‘The Path to Glory is Rough’: The Causes and Course of the Black Hawk War, 1804–1832

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Rivalries, Allies, Histories & Cultures that Shaped the Black Hawk War

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"The Path to Glory is Rough"[1]: The Causes and Course of the Black Hawk War, 1804-1832

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The Black Hawk War has been of great interest to scholars and the general public since 1832. Participants and observers, including the Sauk leader Black Hawk, penned the earliest books on the war. These works assigned blame for the conflict on either Black Hawk and the Indians who followed him or their foes: land-hungry white settlers and their political allies. Other works appeared throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that relied more on primary sources such as letters and journals, but these generally restated the interpretive frameworks found in the earlier histories.[2] In the latter half of the twentieth century, the intersection of cultural anthropology and history produced works that examined the war from the standpoint of tribal politics. Rather than casting blame for the instigation of the war, scholars

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[1] Quoted in Black Hawk, *Life of Ma-Ka-Tai-Me-She-Kia-Kiak or Black Hawk*, J.B. Patterson, ed. (Cincinnati: n.p., 1833), viii (qtd. viii). The original 1833 version of Black Hawk's autobiography has been reprinted many times. Donald Jackson's 1955 edition is still widely used by scholars and will be cited throughout the remainder of this essay. For the initial citation of this work, see note 2 below.

[2] For the earliest works, see Black Hawk, *Black Hawk, An Autobiography*, Donald Jackson, ed. (1833; reprint edition, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955); John Wakefield, *History of the War between the United States and the Sac and Fox Nations* (Jacksonville, Ill.: Calvin Goudy, 1834); Benjamin Drake, *The Life and Adventures of Black Hawk* (Cincinnati: G. Conclin, 1838); Thomas Ford, *A History of Illinois* (Chicago: C.S. Griggs, 1854); and John Reynolds, *My Own Times; Embracing also a History of My Life* (Belleville, Ill.: B.H. Perryman and H.L. Davison, 1855). For works written during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Perry Armstrong, *The Sauks and the Black Hawk War, With Biographical Sketches, Etc.* (Springfield, Ill.: H.W. Rokker, 1887); Reuben G. Thwaites, "The Story of the Black Hawk War," in *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, Lyman C. Draper, et al., eds., 20 vols. (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1855-1931), 12:217-265 (this collection hereafter cited as *WHC*); Frank Stevens, *The Black Hawk War* (Chicago: Blakely Printing Company, 1903); Jacob Van der Zee, "The Black Hawk War and the Treaty of 1832," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 13 (July 1915): 416-428; John H. Hauberg, "The Black Hawk War, 1831-1832," in *Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, 1932* (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Society, 1932), 91-134; Cyrenus Cole, *I Am a Man: The Indian Black Hawk* (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1938); Joseph Lambert, "The Black Hawk War: A Military Analysis," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 32 (December 1939): 442-473; and Cecil Eby *"That Disgraceful Affair," The Black Hawk War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973). For an historiographical assessment of these works, see Roger L. Nichols, "The Black Hawk War in Retrospect," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 65 (Summer 1982): 239-246.

focused on the conflict between Black Hawk, who led the anti-removal faction of the confederated tribes of the Sauks and Meskwakis (also known as Foxes), and his rival, Keokuk, who led the treaty-abiding faction that advocated removal westward (albeit reluctantly) to avoid conflict.[3] In the past two decades, historians have examined the cultural changes evident in the regional Native societies before the Black Hawk War as well as the participation of other Indian nations in the conflict such as the Menominees and Ho-Chunks (also known as Winnebagos).[4]

Thus, the story of the Black Hawk War has been told many times but still presents new questions. This essay examines the causes that brought about the conflict. The 1804 Sauk and Meskwaki treaty stands as the principal cause, for the United States in this year stole fifteen million acres of land from the two tribes. Many Sauks, and to a lesser degree Meskwakis, also embraced an ideology of nativist resistance that reached its height during the War of 1812, a conflict that provided a template for later Indian opposition, especially the duel strategies of pan-tribal cooperation and alliance with the British in Canada. The 1832 Black Hawk War was evidence of this continued nativist sentiment, as was the earlier 1827 Winnebago Uprising led by the Ho-Chunk leader Wanukchouti, or Red Bird. However, the ideological forces and military

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[3] For these works, see William Hagan, *The Sac and Fox Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958); P. Richard Metcalf, "Who Should Rule at Home? Native American Politics and Indian-White Relations," *Journal of American History* 61 (December 1974): 651-665; Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster: The Course of Indian-White Relations Which Led to the Black Hawk War of 1832," in *The Black Hawk War, 1831-1832*, Ellen M. Whitney, ed., 2 vols., *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library*, vols. 35-38 (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1970-1978), 1:1-51 (this collection hereafter cited as *BHW*); and Roger L. Nichols, *Black Hawk and the Warrior's Path* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1992).

[4] In particular, see Kerry A. Trask, *Black Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006); Patrick J. Jung, *The Black Hawk War of 1832* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); John W. Hall, *Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); and Libby Tronnes, "Corn Moon Migrations: Ho-Chunk Belonging, Removal, and Return in the Early Nineteenth-Century Western Great Lakes" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2017). For an historiographic assessment of these works, see Roger L. Nichols, "Black Hawk and the Historians: A Review Essay," *Annals of Iowa* 75 (Winter 2016): 61-70.

strategies that had allowed the Indian societies of the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley and their British allies to achieve victories against the United States during the War of 1812 were not strong enough to bring about similar successes after this conflict ended in 1815, particularly since Britain's withdrawal denied Indian societies the services of a crucial ally. In fact, the Native societies of the region often resorted to anonymous resistance as an alternative to open forms of rebellion such as warfare; in the case of the Winnebago Uprising, anonymous forms of resistance preceded acts of war. The escalation of intertribal warfare in the 1820s and 1830s also produced a system of alliances that not only prevented Black Hawk from consolidating Indian support but led to more Indians fighting against him than with him.

The ideological forces that produced the Black Hawk War had emerged about a century earlier. During the eighteenth century, the Indian societies of the Trans-Appalachian West experienced what Gregory Dowd calls an "awakening" of nativist spirit. The tribes developed a nascent sense of common identity and the strategy of intertribal cooperation to counter domination by the imperial powers, particularly Britain and later the United States. Indian prophets often arose who mixed Native and Christian beliefs to bring about cultural renewal within their societies. The teachings of these prophets often encouraged opposition to Euro-American culture in general and United States expansion in particular. The nativist movement reached its zenith during the era of the War of 1812 with the rise of the Shawnee leader Tecumseh and his brother, Tenskwatawa, or the Shawnee Prophet. Even during this period, the broader nativist movement rarely appealed to the majority of Indians in any native society. Most Shawnees rejected the message of Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet and remained neutral during the conflict, while those Shawnees under Black Hoof actively assisted the United States. The same was true of the Potawatomis under Gomo who resisted the leadership of Main Poc, a

Potawatomi seer who preached a message similar to that of Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet but remained independent of their movement. Like the Shawnees and Potawatomis, a significant number of Sauks also chose to remain neutral, and about a one-quarter of the tribe removed to the Missouri River to avoid taking sides in the conflict.[5]

The nativist movement also had little influence among the tribes of the northern Great Lakes such as the Menominees and Odawas (or Ottawas). Nevertheless, their strong ties to the British fur trade ensured those communities' alliance with Great Britain during the War of 1812. Only the Ho-Chunks became zealous adherents of the broader nativist movement in this region, and they formed the core support for Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet. Yet, many Ho-Chunks abandoned Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet after suffering significant casualties at the Battle of Tippecanoe in November 1811. With the cessation of hostilities in 1815, the nativist movements in the southern Great Lakes and Ohio Valley largely collapsed with the deaths of leaders such as Tecumseh and Main Poc. Those nativist factions that had fought against the United States in the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley, on the other hand, retained the will to fight despite the cessation of hostilities.[6]

The participation of the Sauks and Meskwakis during the War of 1812 illustrates both the extent and limits of this ideology that sought to stem the tide of American expansion. Officially,

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[5] Gregory Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 23-190; Jonathan Todd Hancock, "Widening the Scope on the Indians' Old Northwest," in *Warring for America: Cultural Contests in the Era of 1812*, Nicole Eustace and Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Williamsburg: Omohundro Institute, 2017), 359-385; R. David Edmunds, "'A Watchful Safeguard to Our Habitations': Black Hoof and the Loyal Shawnees," in *Native Americans and the Early Republic*, Frederick Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter Albert, eds. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999), 162-199; James Clifton, *The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 213-214; Patrick J. Jung, "Toward the Black Hawk War: The Sauk and Fox Indians and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 38 (Spring 2012): 33.

[6] Timothy D. Willig, *Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Great Lakes, 1783-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 206-242, 262-264.

the Sauk and Meskwaki leadership had pledged neutrality in the conflict, but the loose nature of Native governance meant younger warriors often eschewed the decisions of tribal councils. Ultimately, many Sauks and Meskwakis joined the British and other Indian allies during the War of 1812, in part because the United States was unable to keep its promise to adequately provide these societies with the trade goods necessary to maintain their economies.[7] In July 1814, between 400 and 700 Sauk and Meskwaki warriors attacked an American relief column ascending the Mississippi River enroute to Prairie du Chien. In September 1814, another relief column encountered an even larger force of about 1,000 warriors—Sauks, Meskwakis, Kickapoos, Ho-Chunks, and Dakotas (also known as Santee Sioux)—near the Sauk village of Saukenuk along the Mississippi. While these numbers seem considerable, those engaged in these battles did not constitute the majority of the Sauks' available manpower. The Sauks possessed about 1,000 able-bodied men during the War of 1812, and, given these numbers, only twenty-five to forty percent of the Sauks' warriors engaged in combat against the United States.[8]

Still, these numbers also indicate the Sauks possessed many tribal members whose participation in the war shaped their notions of contesting the policies of the United States in the

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[7] Nicolas Boilvin to William Clark, 25 July 1813, in William Clark Papers, vol. 2, pp 4-12, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka (hereafter cited as Clark MSS; references are to volume and page numbers); John Johnson to Clark, 25 July 1813, Clark MSS, 2:17-18; Jung, "Toward the Black Hawk War," 39-40.

[8] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 88; William McKay to Robert McDouall, 27 July 1814, *WHC*, 11:269-270; Jung, "Toward the Black Hawk War," 43-44. For the population of the Sauks and the number of warriors in the tribe, see Jeanne Kay, "The Fur Trade and Native American Population Growth," *Ethnohistory* 31 (Autumn 1984): 266, 275-277. For the numbers of warriors present at the two battles along the Mississippi, see Benjamin Howard to Benjamin Armstrong, 1 August 1814, in *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, Clarence E. Carter and John P. Bloom, eds., 28 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934-1975), 17:3-8 (hereafter cited as *TPUS*); *Missouri Gazette* (St. Louis, Mo.), 30 July 1814; Zachary Taylor, "Zachary Taylor in Illinois," Holman Hamilton, ed., *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 34 (March 1941): 84-91; Thomas Anderson, "Anderson's Journal at Fort McKay, 1814," *WHC*, 9:213-226; Duncan Graham to Anderson, 7 September 1814, *WHC*, 9:226-228; and *Missouri Gazette and Illinois Advertiser* (St. Louis, Mo.), 17 September 1814. I have further developed this argument in an unpublished paper. See Patrick J. Jung, "The Echoes of War: Indian Resistance in the Post-War of 1812 Era," delivered at *Enemies to Allies: An International Conference on the War of 1812 and Its Aftermath*, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, June 13, 2013.

period after the conflict. Superintendant of Indian Affairs William Clark, who gained fame earlier as a member of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, estimated in 1831 that one-sixth of the Sauks remained hostile to the United States.[9] Black Hawk had participated in several battles against the United States during the conflict, and in the 1820s, he became the leader of those Sauks (as well as Mesquakis and Kickapoos) who sought to resist American expansion into their homelands. While the War of 1812 may have deepened this ideology among the Sauks, it originated in the policies of the United States toward Native communities. Under the earlier French and British regimes, the various Indian nations enjoyed a great deal of political, cultural, and economic autonomy, such that the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley constituted a "Native Ground" whereby the Indians shaped their relationships with the imperial powers in a manner to their liking.[10] The United States, unlike the French and British, sought to remove the Indians from their homelands and replace them with white settlers and territorial governments that would eventually become states. The resident tribes had witnessed this process of forced removal among the Indian nations of the Ohio Valley a generation earlier, and this, along with their participation in the War of 1812, bred distrust toward the United States. Black

[9] William Clark to John Eaton, 17 January 1831, in Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Microfilm Publication M-234, reel 749, frame 1126, Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as M-234; references are to reel and frame numbers; this archives hereafter cited as NA).

