

BOOKS



Book reviews of general military interest are solicited. Rates: \$10.00. Any book listed may be purchased by MCA members from the Gazette Bookservice at reduced rates.

THE BLUE BERETS. The Story of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. By Michael Harbottle. (Stackpole Books, 1972, Harrisburg, Pa. Printed in England, \$7.95.) Members' price: \$7.15.

reviewed by
Maj William A. Moffett III

As the author states, this book concerns the more prominent and memorable peacekeeping efforts that the United Nations has mounted over the last twenty-five years. It briefly describes the causes and effects of each major conflict—Egypt, 1956; Congo, 1960; Cyprus, 1964; West Irian, 1962 and Korea, 1950. The book artfully delineates the conduct of the operations themselves and adds a few basic statistics that help the reader count the cost in terms of peace or war.

BGen Harbottle is well qualified to write the book with authority; he was Chief of Staff of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus from 1966 to 1968. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, he writes the résumé of each conflict in an easy-to-read style.

The chapter on the Egypt operation is of particular poignancy, providing good background for following today's news in the Middle East. It is equally as complete as the chapter on Cyprus, the chapter one would expect the author to devote most of his attention to because of his intimate comprehension of the situation there. He plays no "favorites," however, and is indeed an expert on all the actions he cites.

This is a relatively short book, 157 pages with photos, and is not intended to be a comprehensive educational manual. It is a substantive reference book for those with a bent toward international relations, the objectives of international organizations and the detailed study of "conflict management." Conflict management is one area all leaders and potential leaders in the Corps should be interested in.

The "peaceable intervention," the aim of all UN peacekeeping operations, is hard to grasp for those in the military whose job usually begins after the diplo-

mat's job has failed and whose one objective is to succeed militarily. The UN soldier is also armed but his job is to use his weapon only in self-defense. He is to use the "weapons" of negotiation, reason and quiet diplomacy.

One quote seems to sum up the intent of the author: "The essential qualities of training, discipline and courage are as important to his [the UN soldier's] make-up as to any other soldier of any army; but more than this he requires the intuitive touch of a diplomat, the patience of a Job and the imperturbability of a Buddha, whether he be a private soldier or a Force Commander himself, for negotiations take place at all levels and it is often the success of the most junior rank on the spot that prevents the escalation of a local incident into a larger conflict. It is a role that depends on words rather than deeds for its success and it is in this context that this book should be read."

THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICA. By Guillaume Thomas Francois Raynal, 1713-1796. (1st edition: Edinburgh, 1783; 2nd edition: Gregg Press, Boston, 1972, pp. 191, \$12.00.) Members' price: \$10.80.

THE WINTER SOLDIERS. By Richard M. Ketchum. (Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y., 1973, pp. 435, endnotes, bibliography, index, 6 maps, 61 illustrations, \$10.00.) Members' price: \$9.00.

reviewed by LtCol C. E. Marean Sr., USMCR

The Revolution of America was published for the first time in Edinburgh. This anonymous issue followed by two years a secret London circulation which appeared in 1781. Written a year earlier, the essay afforded Abbé Raynal a convenient vehicle for disclosing the impact that the New World conflict had on the French intellectual. The present edition is an exact photographic copy of the 1783 work. Published in cooperation with the Boston Public Library, it is part of the American Revolutionary Series and will excite the buff.

Although the typeface of the period makes the reading a little difficult, the book is fascinating. Some of the reprints in this series are primary sources, such as the personal accounts of officers and men who participated or the orderly books, i.e., daily diaries. Among the secondary sources, some hold that the American cause would have been lost without French intervention against the British and Hessian regulars. Others aver that the Americans would have been better off without the French.

Raynal, prominent French writer and historian, attempted the objectivity his profession seeks. In discussing the distressed state of England in 1763, he examined the flip side of the record. While observing that it was accepted that the protected were in debt to the protector state, that it was "... wise and just for colonies to come to the assistance of the mother-country," that Americans and British were countrymen, the author also reported grossly unjust gathering and distribution of taxes which led to "... the loss of patriotic sentiment" (toward England) and the creation of a body of "... subjects, corrupted by the government."

This body of subjects included a Virginian well-known for his military experience in dealing with Raynal's countrymen. LtCol Washington had been captured by the French in 1754 near the Allegheny Mountains. Twenty-six years later the Commander-in-Chief and his cause were given sympathetic treatment by the author who, at 67, unfolded his main thesis in this short book: "Europe was decadent . . . and America was the hope of the world and promised regeneration for mankind." His pre-dilected statements of fact, his analyses of the American and British options, the British attitude, the American ambivalence, and French motivation were all amalgamated with an abundance of philosophical discourse. The book is rife with quotable passages on liberty, republicanism, and defense. A book for the collector.

