

outstanding library of directives and orders, this book probably is not for you. However, if you feel that the second best way to learn about war is to read about it, and you have a professional interest in fire support coordination and TAC(A) tactics, you may

not want to miss this one. A creative training officer could extract scores of unique training events from this work.

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Harrison keeps you turning the pages long after you should have gone to bed.



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Every Man a Soldier

reviewed by Col John R. Moore

THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By John Keegan. Penguin Books, New York, 1989, 607 pp., \$24.95. (Member \$22.45)

In keeping with the general theme and content of his other books, John Keegan concentrates on the human perspective in his latest book, *The Second World War*. In this endeavor, Keegan describes the war in six sections: The War in the West (1939-43); The War in the East, 1941-43; The War in the Pacific, 1941-43; The War in the West, 1943-45; The War In The East, 1943-45; and The War in the Pacific, 1943-45. He uses four major styles—narrative, strategic analysis, battle piece, and a relevant "theme of war"—to analyze the political, human, strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of the war.

His insights into the major commanders, strategists, and political figures ensure that the war and the book maintain their human perspective. He briefly dissects the human and technical aspects of intelligence, the utility of

special operations, and a philosophical discussion of the use of atomic weapons against Japan. Keegan's prologue also discusses the ramifications of universal conscription, which provided the basic capability to wage modern war.

Keegan raises several penetrating questions about the origins of both world wars. Perhaps, according to Keegan, we should look at what made these wars possible rather than the immediate incidents that preceded them. The rise of Hitler is closely examined against the backdrop of the human issues of militarism and emerging nationalism. Hitler's distrust and suspicion of his generals provide an intriguing sidelight that eventually figures prominently in the war.

The Polish and Russian campaigns are described in tantalizing detail. The use of contemporary pictures meshes well with the flow of the narrative and complements the descriptions given. The blitzkrieg theory of war is examined as is the legacy of World War II for the victors, the losers, and those in between.

The Second World War looks primarily at the war in Europe, particularly on the Eastern Front, while just brushing the surface of Pacific and Asian operations and strategy. Interesting sidelights, such as the theory of strategic bombing, the relative lack of success by resistance movements, the search for revolutionary weapons, and Hitler's use of revenge weapons, seem to compete with the war in the Pacific for coverage in the book. If there is a shortcoming to the book, it is this minimal attention paid to the Pacific and Asian theaters; however, even in 607 pages something must be left out. Additionally, the maps that accompany each section are too detailed, often more detailed than the explanation of the battle in the accompanying text.

In summary, this book offers a good sampling of the issues, the activities, and the events of the Second World War. The book requires an attentive reader and establishes a good point of departure for a more detailed study of the war. As a text on strategy, operations, and tactics, it is quite valuable. It is well worth the money and, more importantly, the time.



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The Naval History of World War II

reviewed by LtCol Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC(Ref)

THE TWO-OCEAN WAR: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. By Samuel E. Morison. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, MA, 1963; Reprint ed., 1990, paperback, 586 pp., \$15.95 (Member \$14.35)

In the opening days of World War II, each of the U.S. Armed Services established historical entities to chronicle the events of this cataclysmic event.

For the Navy, Samuel Eliot Morison (1887-1976), Trumbull professor of history at Harvard University, answered the call. He served throughout the war as a four-striper and was eventually placed on the Navy's retired list as a rear admiral. A prolific researcher and writer, the frontispiece of this volume lists no less than 30 books attributed to his scholarly skills.

Readers of military and naval history—and, according to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, that includes eve-

ryone wearing forest green—must note immediately that *The Two-Ocean War* is, first, a distillation of Morison's exhaustive 15-volume study, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*. Second, this is a paperback reprint of his book first published in 1963; there is no indication that any revision has occurred. Serious readers must wonder, then, why the publisher chose to bring out this fine volume again, especially in light of the scholarship on this subject that has appeared since Morison originally researched and wrote the book.

The author's rendition of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is simplistic at best. As another generation

of historians examine "the day that will live in infamy," they seem less sanguine and comfortable with traditional treatments of the event that propelled America into World War II. The late Gordon Prange's exhaustive study, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*, remains as the most recent and convincing examination of the surprise attack by the Japanese. A useful summary and examination of all literature on the subject can be found in Alvin D. Cox's article, "Repulsing the Pearl Harbor Revisionists: The State of Present Literature on the Debacle," in the January 1986 *Military Affairs*. But Morison did not have access to this exciting material. Moreover, the author never had access to the breathtaking signal intelligence information that contributed so greatly to the Allies' victory over the Axis enemy in World War II.

Of all the venerable naval leaders of World War II, Morison was influenced most by FAdm Ernest J. King. An inscribed photograph of the acerbic Chief of Naval Operations appears in the front of this volume; likenesses of the other naval leaders appear in the center section of the book. Morison, more than most, believed that it was ultimately King who dominated American naval leadership during World

War II and was most responsible for its victories. A visit to the U.S. Naval Academy demonstrates a dichotomy; buildings abound in memory of such notables as Adm Chester W. Nimitz and William F. Halsey, but King's memorial consists only of the Midshipmen Dining Hall.

As the high priest of sea power, Morison would be expected to denigrate the role of the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps and its senior leadership; he does not disappoint his readers. Morison suggests an underlying current of intense inter-Service rivalry, dominating much of the strategic deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Two-Ocean War*, like his multivolume study, is rife with barbed comments regarding Gens George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur.

Despite his training and experience, Morison slips occasionally into hyperbole. For example, after Bataan and Corregidor, "A new band of brotherhood between Americans and Filipinos was forged, and it has never since been surrendered." It would appear that the author's solemn pronouncement in this case has been torn asunder, as the rising financial demands by Philippine President Corazon Aquino and others for the use of American military and naval installations on

Philippine soil grow increasingly shrill. The author's historical detachment appears to be distracted occasionally when he writes:

The [Marine] Corps' first stand-up fight [Guadalcanal] with the much-touted jungle-fighting Jap . . . proved that the American was the better fighting man, even in his enemy's chosen terrain. From that point on, United States Marines were invincible.

In the main, however, Morison holds a historical balance. Criticisms and defeats, appear where warranted: Savo Island was "probably the worst defeat ever inflicted on the United States Navy in a fair fight." Morison defends the U.S. decision to seize the Gilberts in 1943, largely because of the lessons learned. The casualty figures—984 dead Marines and another 2,072 wounded—suggest that the cost exceeded the benefits. Gen Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, among others, declared flatly that the assault of Tarawa was a mistake! The author takes issue with detractors who condemned Adm Raymond A. Spruance's decision on 18 June 1944 not to pursue the withdrawing Japanese force following the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Spruance's primary mission was to cover the American amphibious assault on the Marianas; he was not ordered to destroy the Imperial Fleet in an epic Mahan-like sea battle. Army planners do not escape Morison's critical eye, either. He damns the assault on Salerno, especially the decision to curtail the preassault bombardment in order to achieve tactical surprise. In Morison's view, the decision to land at Anzio was flawed. Finally, the author decries the joint U.S.-Royal Navy decision not to attack the ferries hauling the retreating German forces from Corsica in early Fall 1943.

The author's prose, while pristine and crisp, reflects the writing of an older generation of historians. Morison often writes in the first person, slips into the royal "we," and overuses the verb "to be." These nuances said, this volume is useful chiefly as a relatively inexpensive reference for novice historians and students of American naval history and because his 15-volume work, albeit an early interpretation, has acquired the status of a classic work on American naval history.



>LtCol Bartlett retired in 1983 following an extended tour teaching history at the U.S. Naval Academy. He has continued researching and writing about military history since his retirement.

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