[10] In the 1990s, Richard White argued this region constituted a "Middle Ground" whereby the imperial powers maintained a balance of power vis-à-vis the various Indian tribes. See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50-93, 269-314, 473; and Susan Sleeper-Smith, "The Middle Ground Revisited: Introduction," *William and Mary Quarterly* 63 (January 2006): 3-8. For more recent works that stress Native predominance, see Kathleen Duval, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 5-12; Michael Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 114-139; Brett Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France* (Williamsburg: Omohundro Institute, 2012), 192-207; and Michael A. McDonnell, *Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015), 14-19, 337n23-338n23. The concept of the Native Ground is more relevant to the French and British periods as the Native societies clearly had exercised the bulk of political, economic, and military power in the region.

Hawk, for example, asserted, "we had always heard bad accounts of the Americans from Indians who had lived near them!"[11]

The United States did not put this program into effect in the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley immediately after the War of 1812; the project that historians label settler colonialism did not begin in earnest until the late 1820s. The federal government had virtually no presence in this region before the War of 1812, and it lacked the means to establish hegemony over the Native societies in the years following the conflict. Instead, it established a series of accommodations in a manner similar to the French and British. Before the region opened for settlement, the U.S. Army often removed illegal white squatters from Indian lands and punished those who committed violence against Native persons, albeit sporadically and inconsistently. These actions, despite their shortcomings, resulted in a stable, if sometimes tenuous relationship between the United States and the regional tribes.[12]

The Sauks, and to a lesser degree the Meskwakis, were less amenable to these efforts due to the 1804 treaty they had signed with the federal government. The second article of the treaty ceded almost the entire western half of present-day Illinois and southwestern Wisconsin to the United States. The tribes had not authorized the treaty delegation to sell any land, but the delegates did so in order to gain a pardon from the acting territorial governor, William Henry Harrison, for a Sauk prisoner held for murder at St. Louis. The evidence suggests the delegates knew they had sold some land in exchange for the pardon, but they did not know the full extent of the cession and did not believe it involved any lands north of the Rock River where the tribes'

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[11] Walter L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4-17; Bethel Saler, *The Settlers' Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America's Old Northwest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 25-29, 41-82, 87; quoted in Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 58 (qtd. 58).

[12] Hall, *Uncommon Defense*, 37-69.

main villages stood. There is little doubt that Harrison lied to the delegation concerning the extent of the land cession; he kept no journal of the proceedings (a significant deviation from the standard practice of the time), and the delegates lacked the authority to transfer such a sizeable tract. One of the Sauk delegates, a chief named Quashquame, later stated that he and the other delegates believed they had only sold small amounts of land on the western and eastern banks of the Mississippi in the region north of St. Louis. This area had been used as hunting grounds and did not contain any permanent village sites.[13]

The true extent of the cession gradually became known among the Sauks and Meskwakis. In July 1815, several Sauks told William Clark that their tribe "would never consent to relinquish the lands which they had ceded" to the United States, and in 1817, the Meskwakis told a federal Indian agent they would "live on roots rather than part with their lands."[14] While some Sauks and Meskwakis definitely knew the 1804 treaty had involved a land sale, as late as 1818, many tribal members had assumed the annuity goods they received from the federal government were simply presents rather than payments for land. By the 1820s, an increased number of Sauks and Meskwakis began to understand that the 1804 treaty included lands north of the Rock River.

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[13] Hagan, *Sac and Fox*, 16-25; Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 21; Treaty with the Sauks and Foxes, 3 November 1804, in *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, Charles Kappler, ed., 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903-1904), 2:74 (hereafter cited as *IALT*); Charles Royce, "Indian Land Cessions in the United States," in *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 666. For sources that demonstrate the Sauks and Meskawkis knew the 1804 treaty ceded at least some land to the United States, see Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 61-63, 61n-64n, 111; Thomas Forsyth, Original Causes of the Troubles with the Sauk and Fox, 1 October 1832, in Thomas Forsyth Papers, series T, vol. 9, pp 54-59, Lyman C. Draper Manuscript Collection, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin (hereafter cited as follows, Forsyth MSS, 9T:54-56; this archives hereafter cited as WHS); James Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, 27 July 1805, *TPUS*, 13:168; James Many to Wilkinson, 20 May 1806, *TPUS*, 13:513; Boilvin to William Eustis, 11 February 1811, *TPUS*, 14:439-440; Felix St. Vrain to William Clark, 28 May 1831, *BHW*, 2:21; Talks between Edmund Gaines and the Sauk, 4-7 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:28; and George Davenport to Joseph Duncan, 11 February 1832, *BHW*, 2:211. For the village sites of the two tribes, see Helen H. Tanner, ed., *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 98-100.

[14] Quoted in Clark, et al., to William Crawford, 16 July 1815, in *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1834), 2:8 (qtd. 8; hereafter cited as *ASP:IA*); quoted in Forsyth to Clark, 3 June 1817, *WHC*, 11:348 (qtd. 348).

Sauk leaders noted in 1821 that the treaty delegation had never intended to sell land north of the Rock River, and several chiefs, including Quashquame, repeated this argument throughout the 1820s. Even by 1830, William Clark noted that many Sauks and Meskwakis still did not fully comprehend the extent the cession. The 1804 treaty allowed the two tribes to continue residing on the ceded land until it was put up for sale. When this process began in the late 1820s, the federal government stepped up efforts to remove the Sauks and Meskwakis. Not surprisingly, the two tribes became more vocal about the illegitimacy of the cession. Black Hawk later asserted the 1804 treaty "has been the origin of all our difficulties."[15]

Other treaties reinforced this mistrust. The Treaty of Ghent ended the War of 1812 and required the United States to restore Britain's Indian allies to all rights and possessions they held before the war. Federal commissioners invited the tribes to Portage des Sioux in present-day Missouri to conclude peace treaties, but the Sauks and Meskwakis sent only low-ranking warriors who treated the commissioners with contempt and possessed no authority to negotiate a treaty. The Sauks and Meskwakis finally decided to make peace and sent appropriate delegations to Portage des Sioux, the Meskwakis in the autumn of 1815 and the Sauks in the spring of 1816. Black Hawk attended and signed the treaty. The commissioners told neither him nor any of the delegates that by signing, they accepted the 1804 land cession. The Meskwaki treaty contained a similar provision. Black Hawk later stated, "Here, for the first time, I touched the goose quill to the treaty—not knowing, however, that, by that act, I consented to give away my village."[16]

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[15] William Jones, "Notes on the Fox Indians," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 10 (January 1912): 108-110; Forsyth, Original Causes of the Troubles, 1 October 1832, Forsyth MSS, 9T:55-57; Sauk and Fox Chiefs to Forsyth, September 1821, Forsyth MSS, 4T:110; Forsyth to Clark, 24 May 1828, M-234, 749:1212; Forsyth to Clark, 17 May 1829, Forsyth MSS, 6T:97-98; Clark, Indian Council with Keokuk, 27 March 1830, M-234, 749:1229; Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 23-24, 27-30; quoted in Black Hawk, *Autobiography,* 62 (qtd. 62).

[16] Robert Fisher, "The Treaties of Portage des Sioux," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 19 (March 1933): 495-503; James Monroe to Clark, et al., 11 March 1815, *ASP:IA*, 2:6; Forsyth to Secretary of War, 30 April 1815, *WHC*, 11:338; Clark, et al., to Monroe, 22 May 1815, *ASP:IA*, 2:7; Forsyth to Commissioners, 30 May 1815, *WHC*,

Further aggravating tensions in 1816 was the arrival of the U.S. Army, which constituted the first wave of Americans in the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley. The regional Indians as well as the British believed the ninth article of the Treaty of Ghent prohibited the United States from establishing military posts on Indian lands where they had not existed before the War of 1812. Thus, the Native societies saw the post-war occupation as an illegitimate invasion of their homelands. A British officer in Canada noted the Indians "have gone so far as to ask our assistance...to enable them to oppose the projects of the American Government to form Military Establishments in their Territory."[17]

Other factors also encouraged the Sauks, Meskwakis, and other regional tribes to maintain skepticism concerning the United States. While the War of 1812 was the final chapter in the imperial struggle for control of the Old Northwest, this was not so apparent in the years immediately following the conflict, and the United States and Britain retained a large measure of suspicion toward each other. American attempts to conquer Canada during the war led British authorities to maintain strong ties with the Indian communities on the American side of the border in case they would be needed again as allies to defend Canada. The main bases for British

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11:340-341; Boilvin to Secretary of War, 11 January 1816, *TPUS*, 17:282; Clark, et al., to Secretary of War, 11 July 1815, *ASP:IA*, 2:8-9; Clark, et al., to Secretary of War, 16 July 1815, *ASP:IA*, 2:8; Clark, et al., to Secretary of War, 18 September 1815, *ASP:IA*, 2:9; Clark, et al., to Secretary of War, 18 October 1815, *ASP:IA*, 2:10; *Missouri Gazette and Illinois Advertiser*, 8 July 1815; Treaty with the Foxes, 14 September 1815, *IALT*, 2:212-222; Treaty with the Sauk, 13 May 1816, *IALT*, 2:126-228; quoted in Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 98 (qtd. 98).

[17]McDouall's [misspelled as McDonall in this collection] speech to the Different Indian Nations, 28 June 1815, in *Collections of the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society*, J.C. Holmes, et al., eds., 40 vols. (Lansing: Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 1877-1929), 16:194-195 (hereafter cited as *MPHC*); Speech of McKay, 29 June 1815, *MPHC*, 16:480-484; McDouall to unknown, 7 August 1816, *MPHC*, 16:509-512; Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), 169-171; A. J. Dallas to Jacob Brown, 22 May 1815, in Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Microfilm Publication M-6, reel 8, vol. 8, pp 106-107, Record Group 107, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, NA (hereafter cited as M-6; references are to reel, volume, and page numbers); Dallas to Andrew Jackson, 22 May 1815; M-6, 8:8:107-108; *Missouri Gazette*, 15 June 1816; William Armstrong to Samuel Armstrong, 8 June 1816, in William Armstrong Papers, file 1814, June 11, box 122, folder 16, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison; William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, 20 June 1816, *WHC*, 19:421-422; quoted in G. H. Monk to Robinson, 13 July 1816, *MPHC*, 16:489 (qtd. 489).

operations after 1815 were Fort Malden opposite Detroit and a series of posts in the northern Great Lakes. For the next two decades, thousands of Indians from the United States flocked to these posts each spring to receive presents and hear speeches that urged them to continue their allegiance to Great Britain. Often, two hundred or more Sauks, many under the leadership of Black Hawk, visited these posts each year.[18] British agents in Canada had to walk a fine line, for they had to keep the tribes within Britain's diplomatic orbit without encouraging them to initiate another war with the United States. British agents patiently listened as the Indians detailed the injustices they suffered under American sovereignty. The British held out the promise of future military aid in the event of another conflict, but they also counseled restraint. The British did not desire another war with the United States, but they believed another conflict might be on the horizon. This resulted in ambiguous messages that were often open to interpretation. Warriors and chiefs who harbored hostility toward the United States often read more into these speeches than British agents intended, and this gave the Indians hope that renewed hostilities with the United States would commence and be accompanied by British aid.[19]

A final cause of Native hostility toward the United States was the burgeoning number of

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[18] For British suspicions of the United States and the need for Indian allies, see McDouall to Secretary Foster, 15 May 1815, *MPHC*, 16:103-105; McDouall to unknown, 7 August 1816, *MPHC*, 16:512; Catherine Sims, "Algonkian-British Relations in the Upper Great Lakes Region: Gathering to Give and Receive Presents, 1815-1843" (Ph.D. diss., University of Western Ontario, 1992), 1, 44-47, 55-64, 85-91, 136-137; and Colin G. Calloway, "The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 12 (Fall 1986): 6, 17-19. Also see Gordon Drummond to Bathurst, 27 August 1815, *MPHC*, 25:631-632; McDouall to unknown, 19 June 1816, *MPHC*, 16:468-469; Return of the Indians of Upper and Lower Canada, *MPHC*, 23:108; Speech of Lieutenant Colonel McKay, 29 June 1816, *MPHC*, 26:479-485; William Puthuff to Lewis Cass, 20 August 1817, *WHC*, 19:472; Extract from the Commissioner's Report, 9 September 1825, *MPHC*, 23:443; Names of Indian Tribes Usually Visiting Drummond Island, 22 August 1828, *MPHC*, 23:151; Calloway, "End of an Era," 12-19; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 110, 119; Forsyth to Clark, 3 June 1817, *WHC*, 11:349-350.