Raynal's statement, that there must be a mutual confidence between "... he who commands and he who obeys," has of course always been axiomatic. The trouble is, reciprocal trust can easily be undermined by insidious influences. Exemplified by readily-named favorites of each reader, some high ranking officers have from time-to-time been victims of peer-group agitation. Ketchum points out in *The Winter Soldiers* that Washington was also the central figure in a dump-the-general movement. In Con-

gress and elsewhere, speculation grew into very serious talk. Washington was to be relieved by the well-trained and experienced, but controversial, MajGen Charles Lee. Fortunately, Lee was captured by twenty-two-year-old "Bloody" Tarleton and six dragoons. Too busy writing his mistress to leave Morristown with his troops, Lee was taken in his nightclothes, alone, on Friday, 13 December 1776. He was exchanged in 1778. His withdrawal from contact with the enemy later that year, in an on-going engagement at Monmouth, led to his court-martial in 1780. With a record of self-serving independent actions and refusal to respond to written orders, Lee died in 1782 calling Washington "... a puffed-up charlatan," according to Ketchum's footnote.

This author fails to display the gravity of the Monmouth situation. Lee's feelings were probably more defensive than peevish. In fact, he had advised Washington against the attack and was mortified to find him on the spot observing. Lee's forces were seen in complete retreat before firing hardly a shot. Ketchum also neglects the confrontation when the C-in-C said, "Whatever your opinion may have been, I expected my orders would have been obeyed." Over-sights of this apparently significant nature are rare. The author is talented in laying hold of the dynamics of inter-relationships and personal motivations. Senior editor with American Heritage, his outstanding job of research lends a tone of accuracy.

On the whole, his book is brimming in detail without being superfluous. His endnotes provide valuable enhancing information on events and sources consulted. Correctly circumscribed, Ketchum's work deals only with the events from the autumn of 1776 to the spring of 1777. His lucid style is spiced with tales of leadership, strategy, and tactical expediency. The author's words practically photograph Washington's command presence and masterful use of fire control when he reverses an imminent rout at Princeton. His depiction of the imperturbable C-in-C yielding a shout of job, in seeing an enemy in full retreat for the first time since the French and Indian war, adds a touch of humor. The writer's descriptive power never fails to hold the attention.

For example, his account of the guerrilla-action retrograde movement in the late fall seems a precursor of Kutuzov's handling of Napoleon in 1812. Bonaparte was to slow down in November snow and leave for Paris the first week

in December. In a string of outposts thirty-six years earlier, the British advance became static (except for several instances of woman and child abuse on 11 December). But the Americans moved. As the enemy were surprised at First Trenton 25-26 December, they were amazed at the second assault on 3 January 1777.


Raynal held that Washington "fell on" Trenton accidentally. Ketchum reveals that the operations were skillfully planned in advance. Moreover, he paints Washington's fox-like withdrawal to Princeton a masterwork of ruse and well-coordinated simplicity in the night march. Raynal articulates the European concept of American terrain as a place where "... lands are almost throughout, bad." The country could not support an army or refit a fleet. This gave the British ministry second thoughts. Ketchum, on the other hand, shows that British/German discipline overcame much adversity—while Washington's troops left for home at the end of their three-month enlistments.

Nearly unstuck, the American cause remained fixed primarily in Washington's determination, ability to take the long view, and an uncanny capacity to be challenged by near catastrophe. Ketchum's novelistic form provides compelling reading. He jars us in relating what happened when Gen Washington faced the troops asking for volunteers to ship-over for an extra six weeks; illuminates us by spotlighting an American statesman of later years as a lieuten-

ant commanding one of Henry Knox's batteries. The description of POW conditions is disturbing; in learning about Washington's sound use of a mobile reserve (the "Flying Camp"), we are satisfied. He intrigues us with riverine operations: British plans to hold the waterways, failure of a Hessian amphibious landing due to tidal waters, a successful amphibious turning movement by Adm Richard and his brother Gen William Howe, the saving of Washington's whole army by crossing the Hudson in the fog, and the significance in the campaign of another ten-odd rivers and creeks.

Portraying the loyalists' precarious position once the British system of enclaves was dissolved, the author puts the impact of occupation precisely into perspective by quoting one of the patriots: "Resentment coinciding with principle is a very powerful motive." Too numerous to list, Ketchum seasons his narrative with an abundance of biographical sketches and some material from primary sources. From event to event, a smooth continuity is maintained. He discusses politics, alliances, attitudes, and personalities. With a clear grasp of the demands of weather and terrain, he examines logistics, tactics and troop movements in an easy-to-follow manner. Maps are well placed. Ketchum's painstaking character studies, with his focus on Washington, are a real strength. Highly recommended for the general reader.

USMC



**The Check
honored around
the world.**