcher's abortive attempt to relieve beleaguered Wake Island, the narrative creates no illusions about the low period in American naval history. But the volume ends with the beginning of the eclipse of the Japanese sun—the event that was the shadow of the darkness to come,—Halsey's carrier raid on Tokyo with Doolittle's Army bombers. This sting of Halsey's *Hornet*, so great a morale

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builder for the American public, was for a long time popularly known as the "Doolittle Raid." Prof Morrison's account brings the naval operation into more proper focus.

Not only as an authoritative reference work, but as engaging literature, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific* indicates that the completed history will be one of the basic records of World War II.

RPMacG

Marksman's Manual ...

HOW TO SHOOT A RIFLE—The National Rifle Association, 62 pages, illustrated. Washington: The Infantry Journal Press. \$1.75

The National Rifle Association has delved into all the resources of its organization to produce this superbly illustrated little book of keen interest to all riflemen.

It appears to be planned primarily for the "Small-bore" shooter who is interested in firing the rifle in competitive matches, but it is a treasury of shooting lore for the beginner and instructor alike since all the fundamentals of rifle shooting are so fully explained and so vividly illustrated. Of particular interest are the chapters entitled "History of the rifle" and "What is the NRA?" and the Glossary which will teach the beginner to talk like an old timer or enlighten the bystander in the slang of the shooting game.

To organizers of "Small-bore" teams and gun clubs *How to Shoot a Rifle* offers valuable suggestions for training new shooters, safety precautions, buying and caring for ammunition and equipment, and the construction of ranges. This book adds little to the average marine's knowledge of the basic fundamentals of rifle marksmanship, but it could be a helpful refresher course before he fires the range again. It is published in magazine form (8½"x11"), and as such is not so handy on the firing line or in a shooting box as it might be if it were in a smaller cloth bound edition.

JM

HQMC Monograph ...

MARINES AT MIDWAY—Historical Section—Division of Public Information—Headquarters USMC. 56 pages, illustrated.

Third in a series of military monographs relating to Marine operations in World War II, *Marines at Midway* represents a further contribution to a growing body of valuable Marine Corps history.

The decisive naval victory achieved by our fleet in the western Pacific in June of 1942 frequently obscures the significance with which the defense of Midway atoll itself was viewed by the American high command. *Marines at Midway* without specifically attempting to do so, develops clearly the vital nature of the local defense of Midway atoll, and then proceeds to illustrate the energetic and