[19] McDouall's Speech, 28 June 1815, *MPHC*, 16:192; Speech of McDouall, 17 September 1815, *MPHC*, 16:273-275; McDouall to unknown, 7 August 1816, *MPHC*, 16:508-512; Forsyth to Clark, 25 August 1826, Forsyth MSS, 4T:260; Thomas Anderson, Remarks on Four Leg's Speech, 13 July 1828, *MPHC*, 23:147-148; Anderson to McKay, 20 July 1828, *MPHC*, 23:148-150; Minutes of a Speech by Mayocantay the Winnebago Chief, 30 June 1830, *MPHC*, 23:144-147; Sims, "Algonkian-British Relations," 81-89.

whites who mined lead on Indian lands in the upper Mississippi Valley. Lead miners constituted another wave of white settlement in the region after the War of 1812. The Native societies had known of the rich ore deposits even before the coming of the French, and American miners entered the area as early as 1811. By the 1820s, the federal government began granting leases to white miners who wanted to take part in the growing lead trade centered around Galena, Illinois. Soon, miners crept up the tributaries of the Fever (now the Galena) River and set up mining operations. The population of the Fever River district exploded from 150 in 1825 to 1,500 by the end of 1826. Many of the tribes, particularly the Ho-Chunks and Meskwakis, mined lead in this area and often exchanged their ore for trade goods.[20] The federal government set aside certain areas for white miners, but these parcels were based on a faulty understanding of which tribes had claims to these lands and thus were of dubious legality. By the late 1820s, white miners flaunted even these ill-conceived boundaries and openly began to extract ore on lands that unequivocally belonged to the Ho-Chunks. Neither federal Indian agents nor regional military commanders did anything to remove these trespassers despite strong Ho-Chunk protests. Lead miners also exhibited the rabidly anti-Indian attitudes characteristic of white frontier residents and frequently committed unprovoked acts of violence against the Ho-Chunks. They also supplied the Ho-Chunks with whiskey, which further aggravated tensions and spurred violence.[21]

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[20] Reuben G. Thwaites, "Notes on Early Lead Mining in the Fever (Or Galena) River Region," *WHC*, 13:271-292; Duane Everhart, "The Leasing of Mineral Lands in Illinois and Wisconsin," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 60 (Summer 1967): 117-123; Martin Thomas to George Bomford, 30 September 1826, in *Message from the President of the United States...in Relation to the Lead Mines Belonging to the United States*, 19th Cong., 2nd sess., 1826, Ho. Exec. Doc. 7 (Serial 149), 8; John Marsh to Cass, 20 November 1826, in Records of the Michigan Superintendency of Indian Affairs, 1814-1851, Microfilm Publication M-1, reel 19, frame 106, Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, NA (hereafter cited as M-1; references are to reel and frame numbers); Herbert Kuhm, "The Mining and Use of Lead by the Wisconsin Indians," *Wisconsin Archeologist* 32 (June 1951): 25-31; Janet Spector, "Winnebago Indians and Lead Mining: A Case Study of the Ethnohistoric Approach in Archaeology," *Midcontinental Journal of Archaeology* 2 (1977): 131-137.

[21] Lucy E. Murphy, *A Gathering of Rivers: Indians, Métis, and Mining in the Western Great Lakes, 1737-1832* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 80-86, 101-128, 152; John C. Calhoun to Forsyth, 14 February 1822, Forsyth MSS, 5T:11-13; Forsyth to Calhoun, 24 June 1822, Forsyth MSS, 6T:5-6; Cass and Thomas McKenney to James Barbour, August 1827, in *Letter...Transmitting a Report of Gov. Cass and Col. McKenney on the Subject of*

On the western bank of the Mississippi, the Meskwakis suffered similar trespasses at Dubuque's Mines, which they had long guarded from the covetous eyes of whites on the opposite shore. The first incursion of white miners came in May 1830 when the Meskwakis abandoned the area due to attacks by the Dakotas and Menominees, both of whom were enemies of the Sauks and Meskwakis. White miners on the eastern bank of the river heard of the Meskwakis' absence, rushed in, and mined and smelted lead ore. By early June, about one hundred whites illegally occupied Dubuque's Mines, and William Clark sent federal troops to remove them.[22] The Meskwakis abandoned the site again the next year when threatened by Dakota attacks, and the army, hoping to prevent a replay of the previous year's events, sent a permanent military detachment to keep whites from overrunning Dubuque's Mines.[23]

The earlier nativist movement, the duplicity of the federal government in its negotiation of the 1804 and 1816 treaties, the continued diplomatic ties with the British, and the invasions of white soldiers and miners onto Indian lands all combined to reinforce and intensify hostility toward the United States among the various factions within the Native communities of the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley. The Ho-Chunks were the first to develop an

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the Complaints of the Winnebago Indians, &c, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1828, Ho. Doc. 117 (Serial 171), 5-6; Thomas to Bomford, 30 September 1827, in *In Relation to the Lead Mines of the United States*, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1828, Ho. Doc. 45 (Serial 170), 7-8; Joseph Street to Secretary of War, 15 November 1827, M-234, 696:42-49

[22] Lucius H. Langworthy, "Dubuque: Its History, Mines, Indian Legends, Etc., By Lucius H. Langworthy," John Parish, ed., *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 8 (July 1910): 371-372; Lucius H. Langworthy, "Autobiographical Sketch of Lucius H. Langworthy," John Parish, ed., *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 8 (July 1910): 321; Wyncoop Warner to Forsyth, 3 June 1830, in *Correspondence on the Subject of the Emigration of the Indians*, 23rd Cong., 1st sess., 1834, Sen. Doc. 512 (Serial 245), 64 (hereafter cited as Sen. Doc. 512 along with the relevant volume serial number); Clark to McKenney, 16 June 1830, M-234, 696:247-248; Clark to McKenney, 19 June 1830, Sen. Doc. 512 (Serial 245), 68; Clark to Andrew Jackson, 21 July 1830, Clark MSS, 4:141.

[23] William Williamson to Clark, 10 September 1830, Clark MSS, 6:1-2; Willoughby Morgan to P.G. Randolph, 23 July 1831, M-234, 728:160-62; Jacob Van der Zee, "Early History of Lead Mining in the Iowa Country," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 13 (January 1915): 44-46; Jefferson Davis, "A Letter by Jefferson Davis," Charles Aldrich, ed., *Annals of Iowa* 4 (October 1899): 230-232; Davenport to Duncan, 11 February 1832, Sen. Doc. 512 (Serial 246), 221-223.

explicit program of opposition to the United States and its rapacious, land-hungry population that was evident in the years preceding the War of 1812. Most members of the tribe eagerly accepted the teachings of Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet and joined them at Prophetstown, the Shawnee Prophet's village in present-day Indiana. William Henry Harrison stated in 1810 that the Ho-Chunks constituted the Shawnee brothers' principal strength, and according to one old Ho-Chunk chief, his young men "breathed nothing but war against the United States."[24] This prophecy came to fruition the next year when Ho-Chunk warriors at Prophetstown initiated a skirmish that resulted in the Battle of Tippecanoe on November 7, 1811.[25]

When the War of 1812 ended, many Ho-Chunks were reluctant to make peace with the United States. Only one village band of the Wisconsin River signed a treaty of peace at Portage des Sioux in 1816. The Ho-Chunks as well as members of other tribes eventually realized it was pointless to continue fighting and abandoned warfare as a means of arresting American expansion. The Ho-Chunks did not reject the notion of challenging United States hegemony; they simply engaged in new tactics in the absence of warfare. They turned instead to anonymous acts of resistance that required fewer resources and allowed for greater flexibility and security than armed insurrection. Ranajit Guha and James C. Scott have produced the most significant works on anonymous forms of resistance, which, they argue, are ideological in their origins and serve as a instruments of dissent when more active (and public) means such as warfare are not possible. Anonymous resistance often precedes—and provides segues for—more active modes

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[24] Harrison to Secretary of War, 25 April 1810, in *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*, Logan Esarey, ed., 2 vols., *Indiana Historical Collections,* vols. 7 and 9 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922), 1:417 (hereafter cited as *WHH*); Harrison to Secretary of War, 14 June 1810, *WHH*, 1:427; Harrison to Secretary of War, 25 July 1810, *WHH*, 1:449; quoted in Harrison to Secretary of War, 28 August 1810, *WHH*, 1:471 (qtd. 471).

[25] Matthew Elliot to Isaac Brock, 12 January 1812, *WHH*, 1:616-618; Harrison to Secretary of War, 13 May 1812, *WHH*, 2:49; Jonathan Askin, Jr., to Louis Grignon, 28 January 1814, *WHC*, 10:101; Louise Kellogg, *The British Régime in Wisconsin and the Northwest* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1935), 272, 276-279, 289, 295, 304.

of opposition such as warfare, as it did for the Ho-Chunks in 1827. Anonymous resistance, according to Scott, includes "foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth."[26]

If federal policies centered on settler colonialism gave Indian communities the ideology required to commit anonymous acts of resistance, the Native culture of warfare provided the means. The Indian culture of war in the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley depended to large degree on the element of surprise and tactics such as raids an ambushes. Indian communities were warrior societies that celebrated the victories of their war parties in battle, and Indian men gained social prestige through warfare. As every Indian warrior was also a hunter and provider, Indian war parties sought to minimize casualties and withdrew from battle when faced with a numerically superior foe. Native societies also distinguished between national wars and private wars. Tribal councils authorized national wars, which had larger strategic goals and consisted of hundreds and even thousands of warriors. Small parties of fewer than one hundred and sometimes fewer than a dozen men conducted private wars, often against the wishes of tribal councils that lacked the coercive mechanisms required to stop younger warriors, eager to gain recognition, from engaging in private warfare. Anonymous acts of resistance carried out by private war parties constituted warfare by another means, and, after 1815, these became the modus operandi for those warriors who sought to oppose the American program of settler

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[26] Treaty with the Winnebago, 3 June 1816, *IALT*, 2:130-131; Martin Zanger, "Red Bird," in *American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity*, R. David Edmunds, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), 65; Bernard Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 190-191. For works on anonymous resistance, see Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 78-108, 136, 254-264; and James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), x-xiii, 1-44, 140-172. Quoted in James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 23-35, 255-272, 295-303 (qtd. 29).

colonialism. In the case of the Ho-Chunks, these paved the way for open revolt in 1827.[27]

In 1819, after returning from Canada where they heard a series of inflammatory speeches from British agents, Ho-Chunks of the Fox River valley shot at federal soldiers traveling on Lake Winnebago and harassed an army detachment at the portage of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. The next year, in March 1820, three Ho-Chunk warriors of the Rock River bands killed two soldiers at Fort Armstrong near Rock Island. Despite their attempts at anonymity, the perpetrators of these and similar acts were sometimes apprehended by Indian agents and military officers who recorded their testimonies. These documents often reveal an intense ambivalence toward the United States and the presence of Americans in their country.[28] The Ho-Chunks were hardly unique, for throughout the 1820s Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Menominees also engaged in anonymous acts of resistance that ranged from petty thefts to killings. The underlying motivations for these actions are frequently difficult to determine, and some originated from personal altercations rather than any discernable hostility toward the United States. In other cases, legal depositions record a deep-seated resentment toward the United States and its land-hungry population. Indian war parties often carried out such anonymous acts in retaliation for violence committed by American soldiers and miners against their communities. Members of the

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[27]Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 17-35; Richard J. Chacon and Rubén G. Mendoza, eds., *North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007), 227-230; John Phillip Reid, *Patterns of Vengeance: Crosscultural Homicide in the North American Fur Trade* (Pasadena: Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society, 1999), 23-30.

[28] Alexander Wolcott to Cass, 14 November 1819, M-1, 6:212-213; Joseph Smith to Jacob Brown, 5 January 1820, *WHC*, 20:139-142; William Whistler to Smith, 3 January 1820, M-1, 7:63; Whistler to John Bowyer, 13 January 1820, *WHC*, 20:142-143; William Maddison [*sic*], to unknown, 5 October 1819, *WHC*, 20:126; Martin Zanger, "Conflicting Concepts of Justice: A Winnebago Murder Trial on the Illinois Frontier," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 73 (Winter 1980): 263-276; Henry Leavenworth, Interrogation of the Winnebago Prisoners, Clark MSS, 2:182-194; Lawrence Taliaferro to Clark, 12 June 1820, in Letters Received by the Secretary of War Relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-1823, Microfilm Publication M-271, reel 3, frame 316, Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, NA (hereafter cited as M-271; references are to reel and frame numbers); Clark to Calhoun, 25 June 1820, M-271, 3:320; Leavenworth to the Winnebagos, n.d., M-271, 3:322.

Ho-Chunk bands of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers seemed particularly eager to resist the United States. Jedidiah Morse, who traveled throughout the region in 1821, noted:

> No other tribe seems to possess so much jealousy of the whites.... They will suffer no encroachment upon their soil; nor any person to pass through it, without giving a satisfactory explanation of their motives and intentions. In failing to comply with this preliminary step, their lives would be in danger.[29]

Later events illustrated the ambiguous boundary that separated anonymous acts of resistance from open warfare. In the spring of 1826, a party of Ho-Chunks killed a French-Canadian family near Prairie du Chien. Colonel Willoughby Morgan, the commander of Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien, determined that the incident resulted from a personal altercation as the Ho-Chunk perpetrators believed the head of the family had sold poisoned whiskey that had killed one of their relations. Morgan's arrogant handling of the matter worsened the already frayed relations with the Ho-Chunks. He arrested two Ho-Chunks, despite the fact neither he nor the Ho-Chunk leadership was certain the killings had been committed by the men. During the summer of 1826, many of the more intensely anti-American Ho-Chunks, particularly those of the Wisconsin River bands, explored the possibility of leading a general uprising against the United States. Some Dakotas evinced strong interest in such a plan, and both parties redoubled their efforts toward consolidating an alliance in 1827.[30]

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[29] George Grosvenor to Smith, 2 January 1820, M-1, 7:62; George Johnson to Smith, 3 January 1820, M-1, 7:64; Smith to Brown, 5 January 1820, *WHC*, 20:139-142; James Doty to Henry Schoolcraft, 17 November 1821, *TPUS*, 11:176-177; Schoolcraft to Cass, 31 August 1824, M-234, 419:87-88; Deposition of the Account of Little Frenchman, 10 July 1825, M-234, 419:363-364; Deposition Regarding the Statements of O-quay-gun and Mee-toh-korsee-kanse, 16 July 1825, M-234, 419:365; Doty to Secretary of War, 22 July 1825, M-234, 419:355-357; quoted in Jedidiah Morse, *A Report to the Secretary of War, of the United States, on Indian Affairs* (New Haven: S. Converse, 1822), appendix, 48 (qtd. 48).

[30] Depositions, 6-7 July 1826, Circuit Court File on the Methode Murder, Iowa Microseries 4, University of Wisconsin-Platteville Area Research Center, Platteville, Wisconsin (hereafter cited as IMS-4; this archives hereafter cited as UWP-ARC); E. Reid to Cass, 19 June 1826, M-1, 18:114; Council with the Winnebagos, Sioux, and Menominees, 5 July 1826, IMS-4; Council with the Winnebagos, 7 July 1826, IMS-4; Morgan to Acting Adjutant

The culmination of these efforts brought about a short-lived uprising by the Ho-Chunks of the Mississippi River bands and the Dakotas in June 1827. The Ho-Chunks were spurred to action by the unfounded rumor that their warriors arrested the year before had been murdered after the army turned them over to their enemies, the Ojibwas. The army also had abandoned Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien the year before, and many Ho-Chunks interpreted this as a sign of American weakness. Members of the Prairie La Crosse band (at present-day La Crosse, Wisconsin) under the leadership of Wanukchouti, or Red Bird, initiated the revolt by going to Prairie du Chien to kill an American trader. When they discovered that he was not home, they settled on the household of Registre Gagnier. The decision appears to have been made due to the isolated location of the Gagnier homestead and the fact Gagnier's hired man was a discharged American soldier. Wanukchouti and his party killed Gagnier and his hired man. Afterward, the Prairie La Crosse band sent war belts to other tribes urging them rise up against the United States, but only the Dakotas remained interested. Two days later, the Prairie La Crosse Ho-Chunks and their Dakota allies attacked two American keelboats descending the Mississippi River. The warriors killed two men and wounded four others. The party that carried out the attack likely included about thirty Ho-Chunk and thirty Dakota warriors along with 150 women, children, and other non-combatants.[31]

General, 9 July 1826, M-234, 931:1; Depositions, 18 July - 4 August 1826, Crawford and Iowa County Criminal Case Files, 1824-1836, Iowa Series 20, box 1, folder 84, UWP-ARC; Morgan to Assistant Adjutant General, 7 August 1826, IMS-4; [William J. Snelling], "Early Days at Prairie du Chien and the Winnebago Outbreak of 1827," *WHC*, 5:126-128; Forsyth to Cass, 10 September 1827, M-1, 21:102; Street to Secretary of War, 15 November 1827, in *Letter from the Secretary of War...In Relation to the Hostile Disposition of the Indian Tribes on the Northwestern Frontier*, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1828, Ho. Doc. 277 (Serial 175), 14-15 (hereafter cited as Ho. Doc. 277); Journal of the 1828 Council with the Winnebagos, in Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes of Indians, 1801-1869, Microfilm Publication T-494, reel 2, frame 136, Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, NA (hereafter cited as T-494; references are to reel and frame numbers); Zanger, "Red Bird," 69-70.

[31] Zanger, "Red Bird," 70-73; Cass to Barbour, 10 July 1827, *TPUS*, 11:1101-1102; McKenney to Secretary of War, 17 September 1827, Ho. Doc. 277, 9-10; Street to Secretary of War, 15 November 1827, Ho. Doc. 277, 14-15; Marsh to Cass, 4 July 1827, *TPUS*, 11:1096-1097; Thomas McKenney, *Memoirs, Official and Personal; With Sketches of Travels...*, 2nd ed. (New York: Paine and Burgess, 1846), 127-131; James Lockwood, "Early Times and

While the attack on the keelboats involved a relatively small number of warriors, it was an open act of war executed by an entire village band and its confederates. The Prairie La Crosse Ho-Chunks and their Dakota allies had crossed the threshold that separated the realm of anonymous resistance from open warfare because the participants did not attempt to shield their identities or evade detection. Instead, they publicly proclaimed the act in order to attract other Native communities to their standard. The army and federal Indian agents moved quickly to suppress the uprising and prevent the disaffection from spreading to other tribes. By September 1827, Brigadier General Henry Atkinson had moved an army up the Mississippi River with a force composed of six hundred regulars and 150 mounted volunteers and apprehended the leaders of the revolt without a fight at the portage of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. Another party of regulars marched from Fort Howard at Green Bay along with detachments of Menominees and recently arrived New York Indians (Oneidas, Brothertons, and Stockbridges).[32] Despite the limited nature of the conflict and its anti-climactic resolution, the actions of the Indians throughout the upper Great Lakes and upper Mississippi valley revealed a persistent opposition to American settler colonialism. The Fox River Ho-Chunk bands did not participate directly in the uprising; they were engaged in a treaty council with the United States during the affair, which prevented a more active response. Nevertheless, they used the occasion to complain about white miners on Ho-Chunk lands and even burned down buildings that American negotiators had erected at the treaty grounds. Ho-Chunks of the Wisconsin River bands

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Events in Wisconsin," *WHC*, 2:161-163; McKenney to Secretary of War, 17 September 1827, Ho. Doc. 277, 9-12; Taliaferro to Clark, 1 August 1827, in Lawrence Taliaferro Papers, vol. 4, pp 95-96, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota (hereafter cited as Taliaferro MSS; references are to volume and page numbers); Marsh to Cass, 4 July 1827, *TPUS*, 11:1096; Marsh to McKenney, 10 July 1827, M-234, 419:937-938; Forsyth to Clark, 28 July 1827, Forsyth MSS, 6T:66.

[32] Roger Nichols, *General Henry Atkinson: A Western Military Career* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), 124-136; Henry Atkinson to Gaines, 28 September 1827, in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1827*, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1827, Ho. Doc. 2 (Serial 161), 155-156 (hereafter cited as Ho. Doc. 2).

threatened to stop any Americans passing through the Fox-Wisconsin portage, while others near Prairie du Chien killed cattle. Dakotas around Fort Snelling, at the confluence of the Mississippi and Minnesota Rivers, spread the rumor they would kill all the Americans in the area, and Ho-Chunks issued a similar threat at Prairie du Chien. These anonymous acts by sympathetic Indians would be the limit of support for the leaders of the uprising. Tribes such as the Potawatomis and Meskwakis rejected the war belts they had been sent. The Rock River Ho-Chunk bands remained the particularly quiescent, most likely because the United States had executed two of their warriors in 1821 for the killing of American soldiers at Fort Armstrong the previous year. Thus, the Rock River Ho-Chunks exhibited little enthusiasm for a general war against the United States. Nevertheless, some young warriors of the Rock River bands used the occasion of the Winnebago Uprising to harass American miners and virtually shut down wagon traffic between Peoria, Illinois and the lead mining region.[33]

The Ho-Chunks were not alone in using the Winnebago Uprising as an excuse to express their grievances. A few Potawatomis also demonstrated their support for the uprising, and while they did not join the Ho-Chunks, some had threatened to do so, which created a sense of panic among the Americans at Chicago. While this threat amounted to little more than a rumor, other Potawatomis near Peoria committed robberies against Americans. As for the Dakotas, more would have probably joined the Ho-Chunks had not the influential Dakota chief Wabasha

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[33] Depositions, 10 March 1828, M-234, 748:505; Atkinson to Gaines, 28 September 1827, Ho. Doc. 2, 155-156; Forsyth to William Downy and Charles St. Vrain, 27 August 1827, Forsyth MSS, 6T:74; Marsh to Clark, 30 June 1827, M-234, 748:92-93; Forsyth to Clark, 9 July 1827, Forsyth MSS, 4T:274-275; Cass to Barbour, 10 July 1827, *TPUS*, 11:1101-1104; McKenney to Barbour, 19 July 1827, M-234, 419:932; Marsh to Cass, 31 July 1827, M-1, 21:27; Clark to Barbour, 23 July 1827, M-234, 748:132; John Dixon to Clark, 24 July 1827, M-234, 748:144; Journal, 1827 Butte des Morts Treaty, T-494, 2:26-33; Forsyth to Clark, 7 August 1827, Forsyth MSS, 6T:72; McKenney to Cass, 9 August 1827, Forsyth MSS, 2T:53; Forsyth to Cass, 10 September 1827, M-1, 21:102; Joseph Rolette to Cass, 16 November 1827, M-1, 21:176; Robert Irwin to Cass, 5 January 1828, M-1, 22:1; Zanger, "Red Bird," 71-72; Cass to Barbour, 4 July 1827, *TPUS*, 11:1093-1095; Wolcott to Barbour, 25 July 1827, M-234, 132:32-33; Forsyth to Cass, 10 September 1827, M-1, 21:102-103.

prevented his warriors from doing so. These anonymous acts of resistance showed both the extent and limits of ideologically motivated hostility toward the United States. While a few Ho-Chunks and Dakotas crossed the boundary that separated anonymous acts of resistance from open warfare, most Indians who possessed such attitudes continued to express their opposition through anonymous and generally non-violent means.[34]

The Winnebago Uprising reveals additional details concerning the nature of Native hostility to American settler colonialism that are relevant to the Black Hawk War. Rumors such as those spread by the Potawatomis, while seemingly innocuous, are a form of anonymous resistance, which, according to Gregory Dowd, spread through "circuits and exchanges" and reflect the ideology of the persons within such networks.[35] Scott advances a similar notion and argues that rumors are part of the "hidden transcript" that serves as a critique of systems of power such as those established by colonial regimes.[36] Thus, while only small numbers of Indians participated in the Winnebago Uprising, many more expressed their disdain through other, more subtle means. Most Indians in the region, including most Ho-Chunks, remained at peace, thus indicating the limited appeal that resistance, both anonymous and public, had among Native societies. Indian agents and other American officials generally overstated the extent of such hostility because fears of pan-Indian confederacies and revolts, both real and imagined, had a long history in the American psyche that stretched back to the Pontiac Uprising in the mid-eighteenth century. Thomas L. McKenney, the head of the Indian Office, expressed these overblown anxieties when he noted that while there were no more "Pontiacs or Tecumthes [sic]

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[34] Zanger, "Red Bird," 70-74; Joseph Rollette to Cass, 16 November 1827, M-1, 21:176; McKenney to Secretary of War, 4 August 1827, M-234, 419:946-948.

[35] Quoted in Gregory E. Dowd, *Groundless: Rumors, Legends, and Hoaxes on the Early American Frontier* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 4-15 (qtd. 4).

[36] Scott, *Domination*, 137-156.

to form and lead on confederated bands," the Ho-Chunks, Dakotas, and Potawatomis, he believed, "would have broken out...into acts of a general violence."[37]

The Winnebago Uprising also revealed the cleavages between and within the tribes that prevented many Native communities from supporting the leaders of the rebellion. None of the Native societies in the region possessed centralized governing structures and instead lived in largely autonomous bands and villages. Thus, local communities, and even factions within communities, possessed the ability to make decisions concerning war and peace. While tribal councils composed of chiefs and other leaders from the various communities could make such decisions, these were not binding on local bands and villages, and even within these communities, individuals could, and often did, defy their decisions. In the case of the Ho-Chunks, the various bands that resided along the banks of the Fox, Wisconsin, Rock, and Mississippi Rivers exercised so much autonomy they even found themselves in rival intertribal alliances, although Ho-Chunk bands never engaged each other in war. The anti-American factions of the Sauks and Meskwakis had little interest in supporting the uprising since the Ho-Chunks of the Mississippi River bands, who were the core of the Ho-Chunk communities that participated in the revolt, tended to side with the Dakotas in intertribal wars. The Sauks and Meskwakis, on the other hand, tended to side with the Ojibwas, the sworn enemies of the Dakotas. Indeed, the Ojibwas sent wampum belts and messages to their Sauk and Meskwaki allies during the Winnebago Uprising urging them not to support the Ho-Chunks.[38]

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[37] Robert M. Owens, *Red Dreams, White Nightmares: Pan-Indian Alliances in the Anglo-American Mind, 1763-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 3-14, 235-243; quoted in McKenney to Secretary of War, Ho. Doc. 277, 9-11 (qtd. 11).

[38] Tanner, *Atlas*, 96-104; Nancy O. Lurie, "Winnebago," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 15, *Northeast*, Bruce G. Trigger, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 693-696; Nancy O. Lurie, "In Search of Chaetar: New Findings on Black Hawk's Surrender," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 71 (Spring 1988): 166-168; Forsyth to Clark, 9 July 1827, Forsyth MSS, 4T:274-277; Forsyth to Cass, 10 September 1827, M-1, 21:102; Forsyth to Clark, 15 June 1827, Forsyth MSS, 4T:271; Forsyth to Clark, 15 October 1827, Forsyth MSS, 6T:76-78.

This was evidence of a pattern of intertribal warfare that intensified in the 1820s and early 1830s and stymied the creation of larger pan-tribal alliances. As the tribes removed farther westward due to the press of white settlement, conflicts over hunting grounds served as the initial impetus, and, as the warfare intensified, revenge killings for earlier attacks further fueled the aggression. The longest running rivalry was between the Ojibwas and the Dakotas for control of the lands to the south and southwest of Lake Superior. The two groups began fighting in the 1730s, and after about 1805, the Sauks and Meskwakis began to expand north and west into the lands of the Dakotas. These dual expansions created two alliance systems that, while loosely constructed, became more entrenched during the 1820s and 1830s. The Ojibwas, Sauks, and Meskwakis became allies because they shared a common enemy, the Dakotas. The Kickapoos in Illinois and the Iowas of the western prairies often joined the Sauks and Meskwakis, as did the confederated bands of the Ojibwas, Odawas, and Potawatomis that resided along the western shore of Lake Michigan. The Menominees had enjoyed peaceful relations with the Dakotas and the Ojibwas and even hunted in the contested area that stood as a "no man's land" between the two tribes. However, the killing of Menominees by Ojibwas in the contested area forced them to join the Dakotas, and the deaths of Menominees at the hands of the Sauks and Meskwakis reinforced this alliance. The Ho-Chunks had traditionally been the allies of the Dakotas, and killings committed by the Sauks and Meskwakis against Ho-Chunks of the Mississippi River bands increased the enmity between them. The Ho-Chunks of the Rock River bands, on the other hand, retained strong relations with the Sauks.[39]

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[39] Harold Hickerson, *The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1970), 66, 76-90; Royce Kurtz, "Economic History of the Sauk and Mesquakie: 1780s-1845" (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1986), 37-54; Schoolcraft to George Porter, 15 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1007; Forsyth to Clark, 30 September 1818, Forsyth MSS, 4T:61-62; Forsyth to Clark, 6 May 1830, Forsyth MSS, 6T:125-126; Talk of Ta-oman to Clark, 17 May 1830, M-234, 749:945-946; Clark to John Eaton, 17 May 1830, M-234, 749:943; Street to Eaton, 2 March 1831, M-234, 315:609-610; Marsh to Clark, 30 May 1827, M-234, 748:94; Robert Stuart to Eaton, 9 February 1830, *TPUS*, 12:125-126; John Kinzie to Cass, 1 June 1830, M-1, 26:85.

The federal government sought to quell intertribal conflicts because Indian war parties often attacked white traders, miners, and settlers in retaliation for earlier acts of violence against Native communities. Federal commissioners concluded treaties at Prairie du Chien in 1825, Fond du Lac on Lake Superior in 1826, and Little Lake Butte Morts in 1827 that established boundaries between the tribes.[40] By 1828, these efforts to bring about peace failed when the Dakotas and Ojibwas resumed their conflict. The next year, the fighting spread to the south when Sauk and Meskwaki war parties raided Dakota villages. In 1830, the Menominees and the Ho-Chunks joined the Dakotas.[41] The United States hoped to avert further escalations by inviting the tribes to a treaty council at Prairie du Chien in 1830. The council was almost thwarted when a party of Dakotas and Menominees slaughtered fifteen Meskwaki chiefs in retaliation for the killing of a Ho-Chunk woman the previous year. The commissioners produced a treaty despite this obstacle and went one step further by separating the Dakotas from the Sauks and Meskwakis with a strip of land forty miles wide and two hundred miles long known as the Neutral Ground.[42]

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[40]For the rationale of quelling intertribal conflicts, see Clark to Forsyth, 4 June 1820, Forsyth MSS, 1T:79-80; Record of Proceedings, 28 June 1821, Forsyth MSS, 1T:105; Forsyth to J.H. Vose, 8 September 1824, M-234, 419:83-84; Street to Clark, 20 March 1829, M-234, 749:641; and Clark to Secretary of War, 17 November 1830, Clark MSS, 4:190. For the various councils and treaties, see Journal of Proceedings at Prairie du Chien, August 1825, T-494, 1:718-26, 746; Treaty with the Sioux, etc., 19 August 1825, *IALT*, 2:250-255; Thomas McKenney, *Sketches of a Tour to Lakes, Of the Character and Customs of the Chippeway Indians, And of Incidents Connected with the Treaty of Fond du Lac* (Baltimore: Fielding Lucas, Jr., 1827), 457-476; McKenney, *Memoirs*, 80-84; Treaty with the Chippewa, 5 August 1826, *IALT*, 2:268-273; and Treaty with the Chippewa, etc., 11 August 1827, *IALT*, 2:281-283.

[41] Kurtz, "Sauk and Mesquakie," 47; Street to Clark, 25 August 1828, M-234, 696:97; Taliaferro, Journal, 4 January 1829, Taliaferro MSS, 8:211; Taliaferro to Clark, 30 July 1830, M-234, 757:64-65; Rollette to unknown, 3 July 1829, M-234, 749:759; Stuart to Eaton, 9 February 1830, *TPUS*, 12:125-126; Taliaferro to Clark, 3 May 1830, M-234, 749:935.

[42] For the killing of the Meskwaki chiefs, see Forsyth to Clark, 6 May 1830, Forsyth MSS, 6T:125-127; Clark to Eaton, 10 May 1830, M-234, 749:919-921; and Talk of the Sacs and Foxes, 24 May 1830, M-234, 749:964, 967. For the 1830 treaty council and the Neutral Ground, see Jacob Van der Zee, "The Neutral Ground," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* 13 (July 1915): 311-331; Minutes of a Council at Prairie du Chien, 1830, T-494, 2:253, 258-264; Royce, "Indian Land Cessions," 726-727; and Clark and Morgan to Eaton, 16 July 1830, Sen. Doc. 512 (Serial 245), 78-79. There were actually two treaties signed at the 1830 Prairie du Chien council. On July 10th, the Menominees, Dakotas, Sauks, Meskawkis, and Ho-Chunks signed the first treaty, which established peace between

This buffer zone failed to stem the tide of intertribal war. In July 1831, a war party of about forty Sauks and Meskwakis invaded the lands of the Dakotas and killed two tribal members. All hopes for peace were deflated that same month when a Meskwaki war party killed twenty-five Menominees at Prairie du Chien in retaliation for the slaying of the Meskwaki chiefs the previous year. The Menominees were shocked by the massacre, and while they promised federal officials they would remain at peace, they demanded swift justice from the United States.[43]

These two events—the 1827 Winnebago Uprising and the escalation of intertribal warfare—explain the course of the Black Hawk War. After the War of 1812, certain factions within the various Native societies in the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi Valley continued to harbor hostility toward the United States that served as an ideological foundation for resistance. While anonymous acts tended to be the most common means of expressing this ideology, both the 1827 Winnebago Uprising and the 1832 Black Hawk War were examples of open warfare, and in the case of the Winnebago Uprising, anonymous acts preceded the advent of the conflict. However, not all Indians in the region were willing to go war. Among the Ho-Chunks, only the Prairie La Crosse band participated in the Winnebago Uprising despite the fact about two thirds of the tribe were estimated to be steadfastly anti-American. The Rock River and Fox River Ho-Chunk bands merely committed anonymous acts or even sat out the conflict. In the period after the War of 1812, many Indians in the region saw open warfare against the United States as futile and dangerous, and often times even the most staunchly anti-American Indians

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them but involved no land cessions. Although not ratified, this treaty reaffirmed the boundaries and state of peace established in the 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien. See Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 10 July 1830, T-494, 8:47-53. The second treaty, signed on July 15th, was the document that established the Neutral Ground as a buffer zone. See Treaty with the Sauks and Foxes, etc., 15 July 1830, *IALT*, 2:305-310.

[43] For the Sauk and Meskwaki attack against the Dakotas, see Taliaferro to Clark, 8 August 1831, M-234, 749:1260. For the Menominee massacre, see List of Menominees Killed at Prairie du Chien, 31 July 1831, M-234, 728:133; Street to Secretary of War, 1 August 1831, *BHW*, 2:116-119; Journal of Proceedings with the Menominees, 15 August 1831, M-234, 315:530-540; and Samuel Stambaugh to Cass, 16 August 1831, M-234, 315:527-529.

declined to engage combat.[44] The federal government also reinforced the region militarily after the Winnebago Uprising, which made warfare more risky. In 1826, the United States had only 680 soldiers stationed at the three posts west of Lake Michigan: Forts Howard, Armstrong, and Snelling. After the uprising, the army reoccupied Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien and Fort Dearborn at Chicago. The federal government also established a new post, Fort Winnebago, at the portage of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers in the heart of the Ho-Chunks' country. By the end of 1828, these six posts possessed a total of 801 troops.[45]

Black Hawk's situation in 1832 was more tenuous than Wanukchouti's had been five years earlier due to this increased military presence. Also problematic were the further erosion of Indian unity due to intertribal fighting in the early 1830s and the fact Black Hawk led only a faction of the Sauk and Meskawki tribes, and a relatively small faction at that. His rival, Keokuk, was every bit as anti-American as Black Hawk, but Keokuk believed the two tribes had little to gain by defying the United States despite the odious nature of the 1804 treaty. Black Hawk's band totaled a little over one thousand members, about eight hundred of whom were Sauks and Meskwakis and the balance of whom were members of the anti-American faction of the nearby

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[44] Clark to Barbour, 11 July 1827, M-234, 748:89; Forsyth to Clark, 7 August 1827, Forsyth MSS, 6T:71-72; Cass and McKenney to Forsyth, 9 August 1827, Forsyth MSS, 2T:53; Forsyth to Clark, 28 July 1827, Forsyth MSS, 6T:66-67; McKenney, *Memoirs*, 73-76, 78-79; Journal of the 1827 Butte des Morts Treaty, T-494, 2:32-33; Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction*, 190-191.

[45] For troop strength in 1826, see Brown to Barbour, 11 January 1826, *American State Papers: Military Affairs*, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832-1861), 3:216 (hereafter cited as *ASP:MA*); Position and Distribution of Troops, November 1826, *ASP:MA*, 3:339-342; and Francis Paul Prucha, *A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), 8, 68, 71. For troop strength after the Winnebago Uprising, see Roger Jones to Winfield Scott, 14 August 1827, M-1, 21:57; Barbour to Cass, 16 August 1827, *TPUS*, 11:1113-1114; Jones to Cass, 6 September 1827, M-1, 21:100; Atkinson to Gaines, 28 September 1827, Ho. Doc. 2, 158; Alexander Macomb to Peter Porter, November 1828, in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1828*, 20th Cong., 2nd sess., 1828, Sen. Doc. 1, (Serial 181), 157; Fort Armstrong Post Returns, December 1828, in Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800-1916, Microfilm Publication M-617, reel 41, Record Group 94, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, NA (hereafter cited as M-617; references are to reel numbers); Fort Winnebago Post Returns, December 1828, M-617, 1454; Fort Crawford Post Returns, December 1828, M-617, 264; Fort Dearborn Post Returns, December 1828, M-617, 300; Fort Howard Post Returns, December 1828, M-617, 488; and Fort Snelling Post Returns, January 1829, M-617, 1193.

Kickapoos. The total population of the Sauk and Meskwaki tribes was about 6,600 members, which means that Black Hawk had the support of about one eighth of the two tribes. This corresponds closely with William Clark's estimate that one sixth of the Sauks and Meskwakis supported Black Hawk. The traditional allies of the two tribes—the Ojibwas and the confederated villages of Ojibwas, Odawas, and Potawatomis along the western shore of Lake Michigan—were reluctant to support what they saw as a renegade band that did not have the full support of either tribe.[46]

Black Hawk had fought in several battles on the side of the Indian-British alliance during the War of 1812, and these experiences and the treaty of 1804 (as well as the treaty he signed in 1816) shaped his perception of the United States, which he saw as a threat to the Sauks and Meskwakis. He had rejected the Shawnee Prophet's and Tecumseh's movement before the War of 1812 because he thought it would undermine his aspirations for leadership among his own people. Other nativist leaders such as Main Poc also had rejected the leadership of the Shawnee brothers, but Black Hawk, in the same spirit as the Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Main Poc, eschewed any compromise or accommodation with the United States in the manner of his rival Keokuk.[47] Yet, it would be inaccurate to characterize Black Hawk and other nativist leaders as mere reactionaries; instead, they articulated visionary, progressive programs of renewal that anthropologists and historians define as revitalization movements. Societies that experience the loss of cultural identity and social dislocation due to the stresses created by external factors such

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[46] For Keokuk's sentiments, see Proceedings of the Commissioners, 1829, T-494, 2:193; and Hagan, *Sac and Fox*, 94-95. Numerical estimates presented in the text are taken from Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 39-40; Kay, "Fur Trade and Native American Population Growth," 275, 277; and Clark to Eaton, 17 January 1831, M-234, 749:1126. For the confederated villages and their reluctance to join Black Hawk, see Street to Clark, 21 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:402; Thomas J.V. Owen to Porter, *BHW*, 2:383-384; Owen to Atkinson, 6 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:534; and Atkinson to Zachary Taylor, 6 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:529.

[47] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 66; Trask, *Black Hawk*, 108-116; Metcalf, "Who Should Rule at Home," 658-659; Willig, *Restoring the Chain of Friendship*, 213-214.

as settler colonialism frequently seek to revitalize their cultures through the "elimination of alien persons, customs, values" according to Anthony F.C. Wallace.[48] In Black Hawk's case, he determined that retaining the Sauk and Meskwaki homelands east of the Mississippi, "where the bones of so many of our people had been laid," would guarantee a prosperous, happy future for his people and the "hope our sky will soon be clear."[49]

The great nativist leaders during the era of the War of 1812 who led similar movements such as Tecumseh and Main Poc died during the conflict or shortly thereafter. Black Hawk was able to keep the nativist spirit alive among the Sauks (and to a lesser degree the Meskwakis) for another generation after the conflict ended in 1815, and he believed that pan-tribal cooperation and the support of the British in Canada—the two pillars of success during the War of 1812—were the principal means by which he could triumph. Black Hawk would not default to war in 1832; instead, he believed these stratagems could be employed to peacefully coerce the United States into letting his followers remain on the eastern bank of the Mississippi. Only a chance encounter with Illinois militiamen in May 1832 destroyed his plans for a peaceful means of resisting American expansion into his people's homelands.[50]

The events that directly precipitated the Black Hawk War began in 1828 when the federal government opened up the 1804 cession for settlement. The first tracts were sold in October 1829, but earlier that year, a number of illegal white squatters arrived as well. While both the

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[48] Quoted in Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist* 58 (April 1956): 264-281 (qtd. 267). Also see Ralph Linton, "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist* 45 (April- June 1943): 230-240; and Michael Harkin, "Introduction: Revitalization as History and Theory," in *Reassessing Revitalization Movements: Perspectives from North America and the Pacific Islands*, Michael Harkin, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), xv-xxxvi.

[49]Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 42-46; quoted in Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 116, 123, 132-133 (qtd. 116, 133).

[50]Willig, *Restoring the Chain of Friendship*, 263-264; Jung, "Toward the Black Hawk War," 48-52.

treaty-abiding faction under Keokuk and the faction under Black Hawk (labeled the British Band by white observers) wanted to remain on the east side of the Mississippi, those Sauks and Meskwakis under Keokuk went westward to the Iowa River valley in order to avoid conflict. Black Hawk's band remained at Saukenuk, the main Sauk village at the confluence of the Rock and Mississippi Rivers, and soon became engaged in almost daily quarrels with newly-arrived white settlers who frequently assaulted innocent Sauks and stole their corn and other property.[51] The altercations at Saukenuk occupied a nebulous position because the Sauks' very presence there was an open, yet nonviolent form of resistance as the federal government had ordered them to remove to the west side of the Mississippi. In the spring of 1830, Black Hawk's band returned to Saukenuk despite the exhortations of federal Indian agents and Keokuk. Black Hawk proclaimed that he and his followers would do the same the next year after their winter hunts, and they fulfilled his promise when they returned to Saukenuk in the spring of 1831. During the course of 1831, Black Hawk's followers became reinforced by the arrival those Meskwakis who had participated in the massacre of the Menominees at Prairie du Chien and by Kickapoos from southern Illinois who also protested earlier land cessions by their tribe.[52]

The return to Saukenuk in 1831 became a fiasco. Governor John Reynolds of Illinois called up seven hundred mounted militiamen to force Black Hawk's band west across the Mississippi River. A federal contingent of regular army soldiers under the command of Major General Edmund P. Gaines joined the militia. Keokuk urged the members of Black Hawk's band

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[51] Sales of Land in Royce Cession 50, exhibit 146, docket 83, Record Group 279, Records of the Indian Claims Commission, NA; Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 20-30; Forsyth to Clark, 24 May 1828, Forsyth MSS, 6T:81-82; Forsyth to Clark, 22 May 1829, Forsyth MSS, 6T:100-101; Forsyth to Clark, 1 October 1829, M-234, 749:1215; Clark to Eaton, 20 May 1829, M-234, 749:631-633; Forsyth to Clark, 17 May 1829, Forsyth MSS, 6T:97-99; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 111-116.

[52] Forsyth to Clark, 28 April 1830, Forsyth MSS, 6T:118-120; St. Vrain to Clark, 8 October 1830, M-234, 749:1217; St. Vrain to Clark, 15 May 1831, *BHW*, 2:7; St. Vrain to Clark, 28 May 1831, *BHW*, 2:21-22; Deposition of Rinnah and Samuel Wells, 10 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:43-44; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 120-123, 130; A.M. Gibson, *The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 80-87.

to depart, and a few did so. Many others remained, and Gaines moved the regular troops and militia against Saukenuk in order to break the stalemate. Black Hawk had no intention of initiating hostilities, and he ordered the members of his band to remain in their lodges and offer no opposition even if the troops opened fire. He issued these instructions because he believed Gaines and his regulars would not use violence to remove them. When Black Hawk learned that Gaines also had mounted militiamen, he changed his plans. Black Hawk displayed his rather sophisticated knowledge of American militiamen, their lack of discipline, and their tendency to kill indiscriminately when he stated, "I would have remained and been taken prisoner by the regulars, but was afraid of the multitude of pale faces [militiamen], who were on horseback, as they were under no restraint of their chiefs [commanders]."[53] When Gaines and his force arrived at Saukenuk on June 26th, they discovered Black Hawk's band had slipped across the Mississippi the night before. A few days later, Gaines met with Black Hawk and forced him to sign articles of capitulation. In addition to recognizing the previous treaties signed by the Sauks and Meskwakis, Black Hawk promised to remain on the west side of the Mississippi.[54]

The matter would have ended in 1831 had Black Hawk not accepted the counsels of two other Indians. The first was Wabokieshiek, better known as the Winnebago Prophet. He was of Ho-Chunk and Sauk parentage, and although little is known about his religious teachings, he was said to have contact with the spirit world. Like other Indian prophets, he gained a personal following. While his teachings failed to spark the same level of interest in militant nativism as

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[53] John Reynolds to Clark, 26 May 1831, *BHW*, 2:13; Gaines to Jones, 30 May 1831, *BHW*, 2:25-26; Gaines to Jones, 14 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:47-50; Thomas Burnett to Clark, 29 June 1831; *BHW*, 2:81; Memorandum of Talks between Gaines and the Sauk, 4-7 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:27-31; George McCall to Archibald McCall, 17 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:55-58; quoted in Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 129 (qtd. 129; emphasis in original).

[54] Nathaniel Buckmaster to John Sawyer, 30 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:84; Articles of Agreement and Capitulation, 30 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:85-88; Gaines to Hugh White, 6 July 1831, *BHW*, 2:102-103.

those of the Shawnee Prophet, he attracted about two hundred followers, many of who were also of mixed parentage, as well as members of other tribes such as the Potawatomis and Kickapoos.[55] During the winter of 1828-1829, Black Hawk made his first visit to the Winnebago Prophet, who advised him not to leave Saukenuk. The Winnebago Prophet repeatedly told Black Hawk the Americans would do nothing to dislodge his band because they had promised not to disturb Indian communities that remained at peace. He most likely developed this notion based on his understanding of the ninth article of the Treaty of Ghent, the same article the Indians believed prohibited the United States from establishing military posts in the region. In 1830, Black Hawk and the Winnebago Prophet sent emissaries as far away as Texas to gain Indian allies to support their cause.[56]

The two men's relationship resembled that which Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet had enjoyed twenty years earlier, but it was not as close because Black Hawk had a more influential advisor between 1831 and 1832, a young hereditary Sauk civil chief named Napope. While Black Hawk's band was involved in the standoff with Gaines in the summer of 1831, Napope was at Fort Malden. When he returned, he brought news that the British supported Black Hawk in his effort to remain at Saukenuk and would provide his followers with guns, ammunition, and provisions that would be sent to Milwaukee. The confederated bands of the Ojibwas, Odawas, and Potawatomis as well as the Ho-Chunks would also join him. If they were defeated, Napope asserted, the British promised Black Hawk and his people refuge in Canada.

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[55] Forsyth to Clark, 24 May 1828, Forsyth MSS, 6T:82; Forsyth to Clark, 1 July 1828, Forsyth MSS, 6T:91; Street to Clark, 6 July 1831, *BHW*, 2:104; Henry Gratiot to Clark, 15 October 1831, M-1, 30:9; Black Hawk and the Winnebago Prophet to the President, [1832], M-234, 728:319-320; Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*, 193; Caleb Atwater, *Remarks on a Tour to Prairie du Chien Thence to Washington City in 1829* (Columbus, Ohio: Isaac A. Whiting, 1831), 65, 90, 134.

[56] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 112-113, 120-127; Gaines to Jones, 14 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:48; St. Vrain to Gaines, 15 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:51-52; Jung, *Black Hawk War*, 56-61; Clark to Eaton, 29 June 1831, *BHW*, 2:83.

Other tribal leaders, especially Keokuk, dismissed Napope's promises as mere lies, but Black Hawk, who had been dejected after evacuating Saukenuk in 1831, was buoyed by the news. He stated:

> I was pleased to hear that our British father intended to see us righted...and I now began to hope...that my people would be once more happy. If I could accomplish this, I would be satisfied...and was pleased to think that, by a little exertion on my part, I could accomplish the object of all my wishes.[57]

The counsels of the Winnebago Prophet and Napope convinced Black Hawk he could successfully reoccupy Saukenuk in the spring of 1832, and in April of that year, he and his band crossed the Mississippi. Most federal officials did not think this act meant hostilities had been initiated, and Black Hawk for his part did not plan to start a war. In his autobiography, Black Hawk stated only that he intended to move up the Rock River, plant corn for his band at the Winnebago Prophet's village, and take possession of the British supplies at Milwaukee. He did not clearly state what he and his lieutenants hoped to accomplish by this act, and this ambiguity has led historians to various conclusions concerning whether or not Black Hawk's intentions were hostile.[58] The subsequent actions of Black Hawk's band and information in his autobiography and other sources indicate that Black Hawk hoped that by crossing the Mississippi, he would attract the support of the regional tribes and produce a strong and

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[57] Hagan, *Sac and Fox*, 138; Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 45-47; quoted in Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 110, 119 132-133 (qtd. 132-133).

[58] For works that argue Black Hawk intended to make war, see Wakefield, *History of the War*, 8; Ford, *History of Illinois*, 167; Armstrong, *Black Hawk War*, 280; Thwaites, "Story of the Black Hawk War," 231; Stevens, *Black Hawk War*, 110-111, 165; Cole, *I Am a Man*, 124; Lambert, "Black Hawk War," 446; Hagan, *Sac and Fox*, 140; and Van der Zee, "Treaty of 1832," 421-422. For works that argue Black Hawk did not intend to initiate a conflict, see Drake, *Black Hawk*, 138-141; Reynolds, *My Own Times*, 222-223; Hauberg, "Black Hawk War," 114; Nichols, *Henry Atkinson*, 157-158; Nichols, *Black Hawk*, 110-115; Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 47; and Eby, *That Disgraceful Affair*, 83-85.

defiant—but peaceful—show of force. The United States, wishing to avoid a war, would reconsider its policy and let Black Hawk's band remain at Saukenuk. His followers would not resort to violence unless United States military forces attacked first, but they would stand firm in their right to live peaceably on the east side of the Mississippi.[59] Moreover, the act of crossing the Mississippi did not cause immediate distress among federal officials, for Indian agents and army officers were more concerned at the time with stemming intertribal warfare. Indeed, as Black Hawk crossed the Mississippi, he saw General Henry Atkinson heading north to Prairie du Chien with a steamboat full of troops to arrest the Meskwaki warriors who perpetrated the massacre against the Menominees the previous year.[60]

After crossing the Mississippi, Black Hawk slowly realized that many of Napope's promises rang hollow. The chiefs and headmen of the Rock River Ho-Chunk bands paid him a visit with their subagent, Henry Gratiot, who ordered Black Hawk to return to the west side of the river. The Rock River Ho-Chunks, more so than the Ho-Chunk bands of the Fox, Wisconsin, and Mississippi Rivers, had enjoyed a long intercourse with the Sauks due to the two societies' close geographic proximity. Activities as varied as trade and intermarriage characterized this association. Regardless of these relationships, the Rock River Ho-Chunks sought to avoid being drawn into a conflict between Black Hawk's band and the United States. The Rock River Ho-Chunk orator White Crow and the village chief Whirling Thunder played crucial roles in

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[59] Jung, *Black Hawk War*, 64-73; Wallace, "Prelude to Disaster," 276-287; Hall, *Uncommon Defense*, 129-130; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 135-138; Atkinson to Kinzie, 10 April 1832, M-1, 30:75-76; Atkinson to Macomb, 10 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:243-244; Atkinson to Reynolds, 13 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:245-246.

[60] Nichols, *Henry Atkinson*, 157-158; Clark to Cass, 6 December 1831, *BHW*, 2:205-206; Street to Clark, 11 January 1832, *BHW*, 2:206-207; Clark to Elbert Herring, 23 February 1832, *BHW*, 2:214-215; St. Vrain to Clark, 1 March 1832, *BHW*, 2:216; Elias Langham to Clark, 2 March 1832, *BHW*, 2:216; Herring to Clark, 15 March 1832, *BHW*, 2:218-219; Macomb to Atkinson, 17 March 1832, *BHW*, 2:219-221; Atkinson to Gaines, 3 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:224; Atkinson, Orders, 5 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:225-226; Herring to Kinzie, 6 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:229-230; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 137.

preventing any conflict from erupting and protecting their people from violence, particularly at the hands of American military forces. Thus, the Rock River Ho-Chunks maintained a cautious stand. They, too, were threatened with removal from their lands. They met with Black Hawk at the Winnebago Prophet's village and urged him to move no farther northward. Black Hawk later met with the Potawatomis at the Kishwaukee River, but they were even less facilitating than the Ho-Chunks. When they told him no British warship could be expected at Milwaukee, Black Hawk realized that Napope's promises would not come to fruition.[61]

After meeting with the Potawatomis, Black Hawk determined that his mission had failed, and decided to return. His decision came too late, for the U.S. Army and the Illinois militia had been marshalling forces to fight Black Hawk's band in the event of hostilities. The governor of Illinois called up the militia in April and ordered mounted volunteers to patrol the northern section of the state. On May 14, 1832, about thirty miles north of Dixon's Ferry (present-day Dixon, Illinois), a party of volunteers spotted warriors who had been sent to announce Black Hawk's decision. A few of the militiamen, fearing a ruse, fired and killed two of the warriors. About 270 mounted troops rushed to join the fray, but Black Hawk, hearing of the engagement, readied his followers and counterattacked. The militia panicked and broke ranks. In this engagement known as Stillman's Run, twelve militiamen and five of Black Hawk's warriors died. Prior to this battle, war had been avoidable, but once blood had been spilled, both the members of Black Hawk's band and the citizens of Illinois cried out for revenge, and further

[61] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 138-141; Lurie, "In Search of Chaetar," 166-168; Tronnes, "Corn Moon Migrations," 158-169; Gratiot, Journal, *BHW*, 2:1302-1303; Talk Between Atkinson, Whirling Thunder, and White Crow, 28 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:321-324, 323n-324n; Council Held at Porters [*sic*] Grove, 3-4 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:507-512; Report of Oliver Emmell and White Crow, 27 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:694-696; Council with the Rock River Winnebago, 11 September 1832, *BHW*, 2:1133-1134; Clifton, *Prairie People*, 233-234; Answer of Black Hawk and His Band to Atkinson, 26 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:312-314.

fighting became inevitable.[62]

As with the 1827 Winnebago Uprising, the commencement of hostilities gave the anti-American factions of the Potawatomis and Ho-Chunks an excuse to commit acts of aggression against Americans who had often committed acts of violence against them. About fifty Potawatomi warriors participated in a foray against a white settlement at Big Indian Creek in northern Illinois, but they had little interest in Black Hawk's cause. Their participation resulted instead from earlier confrontations with local white settlers in the area who often abused them and restricted their access to a local river. The Potawatomis and three Sauks of Black Hawk's band killed sixteen white settlers at Big Indian Creek and took two young women, sisters Sylvia and Rachel Hall, captive.[63]

After the Battle of Stillman's Run, Black Hawk and his followers went further up the Rock River and camped near Lake Koshkonong in the country of the Rock River Ho-Chunks, who displayed the same cautious attitude they had from the beginning. It was no secret to Black Hawk that the Rock River Ho-Chunks were aiding both his band and the Americans, although their assistance to Atkinson consisted of guiding his army away from Black Hawk's band and, most importantly, away from Ho-Chunk village sites and cornfields. The Rock River Ho-

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[62] J.A. Atwood, *The Story of the Battle of Stillman's Run* (Stillman Valley, Ill.: Privately published, 1904), 6-10; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 140-145; Wakefield, *History of the War*, 17-26; Reynolds, *My Own Times*, 222-235; Jung, *Black Hawk War*, 88-89; Atkinson to Macomb, 13 April 1832, *BHW*, 2:244-245; Atkinson to Hugh Brady, 8 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:354; Atkinson to Henry Dodge, 17 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:377; Militia Officer's Report on Stillman's Defeat, 18 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:387-388; Reuben Holmes to B. McCary, 23 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:414-415; War News from Galena, *BHW*, 2:377.

[63] The number of Potawatomis involved in the Indian Creek Massacre is an estimate. Eyewitnesses gave numbers of between forty and seventy, while others who were not present gave estimates as low as twenty and thirty. See George Walker to Atkinson, 10-11 October 1834, *BHW*, 2:1287, 1291n-1292n; Clark to Cass, 29 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:471; Atkinson to Reynolds, 24 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:430; and Minutes of an Examination of Prisoners, 27 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1055. In arriving at an estimate of fifty, the most weight is given to the eyewitness accounts. For descriptions of the Indian Creek Massacre and the motivations of the Potawatomis, see Charles M. Scanlan, *Indian Creek Massacre and Captivity of the Hall Girls* (Milwaukee: Reic Publishing, 1915), 23-37; Statement of Rachel (Hall) Munson, 10-11 October 1834, *BHW*, 2:1287, 1291n, 1292n; and Clifton, *Prairie People*, 233

Chunks' support of Black Hawk, in addition to guiding his band through their country, included the corn they provided to his hungry followers, who had not had a chance to plant any crops that season. As a sign of their desire to remain at peace, the Rock River Ho-Chunks even secured the release of the Hall sisters from Black Hawk's band and returned them to the Americans. While the vast majority of the Ho-Chunks under the leadership of White Crow and Whirling Thunder avoided being drawn into the war, a few warriors of the Rock River bands accompanied Black Hawk's war parties, which dispersed and attacked white settlements, particularly those in the lead mining region to the west. About fifty Rock River Ho-Chunks ultimately took up arms during the Black Hawk War. Some fought with Black Hawk's warriors, while others, like the Potawatomis, fought in war parties that operated independently of those under Black Hawk.[64] In late June 1832, a military force composed of federal soldiers and Illinois militiamen under Atkinson began its march up the Rock River making Black Hawk's position at Lake Koshkonong untenable. Black Hawk decided to retreat westward toward the Mississippi. Five Rock River Ho-Chunks guided his band to the Wisconsin River.[65]

The Wisconsin River Ho-Chunk bands also exhibited their sympathies for Black Hawk,

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[64] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 153; Tronnes, "Corn Moon Migrations," 204, 218-297; Council Held at Porters Grove, 3-4 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:508-512; Minutes of an Examination of Prisoners, 20 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1034-1037; Minutes of an Examination of Prisoners, 27 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1055-1057; Gratiot to Porter, 9 June 1832, M-1, 30:129; E. Brigham to Kinzie, 15 June 1832, M-1, 30:148; Gratiot, Journal, *BHW*, 2:1303. As with the Potawatomis, the actual number of Rock River Ho-Chunks who fought against the United States during the Black Hawk War is an estimate, but the best account comes from a member of Black Hawk's band who put their number at about fifty. See Minutes of an Examination of Prisoners, 19 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1028-1033. For the attacks in the mining district, see Hagan, *Sac and Fox*, 163-164; James Strode to Atkinson, 10 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:566-569; Brigham to Kinzie, 16 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:604-605; Kinzie to Porter, 9 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:974; Stambaugh to Scott, 11 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:988; Street to Atkinson, 13 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:998; Robert Anderson, Memorandum, 27 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1057; Stambaugh to George Boyd, 28 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1074; Council with the Winnebago of the Fort Winnebago Agency, *BHW*, 2:1131-1132; Council with the Rock River Winnebagos, 11 September 1832, *BHW*, 2:1133-1134; Council with the Rock River Winnebagos, 12 September 1832, *BHW*, 2:1135-1136; and Atkinson to Jones, 19 November 1832, *BHW*, 2:1212.

[65] Hagan, *Sac and Fox Indians*, 171-172; Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 153-154; Minutes of an Examination of Prisoners, *BHW*, 2:1035.

although their actions were largely passive. When a Menominee force fighting on the side of the United States descended the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers, the Wisconsin River Ho-Chunks urged them not to fight Black Hawk's followers because "the americans [sic] were enemies of all red-skins."[66] Even Joseph Street, the Indian agent at Prairie du Chien who talked in glowing terms of the fidelity of both the Wisconsin River and Mississippi River Ho-Chunk bands, admitted that Winneshiek, a Ho-Chunk chief from Prairie La Crosse who hailed originally from the Rock River valley, had befriended Black Hawk. Yet, the only act committed by the Wisconsin River or Mississippi River Ho-Chunk bands in support of Black Hawk consisted of at least two of Winneshiek's sons acting as guides for his followers as they made their way to the Mississippi after crossing the Wisconsin River.[67]

While these actions demonstrated a persistent opposition to American settler colonialism among the tribes of the upper Great Lakes and upper Mississippi valley, the participation of Indians alongside the United States illustrated the limited nature of this phenomenon by the 1830s and the intense rivalries that existed between the tribes. Military officers took advantage of these two facts and recruited large numbers of Indians to fight Black Hawk's band during the conflict. During the early weeks of the war, Atkinson, in his capacity as the overall commander of American military forces, called for Indian auxiliaries to act as scouts in late May 1832. By early June 1832, he had 225 Indian scouts at Prairie du Chien, forty of whom were Menominees, at least eighty of whom were Dakotas, and about one hundred of whom were Ho-Chunks of the Mississippi River bands, the same Ho-Chunks who had been the core of the Winnebago Uprising five years earlier. At Chicago, many Potawatomis joined scouting parties led by a local fur

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[66] Quoted in Stambaugh to Scott, 11 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:988 (qtd. 988).
[67] Street to Atkinson, 13 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:998; Council between Atkinson and the Winnebago and Menominee Indians, 6 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:951; Stambaugh to Scott, 13 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:996, 997n; Atkinson to Jones, 19 November 1832, *BHW*, 2:1212; Kinzie to Porter, 26 September 1832, M-1, 31:157.

trader, Jean Baptiste Beaubien. The Dakota, Menominee, and Ho-Chunk warriors who assembled at Prairie du Chien were initially employed in defending the mining region, and small parties went out to find and harass Black Hawk's people. Henry Dodge, the commander of a mounted militia force, had a contingent of these warriors with him as scouts for much of the war. During one small action near the Pecatonica River, Dodge's men killed eleven Sauks. When he allowed his Indian scouts to take the scalps, he noted that, "The Friendly Indians appeared delighted with the scalps [and] they went to the ground where the Indians were killed and cut them literally to pieces."[68] The next major battle of the war came on July 21, 1832 at the Wisconsin River. Commonly called the Battle of Wisconsin Heights, the action involved an encounter between Dodge's battalion and the main body of Black Hawk's band. As they did at the Pecatonica River, the Ho-Chunk warriors who accompanied Dodge scalped the dead, and some of the white volunteers took scalps as well.[69]

More dramatic was the later participation by the Menominees and Dakotas. When Atkinson issued his call for Indian auxiliaries, the Menominees and Dakotas were more than willing to fight their old adversaries. This was particularly true of the Menominees, who were still incensed at the killings of their people at Prairie du Chien the previous year. Even before they received Atkinson's request, Menominee warriors had assembled to protect the Green Bay settlement. The Menominees were eager for the opportunity to join the war, particularly since

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[68] Atkinson to Street, 26 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:445-446; Menominee Indians in United States Service, 4 July 1832, *BHW*, 1:562-563, 563n; Owen to Atkinson, 6 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:534; Street to Atkinson, 6-7 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:535-537; Street to Clark, 7 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:547-548; William Hamilton to Atkinson, 13 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:582; Taylor to Atkinson, 13 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:585-586; Atkinson to Dodge, 8 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:751; quoted in Dodge to Atkinson, 18 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:623-625 (qtd. 623).

[69] Lambert, "The Black Hawk War," 457-466; Patrick J. Jung, *The Battle of Wisconsin Heights, 1832: Thunder on the Wisconsin* (Charleston, S.C.: History Press, 2011), 73-95; Dodge to Atkinson, 14 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:791; Dodge to Atkinson, 18 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:820; Dodge to Atkinson, 19 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:825-826; Dodge to Atkinson, 22 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:842-843.

many of the perpetrators of the Prairie du Chien massacre were with Black Hawk. The Green Bay Indian agent, Samuel Stambaugh, organized 232 Menominee volunteers as a battalion composed of two companies with himself as the battalion commander, local fur traders as junior officers, and tribal war leaders as sergeants.[70]

While these preparations were underway, the commander at Fort Crawford asked the Dakotas under Wabasha to fight Black Hawk's band. They agreed and supplied 150 warriors to intercept Black Hawk's retreating followers. Only a few arrived in time to participate in the final battle of the war, the Battle of Bad Axe, on August 2, 1832 at the confluence of the Bad Axe and Mississippi Rivers. The carnage of the battle was heightened by the fact that an American steamboat armed with a canon fired at Black Hawk's panic-stricken followers they attempted to escape the American troops on the eastern bank of the Mississippi and the Dakotas on the western bank. When the bulk of the Dakotas arrived the next day, the commander at Fort Crawford assigned them the duty of capturing stray members of Black Hawk's band. They were not content to simply capture them alive. A Dakota war party found a camp of Black Hawk's weary followers who had managed to cross the Mississippi at a makeshift camp along the Cedar River in present-day Iowa and attacked them at dawn. The members of Black Hawk's band were too tired and confused to put up a fight, and the Dakotas proceeded to Prairie du Chien after their attack with sixty-eight scalps and twenty-two prisoners. The Menominees also arrived late and

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[70] Street to Atkinson, 13 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:369; Street to Atkinson, 20 May 1832, *BHW*, 2:397; Stambaugh to Porter, 7 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:544-546; Burnett to Street, 5 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:525; Street to Dodge, 4 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:521; Stambaugh to Augustin Grignon, 4 June 1832, Grignon, Lawe, and Porlier Papers, box 7, folder 8, WHS; Boyd to Porter, 13 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:581-582; Stambaugh to Cass, 10 June 1832, *TPUS*, 12:486-487; Grizzly Bear's Talk, 22 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:650; Atkinson to Boyd, 12 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:770-771; Boyd to Porter, 23 July 1832, *WHC*, 12:275-280; Roll of Captain Augustin Grignon's Company of Menominee Warriors, 20 July - 28 August 1832, Henry S. Baird Papers, box 5, folder 4, WHS (hereafter cited as Baird MSS; references are to box and folder numbers); Roll of Captain George Johnston's Company of Menominee Indians, 20 July - 28 August 1832, Baird MSS, 5:4; Boyd to Stambaugh's staff, 24 July 1832, *WHC*, 12:281; Porter to Cass, 17 September 1832, *BHW*, 2:1159-1160; Augustin Grignon, "Augustin Grignon's Recollections," *WHC*, 3:294.

had to settle for rounding up escaped prisoners. Stambaugh gave his companies explicit orders to avoid fighting if possible, but the Menominees were eager to bring vengeance on their enemies. According to one of the officers, the Menominees were "fierce for a fight" when they found a small party of Sauks. The Menominees immediately killed the two Sauk men in the party, and in the melee that followed, a lieutenant of the Menominee battalion took an accidental gunshot to the arm from one of his own men.[71]

In the end, Black Hawk faced an overwhelming force of white militiamen and federal soldiers. He also faced a large number of Native warriors; at least 752 Indians fought alongside the United States during the conflict. Black Hawk only attracted about fifty Potawatomis and fifty Rock River Ho-Chunks to his standard, and they did not stay with him for the duration of the war but instead used the conflict to settle scores with white settlers and miners in their respective localities. The vast majority of Indians in the region remained neutral and flocked to local Indian agencies and army posts to avoid the conflict. Although their numbers are difficult to determine, it was in the thousands.[72] Even when Black Hawk and the Winnebago Prophet

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[71] Gustavus Loomis to Atkinson, 31 July 1832, *BHW*, 2:907; Street to Clark, 2 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:917; Atkinson to Scott, 9 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:964-966; Taylor to Atkinson, 5 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:942-943; Minutes of an Examination of Prisoners, 19 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1030; Macomb to Cass, November 1832, in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1832*, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1832, Ho. Doc. 2 (Serial 233), 60; [Henry Smith], "Indian Campaign of 1832," *Military and Naval Magazine of the United States* 1 (August 1833): 331; Scott to Cass, 10 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:980; Street to Scott, 22 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1042; Street to Atkinson, 13 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:999; Stambaugh to Boyd, 28 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:1071-1073; quoted in Grignon, "Recollections," *WHC*, 3:294-295 (qtd. 295).

[72] The Indians who fought on the side of the United States included the 225 Menominee, Santee Dakota, and Ho-Chunk scouts at Prairie du Chien. However, there were many other Indians who acted as scouts during the war whose numbers were not accurately recorded. See Street to Clark, 7 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:547-548; and Menominee Indians in United States Service, 4 July 1832, *BHW*, 1:562-563, 563n. For the fifty Potawatomi scouts at Chicago under Jean Baptiste Beaubien, see Owen to Atkinson, 6 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:534. For the ninety-five Potawatomi scouts with Atkinson, see Potawatomi Indians in United States Service, 22 June - 22 July 1832, *BHW*, 1:560-562. For the 232 Menominee auxiliaries, see Roll of Grignon's Company of Menominee Warriors, 20 July - 28 August 1832, Baird MSS, 5:4; and Roll of Johnston's Company of Menominee Indians, 20 July - 28 August 1832, Baird MSS, 5:4. For the 150 Santee Dakotas under Wabasha, see Street to Clark, 2 August 1832, *BHW*, 2:917. The estimates for the Indians who fought with Black Hawk's band are provided in notes 63 and 64. For the Indians who remained neutral, see Steven Mason to Cass, 9 June 1832, M-234, 421:45-46; Kinzie to Porter, 11 June 1832, M-234, 421:55-56; Cass to Clark, 19 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:630; Cass to George Gibson, 19 June 1832, *BHW*, 2:631;

tried to escape to their Ojibwa allies after the Battle of Bad Axe, Black Hawk's humiliation did not end, for both men were captured near Prairie La Crosse by a Ho-Chunk warrior of the Mississippi River bands named Chaasjan-ga, who delivered them to Fort Crawford.[73]

Black Hawk died among his people six years later. He had no desire to fight the United States anymore and even went out of his way to make visiting Americans feel welcome in his home during his final years.[74] He was an old warrior who realized he could no longer hold back the tide of white settlement as Tecumseh had sought to do twenty years earlier. Anti-Americanism did not die after the Black Hawk War, but in the western Great Lakes and upper Mississippi valley, the members of Indian communities who possessed such attitudes no longer resorted to warfare as means of resistance. Intertribal warfare, on the other hand, did not die out until the press of white settlement put indissoluble barriers between the tribes. Thus, the Black Hawk War stands as the culmination of two phenomena that had existed in the region for many years before Black Hawk's birth. Any understanding of the war he led against the United States must take both into account if we are to understand the causes of the war and the course the Black Hawk War followed.

Kinzie to Porter, 2 July 1832, M-1, 31:20; Porter to Cass, 13 July 1832, M-234, 421:79; Clark to Gibson, 16 July 1832, Clark MSS, 4:389; William Marshall to Cass, 26 July 1832, M-1, 31:75; Owen to Porter, 29 July 1832, M-1, 31:60; Joshua Pilcher to Clark, 18 September 1832, M-234, 728: Tanner, *Atlas*, 152.

[73] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 160-63; Lurie, "In Search of Chaetar," 163-183.

[74] Black Hawk, *Autobiography*, 180-181.

Tenskwatawa, or the Shawnee Prophet, the brother and confident of Tecumseh. The two Shawnee brothers led a nativist movement after 1805 that culminated with members of the various Great Lakes tribes allying with the British during the War of 1812. From Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall, *History of the Indian Tribes of North America*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Edward C. Biddle, 1836).

Sketch of Wabokieshiek, or the Winnebago Prophet, an advisor to Black Hawk. From George Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Condition of the North American Indians*, vol. 2 (London: Tosswill and Meyers, 1841).

Lewis Cass, governor of Michigan Territory from 1813 to 1831 and secretary of war from 1831 to 1836. Cass served as secretary of war during the period of the Black Hawk War and was a major figure in American Indian policy during the first half of the nineteenth century. Library of Congress, LC-DIG-pga-02529.



John Reynolds, governor of Illinois during the Black Hawk War. From John Reynolds, *The Pioneer History of Illinois* (Chicago: Fergus Printing, 1887).

Lithograph of Shabonna, a Potawatomi leader of Odawa ancestry who assisted the United States during the Black Hawk War. From Perry A. Armstrong, *The Sauks and the Black Hawk War* (Springfield, Ill.: H. W. Rokker, 1887).